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lfp/ss lee 3/28/72 
No. 71-452 HEALY v. JAMES 
Argued 3/28/72 
Tentative Impressions* 
This case involves effort of SDS to be recognized as an "official 
campus" organization at Central Connecticut state College (the College). 
The issue in this case is not whether the Court thinks the 
decision of the College in denying SDS official status was wise; rather, 
whether this denial deprived the students in question of First Amendment 
constitutional rights. As little as I think of SDS, the wiser ,course, 
in my judgment, would have been to allow the group to become an 
official campus organization, and then expell it if its conduct so 
justified. Of course, expulsion or even suspension would no doubt 
involve litigation with insistence upon due process rights. Nevertheless, 
I would have thought that less harm might have resulted from that 
procedure. 
* * * * * 
Facts: 
In September 1969 - a year of college turmoil - several students 
applied to the College for "official recognition" of "a local chapter of 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon fallowing argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the 
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion 
at the Conference. 
- 2. 
students for Democratic Society". Official recognition - according to 
petitioner's brief and oral argument - would allow "use of the College 
bulletin boards and newspaper for notices"; "use of campus buildings 
for meetings"; access to "funds from student governmenf'(Appendix 95) 
and the "status" of being an officially approved campus organization. 
The procedure required consideration by a!'student affairs 
committee", which - by split vote - approved the application. 
President James, however, denied the application, and this litigation 
resulted. 
The district judge ( Judge Claire) handled the case with great 
care (see his first memorandum opinion p. 50a of petition for writ) -
in which he ordered an administrative hearing by the College. A 
full hearing was held, after due notice. Counsel for SDS was present 
and participated. Although he deliberately declined to put on any 
witnesses, he testified and argued - quite objectionably - himself. 
Following the hearing, the President reaffirmed his negative decision. 
returned 
Petitioner~ .ati:wxt1 to the federal district court, and Judge 
Claire sustained the College President (p. 40a et seq. of petition for 
writ.) 
Judge Claire stated, at the outset of his opinion, that he had 
ordered the evidentiary hearing for the purpose of ascertaining: 
- 3. "whether or not the proposed groups had among its aims and purposes 
the philosophy of violent activism. " 
He noted that prior to the hearing the group had offered to change 
its name to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut 
State College", and disclaimed connection with the "existing national 
organization" of SDS. 
found: 
WUh respect to the attitude of the SDS group, the district court 
"Rep:resentatives of the group were asked how they would 
respond to issues of violence as compared to the action 
taken by other SDS chapters, where violence had in fact 
erupted on college campuses. Their response was 
significantly evasive and obtuse; it was consistent with 
and typical of a generally recognized pattern of respons(; 
by those who are known to foster subversion and violent 
conduct. They stated 'our action would have to depend 
on each issue'. When pressed on the means of action 
to be used the response again was in similar vein. When 
specifically asked whether they could foresee the 
organization's activities interrupting a college classroom 
activity, their response was that it was impossible to 
say. " 
As to the connection between the local group and the national 
organization, the evidence was equally unresponsive and vague: 
" ... , the question was asked as to the meaning of the 
term_'local chapter, ' as it related to the national 
alliance. The response was that there was no such 
thing as an SDS national and the members wanted to 
keep a loose arrangement, so as to pick ideas from 
several of the fractioned groups; furthermore, the 
concept of SDS exists in the minds of those who run 
it. II (p. 44a). * 
*This quotation comes from the judge's opinion describing what happened in 
Oct. 1969 when the initial committee was considering the request. 
- Basic Finding as to Purpose of the Proposed Organization: 
The district judge found: 
"The evidence clearly and unequivocally discloses 
that the philosophy and purposes of the national organiza-
tion advocate violent overthrow of existing government 
institutions, through the medium of disruptive anarchistic 
force. The College President responsibly concluded that 
'recognition of such a group would be contrary to the 
orderly purpose of change and would be contrary to the 
philosophy and lawful mission of this College. ' This 
Court finds that his decision was validly arrived at and 
violated no constitutional rights of the plaintiffs under 
the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal 
constitution. " (pp. 48a-49a) 
4. 
The district court emphasized that what the petitioners desired 
was a privileged status that imposed responsibilities: 
''What is denied to this plaintiff-group is the 
privileged position of acting from within the college 
structure, as an officially approved campus organiza-
tion. The historical record of their application dis-
closes that the plaintiffs have not met their burden of 
complying with the college standards established by 
the declaration of rights, freedoms and responsibilities 
of students adopted and approved by the school 
administration. Until they do so conform, they have 
no constitutional or other right to have the administrative 
seal of official college respectability conferred upon 
them under the theory of constitutional equal protection." 
(p. 47a) 
- 5. 
My Tentative View: 
Although I expect to talk further with Larry and to make a final 
judgment on this close case at the Conference, I am inclined to affirm. 
There are conflicting interests here which must be balanced -
as is so often the case. The First Amendment rights of petitioners -
of all college students - are well known. The rights and responsibilities 
of a college administration have been more or less subordinated in 
recent years, but it is essential to the preservation of meaningful 
education at our colleges and universities that presidents and boards 
of trustees have authority to prescribe and enforce reasonable rules 
and regulations. 
It is reasonable for a college to have rules and regulations 
with respect to organizations accorded "official status". Facilities 
are limited for campus organizations. The conferring of official 
status carries with it a certain indicia of approval. It also affords 
to such an organization an opportunity - if it proves to be disruptive 
and lawless - to do greater injury to the college than would be pos-
sible by an organization not enjoying official status. An outside group 
would not be entitled to due process if it were expelled or denied 
access 
XKRKB to buildings. Such a group would have far less opportunity -
- 6. I would think - to be disruptive and discordant. 
The history of SDS suggests that at least some (perhaps many) 
of its chapters have brought violence and disorder to the campus; rather 
than contribute to academic freedom, they have denied it to others; 
they have refused to tolerate speakers with whom they disagreed 
(Prof. Archie Cox at Harvard had occasion a few months ago to 
characterize this type of anti-intellectualism - indeed fascist 
conduct - which someof the radical organizations have sought to 
perpetrate on the campus. 
In this particular case, the petitioning group took an arrogant 
attitude - making no commitment whatever not to engage in violence 
or lawless conduct. Indeed, in effect its counsel reserved the right 
to judge each situation as it arose. 
~n oral argumen~ Mr. Wulf said that the College authorities 
had no right to inquire as to the purposes of an organization; that 
the prospective organization could simply respond that such an inquiry 
was irrelevant. (Mr. Wulf was ambivalent in some of his answers, 
and also contradictory. I believe, however, that this is a fair summary 
of his basic position. ) He further acknowledged that under his concept 
of First Amendment rights, a college could not exclude the Ku Klux 
Klan, a fascist organization or any other organization which characterizes 
- 7. itself as "political". He stated that no one had a right to determine 
whether an organization is or is not "political", escept the organization 
itself. 
These students were not deprived of any right of free speech 
individually; nor were they deprived of the right to organize an SDS 
chapter off campus; nor were they deprived of the right to bring SDS 
speakers to the campus. The denial of their rights, if any, was 
minimal and must be balanced against the right of a university to 
adopt and enforce reasonable rules and regulations with respect to 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS March 31, 1972 
Dear Chief': 
As I said in Conf'erence, 
I suggest that No. 71-452 - Healy v. 
James, be assigned to Lewis. 
LQ\)\J 
William o. Douglas 
The Chief Justice 
CC: The Conference 
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I thought you might find this article interesting. Two 
points are of particular interest. (1) The SOS seems to have 
lost some of its violent tinge. (2) The leadership, as your 
memo in Healy indicated, is incredibly bigoted in its view of 
the First Amendment rights of others. Note that one of the 
proposals is to ban certain medical texts which they find 
have racist themes and to organize a campaign to shout down 
certain speakers who espouse what they find to be racist 
views. This is the narrow-mindedness to which Archibald Cox 
must have been referring. 
LAH 
11111" 
.. . ...... 
THE'"NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1972 
S. D. S. in Milder Mood at Convention Against Racism 
By ROBERT REINHOLD sure it did not take long for white students, many of them to determine if whites are the Revolutionary Communist 
spectalto'I1heNewYork'l1lmes them t9 realize it." short-haired and neatly dressed. generally more intelligent than Youth, a dissident Trotskyite 
CAMBRIDGE, Mass., April 2 In fact, the militant Progres- There were also many working blacks. group affiliated with the Spar-
-Three years after it led stu- sive Labor-oriented majority people and blacks, although These names hung in the air tacist League, declared that 
dent rebellions that convu1sed found itself under attack here S.D.S.'s opposition to black na- as the convention opened Students for a Democratic So-
scores of American universities, from a vocal minority who ac- tionalism still separates it from Thursday in the vast wood- ciety was retreating from "the 
students for a Democratic so- cused them of taking a "right- the black left. paneled Ames Courtroom at struggle over slippery mats and 
ciety is still very much alive ward plunge" and retreating to The participants attended the Harvard Law School. scalding pots in the cafeteria 
but not so well as it once was. old campus issues. dozens of strategy workshops Draped on -the walls we.re ban- to the safety of armchair aca-
. . With lingering memonies of . ners declaring "Ban Racist Text d • l'b 1• ,, It 1s still strong enough to on such topics as "The Govern- B k " "W k f th w Id emic 1 era ism. 
have attracted more than 1 000 the S.D.S.-led st~ke .that para- ment Plans and Pushes Racism,'' u0?t d" ~r .~~s to h s~ if "!f Sh~c~ley, ~errnStein and 
. ' . lyzed the uruvers1ty three "A r R . t T hi ., "ff h ~1 e •. an a c ,, oc ey their wntmg disappeared off 
young people to Cambridge this springs ago, Harvard was a re- n 1- ac1s . ~ac,, ~f' . ig Y,1th his G_ene~ Dow_n. Punch- the face of the earth,'' the pa-
weekend for a "national con- luctant host. Nervous deans School Organizm~, .. ~e Figh; mg the air like high school per said, "the same number of 
vention against racism " the made emergency plans and the to st0P Lot>?tomieS, Wor~e cheerlea~ers, members of the black infants would be bitten 
. . . ' l'b h d Student Alliance and Strike Progressive Labor party sought b f 
first national gathenng of the 1 rary was s ut own early. S PP rt" and "Smash Military t h' . ·t ·th h by rats, the same num er o 
revolutionary organization since Plainclothes policemen peered Ru ci ~ .. t~u: .1P u~ srm ~~ ~UC black families would be on wel-
it was splintered at its tumultu- a! the young people through a .. ;acist ideology" was the . m..!Jnf ~ ;i ~. as an ac- fare, the same number of black 
ous Chicago convention in binoculars from p11rke~ ~ars chief focus of the convention is , 
0 
· · · . youths wouldAi~ of overdoses." 
June, 1969. and from the darkened ms1des and the main targets were a A Tremendous Rebirth' Another cntic1sm came from 
S.D.~. has change~ a great of New England Telephone group of scholars who the The meeting heard Martie !ames F. Henry, a Harvard sen-
deal smce then, havmg fallen ~ompany_ trucks, but. an Amer- radicals say provide the intel- Riefe declare that the last three IOr, not an S.D.S. member, 
under t~e hegemony of the ican Legion convention would lectual underpinnings for "ra- months had witnessed "a tre- y,ho told the forum on rac-
Progress1ve Labor party, a doc- pr?bably have been more cist oppression" in the United mendous rebirth in the student ism ~hat S~udents for a Dem-
~inaire, tightly disciplined fac- b01ster?us. . States. Heading the list was movement and s.D.S." The ocratic ~oc1ety too~ Professor 
t10~ _that h8:s sought to for?,e a Martie R1efe, ~ 22-year-ol_d Richard J. Herrnstein, a Har- group is attacking not only op- Herrnstem mor~ sE;~101;1sly than 
politica!_ allian<;e between op- student. from Chicago who 1s vard psychologist who has pression, she said, but also "the anybody else did. It 1s ~nnec-
pressed workmg people and tho!! national secretary of ~tu- argued that intelligence is ideological basis that supports es~ary to exa~erate claims to 
students. dents for a Democratic Society, largely genetic and that society it." build a wo:king class move-
A Gentler Mood Discerned had declai:ed ear:lier, "We're. in- might evolve into different The reason racism is being mE;~t,'' h~ sai~. . 
. tere_sted u~ building ~ fight strata with differing levels of made such an issue, said a Har- . I don t _think burning books 
In four. days o~ mee~ings agamst racism, not havmg any abilit vard law student who is a long- 1s a sol1;1tto'.1 -:; these. people 
here the_ a1r ran.? wuth str1?en,~ IDnd of oonfrontation at Har- ;· time s.D.S. member, is that ~re t?talitar1an," ~e said later 
exho~11:tions to s~as~ ra,~ilSm vard." Pigeons Weather Storm "the main force in the United m an _mterv1ew. Its bad . . 
and fight for socialism. Yet And true to her promise, the Because Professor Herrn- States for dividing the working Marxis~ to say J:IerrnStem is 
to many, the m~od seemed members shuffled purposefully stein's laboratory, filled with class is racism." r~spo;1;1s1ble for attitudes on ra-
more gentle than m the P8:St. from . workshop to workshop, valuable pigeons specially bred He said in an interview that cism. . . 
In a departure from the policy sold literature and renewed old for experiments, was only a .racist appeals to working peo- One sub)ect ~hat got very lit-
f?llowed alt: the 1969 co~v~n- friendships. "We're not bomb- few hundred feet from the con- pie, such as the appeals of tie attention . m al~ the t~lk 
tion, a subs_tantlal maJo:1ty, ers-this is not the Weather- vention hall, there was fear of Governor George C. Wallace of was Communist Chi?a, which 
voted to a~1t the "establis~- men," said Gregory Minshall, a destructive sit-in. But the Alabama, were beingused to has become something of an 
ment. press . to Thursday s a tall, clean-cut Californian with pigeons evidently spent an un- divide blacks and whites who e!Ilbarrassment to the revolu-
openmg session, although re- clos~-cropped reddish hair, re- eventful weekend. Alabama, were being used to tionary left. ~nee the hero of 
porters were excluded from ferrmg to the violent faction Also under attack were gether in revolution by their the Progressive Labor party, 
many subsequent workshops. that spLit away at the Chicago Arthur R. Jensen of Berkeley, class. Mao Tse:tung has been d~-
".T~ere does ~eem to,, be . a convention. author of an article suggesting Much of the discussion cen- nounce? smce he greeted Presi• 
·•definnte change m tone, said Dozens of Wo ksh that black children performed tered on ways of stifling the dent Nixon. 
~ faculty observ~r of the rad- . . r ops poorly in school because of in- Herrnstein and Shockley ideas. -----.-. -.--. 
1cal le~t, who ~8:~d he thought Carrymg sleepmg bags, the herited mental deficiencies; Ed- There was talk of mounting Ceausescu V1s1ting Cairo 
a tactical dec1s1on _had been young people c~me from all ward Banfield, author of "The campaigns to ban their works CAIRO, April 2 (AP)-Presi-
mad~ . to reach left-liberal and parts of the Umted States, as Unheavenly City," and William in colleges, to have them dis- dent Nicolae Ceausescu of Ru• 
apolitical students. "As of last w_ell as from Canada and Puerto Shockley, Nobel-prize winning missed and to shout them down mania, who is winding up a 
October, stut1ent support for Rico. For the most part, they inventor of the transistor who at lectures. tour of Africa arrived today for 
S.D.S. was just pitiful-I'm appeared to be middle-class has been urging a major 'study But a position paper by a five-day vi;it. 
:!Lan awner maintains ancl services his vehide in accorclonc.e with the Volkswagen mointenonce schedule any factory port found to be defective in moteriol or work •-••••-•:--1.1 , .. a01r:am1tniLI w.arir_t1nd_taar_~n..J.ANic.a it.ams.I : wil1-ba reooir.ed or raolaced bv onv U.S. or Canadian Volkswa.cen Dealer. And thi- · 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT 
~------.______. 
l~ C C ! : I ·,/ .:.:.: D 
ROBERT K. KILLIAN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
APr. r., I I I t_ 19?2 ~ 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
30 TRINITY STREET 
HARTFORD 
I~)~--~::;_.-·-r,;_::~, :'.'<•_·,;_,: / 
------ --~~ ~ - -~ -.._ .. -~ 
April 3, 1972 
Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr. 
Clerk, United States Supreme Court 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Re: Healy vs. James 
O. T. 1971 
No . 452 
Dear Mr. Rodak: 
At oral argument of the above case on March 28, 1972, 
Chief Justice Burger requested that I supply copies of the 
enclosed exhibit for the use of the Court in view of the 
fact that said exhibit was spread across three pages of the 
single appendix and consequently lost the effectiveness 
intended by the res pondents. Accordingly, I am enclosing 
herewith ten copies of "Hearing Officer Exhibit G" for the 
use of the Court. 
With kind personal regards, 
FMA:R 
cc: Melvin L. Wulf, Esq. 
Very truly yours, ~ 
ROBERT K. KILLIAN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By :~ \ ~ ( t~ \\u., ~ l\itc,,t, 
F. Michael Ahern 
Assistant Attorney General 
-.., lllJ 
.. 
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.iu:in-mtt <!Jcu.d cf t4t ~ ni:ttlt .itattG 
~itlllpng~ 11}. QJ. 2Llffe'!.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
April 5 , 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: No. 71-452 - - Healy v. James 
After reviewing the record and the briefs again since the Con-
ference, it occurred to me that the underlying problem in this case is 
the failure of the college to establish really clear and adequate stan-
<lards for the recognition or non-recognition of campus organizations 
and standards £or the decision making. I analogize this situation as 
somewhat like an application to F . C. C. or F. P. C. We do not allow 
them to say simply '"Granted" or "Denied, 11 even apart from the 
A. P.A. I agree that it would be improper to deny recognition to an 
otherwise legitimate organization on the mere suspicion that because 
it used the name 11S . D.S." it might engage in disruptive activities at 
some future time. It appears that this may be what the college presi-
dent has done .in this case. 
-
-2-
Nothing in the skel etal policy standards 0£ the college as to 
s t udent conduct instructs what standard the president is to use, thus 
leaving him an unfettered discretion. On the other hand, I know 0£ 
no First Amendment principle requiring a state university to place its 
imprimatur on an organization whose policy it is to engage in violence 
on campus. The First Amendment does not protect such conduct. I£ 
it were entirely clear that petitioners I group had been denied recogni-
tion o n t h e basis 0£ a well founded £ear 0£ violence, I would have no 
hesitation in voting to affirm. But on this record I £ind it somewhat 
difficult to be sure what standards guided the college president in his 
decision or what he relied on. I can guess that Page 95 0£ the Appendix 
loomed large, but neither we nor the student group should be left in 
the dark. If the conduct 0£ the arrogant lawyer was a £actor - - as it 
could well have been -- should the college be permitted to penalize the 
students £or the misconduct 0£ their advocate? 
For these reasons I £eel that this is an inappropriate case £or 
deciding major First Amendment questions. I would recommend a 
remand; since my notions are only tentative, I wiH not review the £acts. 
We took this case to determine whether the district court erred 
in refusing to order the administration 0£ a state college to give official 
recognition to petitioners' student political organization. This college, 
like most, has been confronted in recent years with demands from 
... -
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student groups occasionally leading to irreconcilable conflicts. There 
was a time when the relations between students and administrators 
were generally amicable and problems were solved by ad hoc negotia-
tions. To the extent that students and administrators now deal with 
each other at arms length, the need for regularized procedures and 
articulated standards are obvious . Recent experience teaches that re-
lations between students and administrators, not unlike those between 
labor and management, are inevitably smoother if standards exist to 
guide both. 
Few things are greater irritants than unilateral , ad hoc decisions 
that cannot be related to known standards . The absence of such stan-
<lards permits, or at least gives the appearance of permitting, a college 
decision on the basis of subjective and perhaps even impermissible con-
siderations . There can no longer be serious doubt that a public facility 
must accord-equal treatment to its constituents, and a state-sponsored, 
tax-supported educational institution is no exception. To be sure that 
the decisional processes in administering such an institution are in 
fact even-handed and are seen to be e v en- handed, guidelines should be 
specific, known to all , applied with uniformity and articulated with some 
clarity. 
Here the c ollege had some, but not fully articulated, guidelines 
telling students what would be required of groups seeking to use college 
• -
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facilities, what was unacceptable, or on what basis the college would 
decide. The college I s "Statement on Rights, Freedoms and Responsi-
bilities, 11 adopted by the faculty on May 19, 1969, does establish pro-
cedural prerequisites for official recognition of student organizations: 
''Student organizations shall submit a clear statement 
of purpose, criteria for membership, rules of pro-
cedures and a list of officers as a condition of institutional 
recognition. They shall not be required to submit a 
membership list as a condition of institutional recognition. 11 
Pt. V, B. 
The Statement on Rights also contains a general statement on appropriate 
student behavior which has been deemed relevant to the recognition of 
student organizations: 
11 , :0 :,,:" :' Students do not have the right to deprive others 
of the opportunity to speak or be heard, to invade 
the privacy of others, to damage the property of 
others, to disrupt the regular and essential opera-
tion of the college, or to interfere with the rights 
ofothers. 11 Pt. V, E. 
More important, the college apparently has no guidelines for the man-
ner in which these general principles are to be applied by the college 
to student groups seeking official recognition. Rather, the college 
president appears to have virtually unbridled discretion to determine if 
an organization actually or potentially poses a threat to these basic 
student rights or is objectionable for other reasons. 
The district judge recognized problems in this procedural scheme 
and ordered a full hearing at the college level, but he did not go far 
• -
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enough. His order outlined procedures and areas of fact ual inquiry; 
even on the remand for a de novo administrative hearing, however, the 
students and hearing officer were without adequate guidelines as to what 
had to be proved or how it would be judged. 
Petitioners have asked the federal courts to intervene in this 
dispute and exercise extraordinary, equitable powers. The exercise of 
equitable jurisdiction has traditionally been characterized by flexibility, 
and the courts should refrain from ordering injunctive relief where there 
are means, as yet unused, at the disposal of the parties to resolve the 
conflict. I would therefore remand the cause to the Court of Appeals 
with directions that judgment be entered in the district court requiring 
(a) that Central Connecticut State College establish and promulgate more 
adequate standards for the accreditation of student groups entitled to 
use student facilities; (b) that the college conduct a further administrative 
hearing on the application of petitioners pursuant to those standards; 
(c) that if petitioners I application is rejected, the college president or 
other final-decision maker supply a clear statement of reasons for that 
decision; and (d) that the district court retain jurisdiction to review the 
results of the achninistrative hearing on the application of either party. 
This is all very hasty and tentative but, in general, it expresses my 







Res Healy v. James, No. 71-452 
Judges 
Attached is a memo from the CJ expressing the view that 
in the SDS case, rather than deciding the case under the 
First Amendment, the Court should remand the case to the DC 
ordering it to instruct the college to promulgate more precise 
standards to govern accreditation. He would treat this case 
as a due process case, analogizing to administrative pro-
ceedings before federal agencies, and require (1) clear 
standards, (2) an appropriate administrative hearing, and 
(3) a statement of reasons from the President explaining his 
decision. First, I think there may be some merit in the 
CJ's due process thesis, I would be glad to find a way to 
accommodate those views and gain his vote in the majority. 
While we may be able to agree with him in part, in the main 
his views appear to have too many difficulties to be acceptable. 
I will outline the roadblocks which occur to me at first 
blush. 
(1) As I have stated, the central thesis of the CJ's 
memo is the need for "standards." But, standards--in any 
sense other than Constitutional standards--has never been an 
issue in this litigation. In the first USDC opinion, Judge 
Clairie stated: 
"The petitioners are not challenging the consti-
tutionality of the standards established for the recognition 
of campus organizations and thus that question is not before 
the Court. The plaintiffs do claim that their application 
for recognition does conform with the established standards 
and the defendant James' action in going outside that appli" 
cation and arbitrarily attributing to them aims and purposes 





form of a hearing was in itself a constitutional denial of 
due process. 
, There is nothing in the stated purposes of the petitioners ( 
,n the application itself which can be said to be inconsistent 
with the standards for recognition set by the college. In 
fact, President James in his memorandum denying recognition, 
presents no claim to the contrary •••• " (App. to cert petn 
at 562) 
Judge ~irie then goes on to discuss the mandate of 
due process in matters of the constitutional rights of college 
students. He states that due process requires both.._ 
"standards" and procedures to determine whether particular 
groups meet that standard, 
"No student group is entitled, per se, to official 
college recognition. Rather, once a college allows student 
groups to organize and grants these groups recognition, 
with the attendant atvantages, constitutional safeguards 
must operate in favor of all groups which apply. This re-
quires standards for recognition and the fair application 
of these standards. It is the procedural application of the 
existing college standards that is in issue here." (App. to 
cert petn at 61a) 
After the hearing called for by the DC, the case returned 
to that court a second time. This time the DC looked at the 
record of the hearing and concluded that the still unchallenged 
standards had not been complied with: 
"The historical record of their application discloses 
that the plaintiffs have not met their _burden of complying 
with the college standards established by the declaration of 
rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students adopted 
and approved by the school administration." (App to cert 
petn at 47a) 
Finally, the CA2 opinion makes the basis of the lower court 
ruling clear. In discussing the factual history of the case, 





"(The DC) summarized the claims of the parties, noting 
that plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality 
of the standards established by the college for determining 
whether campus organizations are to be recognized, but that they 
did claim a denial of procedural due process ••• " (App 
to cert petn 7a) 
Later in the opinion, the CA again says that "the essence 
of Judge Clarie's decision of October 29 was that plaintiffs had 
not met their burden of complying with the standard estab-
lished by the college's 'Statement on Rights, Freedoms and 
Responsibilities of Students.'" (P. 18a) Again, at another 
point, the CA refers to "the concededly valid college policy 
governing the constitutional rights, freedoms and responsibilities 
of students at CCSC." 
These excerpts from the lower court opinions persuade ) 
me that there was never a question raised heretofore as to 
whether the college had an adequate set of standards. 
(2) The "standards" referred to b!Ythe lower courts are 
contained in Part V of the "Statement on Rights, Freedoms and 
Responsibilities of Students," reprinted in the appendix to 
the CA2 opinion (app to cert petn at 29a-30a). Five sub-
sections deal with the standards for approval of college 
organizations a 
(A) General statement that care must be exercised 
in establishing and organizing campus groups "so that the 
basic rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students 
will be preserved" 
(B) This section se~s forth the procedural requirementss 
"clear statement of purpose, criteria of membership, 
rules of procedures and a list of officers"; no member-











(C) Membership is limited to matriculated students; 
"Membership shall not be restricted by race, religion 
or nationality," and important to this case, "The 
members shall have sole power to determine organization 
policy consistent with the regulations of the college." 
(D) Each organization may choose its own adviser and 
the adviser "shall advise but not control the organization 
and its policies." 
(E) "College students and student organilzations shall 
have the right to examine and discuss all questions of 
interest to them, to express opinion publicly and pri-
~ 
vately, and to support c•ausesby orderly means. They 
\.., 
may organize public demonstrations and protest gatherings 
and utilize the right to petition, Students do not have 
the right to deprive others of the opportunity to 
speak or be heard, to invade the privacy of others, 
to damage property of others, to disrupt the regular 
and essential operation of the college, or to interfere 
with the rights of others," 
These five broad standards were the ones referred to by 
the lower courts. I do not think that they are inadequate --and I think they clearly cover the case at hand. It is clear -from the President's letters and from the three lower court 
opinions, that the reason why recognition was denied was that 
the organization would not clearly and unequivocally disavow 
a philosoply of activism--because they indicated that they 
might advocate, at some time under some undetermined set of 






(3) The CJ contends that the President's rejection 
letters are not sufficiently clear to satisfy the require-
ments of student due process, he urges the Court to impose a 
statement-of-reasons rule. Again, I disagree. The Presi-
dent made sufficiently clear what the crux of his decision was. 
'--- -- - -- - -
It was the expression of a philosoply antithetical to the -- ---- -
school's policies which motivated his decision. And, it is 
precisely that basis for his decision which renders it con-
stitutionally untenable. The provisions of the standards 
that (1) members "shall have the sole power to determine 
organization policy," and (2) that student organizations 
may discuss and express opinions on "all questions of inter-
est" are, essentially, the embodiment of what I apprehend to 
' \ 
be the const• tutional standard. The school may not refuse to 
extend recognition to particular organizations because of the 
philosophy it advocates. It may, however, as the CJ 
correctly points out, prohibit "conduct" which intt:er-
feres with the legitimate policies of the school. 
(4) I would resist turning this case into a due process 
case at this point. I am satisfied that these plaintiffs 
received all the process that was due any group. They 
were accorded a hearing and two statements of rejection. 
We have discussed the difficulties of the due process 
rationale as it applies to the rights of college students. 
As you ~ntimated, it may well be that at some future point 
the due process rights of college organizations will present 
to this court the most difficult of questions, Le~_ what 
action of the administration must precede the revocation of 





This is a question which the court need not and, in my view, 
should not reach until it is presented with that case. I 
think the administration and the lower courts would be 
dismayed to receive a mandate from this Court telling them 
that desp~te all they have done they have not as yet accorded 
-due process to this applic~ ant organization. 
RECOMMENDATION 
As I indicated at the outset, I think in the main the 
majority opinion cannot accommodate the CJ's view of the 
case. It might be worth considering, however, the possibility 
that a remand rather than a reversal is in order. The Court 
should state the Constitutional standard, and while it appears 
that the SOS chapter has measured up to that standard, it might 
be appropriate to remand to the DC with an order that it is 
to tell the President to reconsider the application in light 
of the requirement that the mere advocacy of an abhorrent 
philosophy is not sufficient grounds for rejection of recDg-
---....... 
nition. There will need to be language in the opinion we 
write indicating where the line between mere advocacy and 
action may be drawn. We will have to think through the 
doctrin~in the area and decide whether it is some vari~ t of 
the "clear and present danger" test or whether something more 
akin to the Tinker standard (interference with substantial 
and material functions of the school) is appropriate. On 
this score, at least at present, I find Torn Emerson's 
approach to the First Amendment persuasive (the view 
approved by CA Wright) and I will endeavor to spell out that 






For the present, I think the burden probably falls to 
you as the assignee of the majority opinion to respond to 
the CJ's suggestion. I think you should indicate that, 
subject, of course, to closer scrutiny as preparation of the 
opinion progresses, your initial view is that the due process 
aspects of this case are no longer in an appropriate state 
for reconsideration. You should state that you see no 
persuasive basis for avoiding the First Amendment issue, 
especially when the tact of avoidance gets the Court into 
another even more uncharted sea. 








Re: Healy v. James, No. 71-452 OT 1971 
Judge: 
Attached is a recent opinion by Judge Wisdom, which I 
mentioned to you in the course of our discussion today. 
In reflecting on your tentative notes and on our dis-
cussion, I come to the conclusion that we are not far apart 
,_.-.- -- .... 
in our views. We agree, I believe, that at the core the concern -is primarily to maintain an atmosphere on college campuses in 
which the educative process can go forward: you refer to an 
air of "civility"--! think that characterization appropriate. 
We agree also, I believe, that college administrations may not 
deny recognition to organizations merely because they 
advocate a philosophy incompatible with the philosophy of 
accommodation and mutual respect necessary to maintain a 
educational institution. If all SDS did was blow hot air, 
advocating a philosophy that they would never put to action, 
I think you would defend their right of speech to express 
that view •. The problem is that we have a history in this 
country of similar organizations doing much more than 
advocating violence in a vacuum. Indeed, education has been 
terminated completely at some institutions. Experience 
and impatient 
dictates that advocacy among impressionable/students may 
contribute directly to action. Your conclusion, as I read 
your statements, is that the college ought not have to wait 
until the match ignites the administration building before 
action may be taken. 
I would be quite willing to go along with any opinion 
which, somehow, accomplishes the result of guaranteeing free-





in such a manner as to make clear that it is not the 
distaste for the theory advocated which underlies the decision, 
but that the crux of the decision is the "likelihood," or 
"probability," or "potentiality" of action or conduct 
antithetical to the legitimate functioning of the school. 
I think, for instance, that it would be permissible for 
a school to ascertain whether a particular group seeking 
recognition planned to engage in such prohibitable conduct. 
In the case--like the instant one--where the administration 
has no history of prior conduct by which to judge these 
individuals making up the orgnaization, I think the college 
can do no more than require that the organization accept the 
c.,) 
basic rules of the college environment. In this case we have 
A 
the positive statement that CCSC-SDS approves of the Student 
{•\ 
Bill of Rights and the acceptable statement of purposes of the 
JI 
organization. On the other side
1 
we have only the statement 
that the organization cou1cf•tay whether they could envision 
~ 
any case in which it might disrupt classes, coupled with a 
SDS 
history of other/organizations causing disruption. I would 
conclude that this recognition issue is a matter of prior 
restraint on associational rights and that the burden to 
justify is on the school. In this case, the burden has not 
been met. We could delineate what that burden wiiit: is. No 
one contests that a college may prohibit disruption or that 
they may take steps in advance of violence to quell it. If 
this were a different case--a case in which this particular 
chapter had violated the rules in the recent past, or a case 
in which the individual leaders had violated college rules in 
the recent past, then I might agree that the college has 




___ 3_ .. 
to the school's legitimate interests. It could then be up 
to the applicants to demonstrate that they have purged them-
selves of the proclivity for unlawful action. 
As long as this can be accomplished in the framework of 
a line-drawing between advocacy and action, it could be 
squared with existing First Amendment precedents. We could 
hold,for instance, that in this case we had little more than 
the "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance." 
Whatis required, however, is a reasonable basis on the part 
of the administration to conclude that this organization is 
likely to engage in action that will "materially and sub-
stantially interfere" with the legitimate functioning of the 
college community. This is a more flexible sttandard than 
clear and present danger, but it is more demanding than a 
simple determination that the group refused to disavow the 
possibility of disruption at some undetermined time. In the 
course of expounding such a test, we could state forth-
rightly that students are free to advocate and express views 
on whatever matters concern them, and no administration is 
empowered to prohibit the expression of those views. We ' 
could make clear that it is only the potentiality of 
unlawful conduct which may justify official action. 
LAH 
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Tentative Reflections on a Possible Remand Theory 
1. The standards were reasonable and were not challenged . 
I/ 
2. To be recognized, an organization must submit a clear statement 
of its purpose. " 
3. The Rules (included by inference if not expressly in the 
standards) proscribed "disruption" of "operation of the college", damage 
to property of others, and invasion of rights of others. 
4. The SDS statement, on its face, comports with the requirement 
for a statement of purpose. The stated purpose is not inconsistent with 
the Rules of Conduct. 
5. President James (as District Court found) initially denied 
recognition becuase of the affiliation with national SDS. 
6. The District Court held this was a denial of due process, in 
that a decision was reached on a central factual issue without a hearing. 
The District Court ordered a hearing, without precisely defining the 
issue (62a) 
7. The hearing focused almost entirely on the relationship of the 
local SDS with the national organization. This issue was muted ( if not 
mooted) by the only evidence on behalf of Petitioners, namely, a brief 
statement of independence and non-affiliation with national SDS. 





(a) The Petitioners rested on this statement. 
(b) The College questioned the continued use of SDS name. 
(c) College also introduced hearsay data as to disruptive 
objectives and history of SDS for purpose of showing that a local 
SDS presented a danger of such disruption. 
( d) Petitioners said burden of showing that there remained 
some affiliation or identification with SDS was on College. 
8. At the meeting of the Student Affairs Committee (A94), the 
Petitioners had refused to dis:savow disruptive tactics (A 95). 
9. At the hearing before Dean Judd, this issue - the central one 
is my opinion - was not addressed directly, either by Petitioners or the 
College. 
10. Questions: Is case in a posture where we could remand for 
further hearing on the issue whether the College had reasonable grounds 
for believing that Petitioners would engage in disruptive conduct? 
(a) Was the Petitioners' statement of purpose prima facie 
acceptable? It certainly would have been except for its proposed 
affiliation with SDS. 
(b) Is affiliation with SDS per se justification for denying 
application on ground that College could assume likelihood of 
violence? I think not, although such application might be 
sufficient to shift burden of proof to Petitioners. 





( c) Normally, burden of proving likelihood of disruption 
would be on College if application states lawful purpose and there 
is no affiliation with a disruptive organization. But here Petitioners 
refused to disavow or repudiate violence in the brief colloquy before 
the Student Affairs Committee (A94). Did this shift burden of proof 
to Petitioners in the hearing before Dean Judd? 
( d) Should we, after an appropriate opinion, remand with 
directions to the District Court to order a new administrative 
hearing at the College on the "likelihood of disruption" issue, 
stating that the burden of proof remains on the College but that 
the burden of going forward with evidence shifte~ to the Petitioner~ 
because of (i) ambiguity of the relationship with and extent of control 
of SDS and (ii) Petitioners' failure to disavow violence and 
disruptive tactics . 
(e) We would have to define some standard. I would think it 
clearly should be less than the "clear and present danger" test. 
A College is not a public street or park, and there are obvious 
and legitimate interests to be protected against what happened at 
Columbia and numerous other educational institutions. 
-
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Did College have a set of standards o(regulations applicable 
to recognition of organizations? 
1. statement of Student Rights, etc. (Pet. for Cert - 24a). 
ID. (B) - Duty of College to "define its own regulations as 
clearly as possible ... (27a). 
V. - "On Campus Freedom of students" 
( B) Prescribes what shall be submitted to an organization as 
a "condition to institutional recognition" (29a). 
(C), (D), and (E) are relevant (30a) but none is specific as to 
what substantive standards need to be met. Although B requires a 
- "clear statement of purpose" there is no indication as to what "purposes" -
if any - will justify recognition or non-recognition. E does refer to 
conduct (e.g. "students"have no right to deprive others of free speech 
-
or to disrupt) but no clear relation between B & E. 
2. Pleadings A3-24. 
Neither Complaint, AnswerAbr stipulation refers to any standards 
though Complaint refers to and incorporates the Statement of Rights. 
Answer by College mentions standards and does not assert 
that SDS failed to comply with applicable Regulations, Rules or 





3. Statements of President James. 
(a) Memo of Oct. 30, 1969, disapproving recognition (A 14-16). 
President Janes states that "the statement of purpose to form 
a local chapter of SDS carries full and unmistakeable adherence to at 
least some of the major tenets of the national organization . . . The 
published aims and philosophy of SDS . . . are contrary to the 
approved policy of (the College)!' He then quotes the last sentence of 
the S tatement of Students Rights in subparagraph V(E) - with respect 
to "students" having no right to disrupt, damage property or interfere 
with the rights of others. 
(b) Letter of July 10 to Dr. Judd, acting dean of student affairs, 
in which Dr. James "reaffirms my earlier decision to deny recognition. " 
He concludes: 
"Rec ognition of such group, in my judgment, would be 
contrary to the orderly processes of change and would 
be contrary to the philosophy and lawful mission of 
this college. " 
Comment: 
In neither of these communications did Dr. James refer to 
any specific standards or regulations applicable to an organization 
seeking recognition. It is clear, especially from his letter of July 





that the SDS had a philosophy contrary to the college's philosophy. 
He did not go as far as the Court did in basing his refusal on any threat 
of disorderly conduct - although this is no doubt implicit from a full 
reading of the letter. 
4. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Smith (Petition for Cert 32a) 
Judge Smith bases his opinion on "prior restraint", and 
analogizes to cases which relate to the right of a particular speaker 
to appear on campus (37a). But he does indicate that the College would 
have been justified if the evidence disclosed a "likelihood that it (SDS) 
would 'materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of 
the school."' Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393 U. S. 503. 
In summary, there is nothing in Judge Smith's opinion which 
is really relevant to whether we should remand on the grounds 
suggested by the Chief Justice. 
5. Majority CA 2 Opinion. 
In commenting on Judge Clarie's opinion, it was noted: 
''That plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality 
of the standards established by the College for deter-
mining whether campus organizations are to be 




The opinion further noted: 
"Judge Clarie directed that President James, after 
conclusion of the administrative hearing ... 'make 
his findings as to whether or not the application met 
the existing policy standards of the college, which 
would qualify the applicant club for official campus 
recognition. "' 
The opinion further noted: 
"The essence of Judge Clarie's decision of October 29, 
was that plaintiffs had not met their burden of com plying 
with the standard established by the College's 'statement 
on Rights, Freedoms and Responsibility of students'; 
that until they did so, they had no constitutional or other 
right to have the College's stamp of approval conferred 
upon their organization; . . . " 
At another point, the majority said: 
"Despite the concededly valid college policy governing 
the constitutional rights, freedoms and responsibililities 
of students at CCSC, plaintiffs fail to avail themselves 
of the procedural due process accorded to them .... " 
(Petition for Cert 20a) 
My Comment on the Majority Opinion: 
4. 
It emphasized the " narrow ground of our decision", and stated 
it was unnecessary ''to reach the substantive constitutional questions 
which might have been presented if plaintiffs had availed themEel ves 
of the procedural due process to which Judge Clarie ordered they 






Although the majority opinion's rationale is not clear, I believe 
it is based - as the quote above indicates - on the view that the burden 
was on the student group to show compliance with the college's admittedly 
valid standards; that the student group failed to carry its burden of 
proof; and that the substantive issue - namely, whether the SDS group 
met the standards - was never reached. 
As the legality of the standards was not questioned, this was not 
an issue. 
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AMUSEMENTS-TV-RADIO 
WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1972 uoo SECTION B 
Mandel Assails 
Md. U. 'Vandals' 
By THOMAS LOVE and LANCE GAY 
Star Staff Writers 
Gov. Ma,rvin Mandel today angrily condemned anti-war 
demonstrators at the University of Maryland, calling them "a 
handful of vandals." He ordered National Guardsmen to 
nearby Greenbelt as "a precautionary measure." 
About 650 members of the National Gui,rd-scheduled to 
hold training drills over the weekend-instead were ordered to 
ireport to the Greenbelt Armory today, after a night of 
confrontations between demonstrators and state police. 
Mandel, taking a hard line against the three years of 
periodic anti-war violence at the university, blamed a small 
portion of the 36,000-member student body for the trouble and 
called on other students to "weed them out" and stop the 
disruptions. 
"There is no justification or excuse for the irrational 
behavior of a handful of students at the College Park campus 
for the past two days," Mandel said. 
"I AM FED UP with this violence and destruction of 
public and private property," the governor continued, "and I 
fully intend to see that it ends. · 
"When unruly mobs take to our streets, hell-bent on 
nothing but destruction and disturbance, the citizens of this 
state have every right to be concerned. The university is 
public property, supported by the tax dollars of the citizens of 
this state." . 
f "And I want them to know that this handful of vandals} has cost Maryland taxpayers more than $1 million to restore peace and order to our university campus during the past 
three years," he said. 
{ 
"There are more than 35,000 serious students at the 
university who abhor the violence and tactics of the few who 
are disrupting their studies. 
"The students know who the ringleaders are. They know 
their plans and plots. As governor of this state, I am appealing 
directly to the majority of students-and to their parents-to 
weed out the destructive ringleaders and to put an end to this 
vicious and wanton destruction," he continued. 
"IF THEY DO NOT, I will use every resource and force at -
my disposal as governor to see that the University of Mary-
land remains open •and free of the disruption and disturbances 
that have caused a number of personal injuries and property 
damage to the university and the private businesses," the 
governor promised. 
The governor's statement followed two days of spasmodic 
demonstrations and violence at the College Park campus 
climaxed by a series of running battles between anti-war 
activists and state police last night. 
A spokesman for the governor said that the men were not 
on a state of alert, but were merely on standby as a preceution. 
The youthful protesters, some of whom were high school 
students, swarmed onto U.S. Route 1 at least four times during 
the night, blocking traffic for up to 15 minutes each time until 
riot-equipped troopers marched along the boulevard and em-
ployed tear gas and pepper gas to clear them away. 
As of 3:30 a.m. today, state ponce reported 19 arrests on 
charges varying from disorderly conduct to carrying danger-
ous weapons, specifically rocks. Prince Georges County Depu-
ty Chief John W. Rhodes reported some minor looting of stores 
in the College Park business district towards the end of the 
demonstration. 
Police said one trooper was injured. He was identified as 
✓ 
1st Sgt. William E. Brooks who was flown to Johns Hopkins 
University Hospital in Baltimore where he was treated for a 
ruptured blood vessel in his hand. He reportedly had been 
struck by a brick. 1 . 
AT LEAST ONE STUDENT was injured when he was 
struck on the hand with a tear gas canister. 
The confrontation began shortly after 10:30 p.m. when the 
young people left a rock concert featuring Commander Cody 
and his Lost Air Band. During the concert, militant students 
had passed out leaflets in the audience urging them to meet at 
the Armory afterward. 
As the young people filed out of Ritchie Coliseum at the 
end of the concert, a group of activists gathered around a Viet 
Cong flag and one of their number exhorted them over a 
bullhorn to "come over to the Armory," which is across Rt.1 
from the coliseum. 
A crowd of about 400 persons gathered in front of Rockford 
Armory, chanting, "stop the war, stop the freeze, victory to 
the Vietnamese," and "ROTC must go, ROTC must go." The 
unidentified student at the bullhorn egged the crowd on to "do 
something," and one burned an American flag while others 
pelted the white columns of the Armory with bricks and 
stones. On at least four separate occasions, to chants of "burn 
. . . burn ... burn," some of the demonstrators threw burning 
objects through broken windows. Only the window frame and 
curtains of one window caught fire and went out by itself. 
Bored with pelting rocks at the unrelenting building, they 
moved to the Main Administration Building, where they broke 
most of the windows in the front of the two-story structure and 
then moved up the three-block-long Mall, smashing windows in 
classrooms along the way. 
They next lolled on the lawn near McKeldin Library 
debating · whether breaking windows was a proper way to 
protest the war in Southeast Asia. "It's at least some action 
any action at all," one young student said. ' 
More than 1,000 students had clogged the roadway when 
state tr~pers ~~essed in flak jac~ets and riot gear moved in 
double lines, frrmg tear and pepper gas into the youthful 
ranks. Police were immediately greeted with Yippie war 
whoops, obscenities, firecrackers, rocks and bottles some of 




Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Healy v. James 
DATE: May 30, 1972 
In rereading the opinions below, I note the comment of the 
district judge as follows: 
"It (the President's decision) is not in the same category 
as a criminal prosecution involving the teaching or 
espousing of revolution; nor does it attempt civilly 
to enjoin those utterances which might be considered 
as an imminent threat to order. See Brandenberg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444." -
I have had a concern, lerking faintly in the back of my mind, 
that we may be extending cases involving criminal prosecution to the 
denial of a privilege. I suppose the answer to this is that the 
principles upon which we rely have been applied (although over 
vigorous dissents) to admission to the bar, to teaching on a faculty, 
and perhaps to other privileges which may or may not be granted by 
the state. 
I send you this note merely to assure that we focus sharply on 
the point made by the district judge. 





Rea Healy v. James, No. 71-452 
Judge, 
Attached is the redraft we have discusseds I hope that 
7. 
we are close enough in now to bring to an end this "gentle 
arm-twisting." Reorganized in this fashion, I was able to de-
lete approximately 4 or 5 pages from the second half of 
the opinion. Part Dis not as long as you may have envi-
sioned but, as reorganized, the factual basis (resting ~n 
petitioners' statements to the Student Affairs Committee and ~ 
the policy embodied in the Student Bill of Rights) is stated 
in Part C. I think the redraft is now more fluid. Part D 
while not lengthy is , I believe
1
pretty direct and unequivocal. 
I have tried to make it clear that a requirement of adher-
ence to school rules is nothing more than an extension of 
the advocacy-action dochotomy and that conditioning recog-
nition on a willingness to abide by thoee rules imposes 
no interference with associational rights. 
Most of the footnotes from 13 on are new or substantially 
redrafted. I have deleted your reference to the demeanor 
of the petitioners' counsel at the court-ordered hearing. 
If you think the point you make in that footnote needs to 
be made, I suggest we append it to the discussion of the 
hearing in the factual layout of the case (in Part I). 
LAH 
LIBRA R Y 
Supreme Court, U. S. 
IN THE 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
No. 71-1801 
Summary Calendar* 
NOV 15 1971 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI 
CHAPTER OF THE 
MISSISSIPPI CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ET AL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
versus 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI, ET AL., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Southern Dist rict of Mississippi 
(November 10, 1971) 
B efore WISDOM, COLEMAN , and SIMPSON, 
Cir cuit Judges. 
WISDOM, Circuit J udge : Twice this Court has been 
a h arbinger of major expansions in the F irst Am end-
men t r tghts of students. In Dixon v. A labama State 
*Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty 
Company of New York, et al. , 5 Cir . 1970, 431 F .2d 409, Part I. 
/ 
2 U. OF SO. MISS. C.L.U. v. U. OF SO. MISS. 
Board of Education, 5 Cir. 1961, 294 F.2d 150, we turned 
our baicks on the old saw that attendance at a universi-
ty was a privilege granted by the state and was there-
fore subject to whatever conditions the state soug'ht 
to impose. Five years later, we said that students' 
rights to free expression cannot be curtailed unless 
that expression "materially and substantially inter-
fere[s] with the requirements of appropriate disoipline 
in the operation of the school." Burnside v. Byars, 5 
Cir. 1966, 363 F.2d 744, 749. The Supreme Court adop,ted 
this phrase in the landmark case of Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
1969, 393 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 733, 21 L .Ed. 2d 737. 
Today's decision requires us to break no new ground. 
During the summer of 1970, the plaintiff, the University 
of Southern Mississippi c:1apter of the Mississippi Civil 
Liberties Union was denied official recognition a,s a 
student organization in accordance with the usual pro-
cedures provided by the University of Southern Mis-
sissippi for processing proposed charters of student 
organizations.' This denial m ,eant that the Chapter 
tThe Chapter's application was submitted to the Director of Stu-
dent Activities and presented by him to the Student-Faculty 
Committee on Student Organizations. The membership of the 
Committee is appointed by the University President, William 
D. McCain, and is presided over by the Dean of Student Af-
fairs. The Committee consists of four faculty members and 
three students. After two meetings the Committee voted to 
deny the charter; the decision was approved by President 
McCain. Upon rehearing, the Committee stuck to its decision, 
and this action was filed. We need not consider the procedural 
adequacy of these proceedings since we have concluded that, 
however it conducted its. business, the Committee failed to 
adduce any valid reasons for banning the Chapter from the 
University campus. 
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could neither participate in University-approved stu-
dent activities nor conduct student activities on cam-
pus on its own initiative. Thus exiled, the Chapter filed 
suit in federal district court for a preliminary injunc-
tion to compel the University to approve its charter 
and grant it official recognition. 
The district oourt found that the Chapter had re-
quested and been denied a statement of reasons for 
the University's denial of its charter application, and 
held that the Chapter was entitled to such a statement. 
In addition, the district court considered each of the 
grounds which had been asserted by the University 
during the court proceedings to justify denial of 
a charter. The only ground which seemed to the dis-
trict court to pruvide a possible basis for keeping the 
Chapter off campus was its litigious orientation.2 This, 
s,aid the district court, was not alone enough to justify 
the denial; but the court took the view that the uni-
versity need not condone "frivolous, vexatious, and 
haras,sing actions to impede the legitimate function 
of a university." It therefore refused to order approval 
of the plaintiffs' charter. Instead, it simply provided 
plaintiffs with a new chance to apply for recognition, 
and, implicitly, the Univers ity wit'h a new chance to 
adduce support for its assertion that the Chapter's ac-
2The district court found: "Of the reasons offered for the denial 
of the charter, the Court does not find sufficient merit in 
any to justify sustaining the University's position except for the 
barely tenable reasons based on the expressed threats of litiga-
tion by the local chapter and this history of the litigation waged 
by the state and national organizations." 
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tivities would interfere with the operation of the Uni-
versity.3 
It is no longer a serious contention that "either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom ,of speech o:r expression, at the schoolhouse 
gate." Tinker, supra, at 393 U.S. 506, 21 L.Ed.2d 737. 
Student rights of free expression may he prohibited 
only if t:hey "materially and substantially [interfere] 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school." Tinker at 393 U.S. 509, 21 
L.Ed.3d 739, citing Burnside v. Byars, 5 Cir. 1966, 363 
F.2d 744, 749. When the restriction upon student expres-
sion takes the form of an attempt to predict in advance 
the content and consequences of that expression, it is 
tantamount to a prior restraint and carries a heavy 
presumption against its constitutionality. See Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 1963, 372 U.S. 58, 70; Organiza-
tion for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 1971, 39 U.S.L.W. 
What is at issue here is whether the students affiliated 
with the Chapter will be permitted to use t:h.e buildings 
and grounds of the campus to conduct meetings and 
discussions. The r estriction impo,sed by the University 
SThe district court also noted, apparently on its own motion, that 
the Chapter proposed to include non-students as members. 
The record disclosed that on a prior occasion a charter had 
been denied to a group whose membership was to include non-
students. Although the district court thought that the university 
should have "an opportunity to consider" this issue during any 
further proceedings, we see no reason why a justification 
never raised by the University should play a part in our dis-
position of this case. If the University did not see fit to object 
to the composition of the Chapter's proposed membership, we 
find it difficult to view the problem as significant enough to 
justify banning this organization from the campus of the Uni-
,:70,.c-1+-u 
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is analogous to one attempting to prevent a particular 
gr,oup or individual from speaking on school premises. 
Such "speaker bans" uniformly have been struck 
down. E.g., Brooks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 
188 (M.D. Ala. 1969); see Wright, The Constitution on 
the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1050-51 (1969). The 
rationale of the speaker ban decisions is that it is plain-
ly incompatible with our constitutional system for a 
state-supported institution to permit some speakers 
but turn others away "accoriding to the orthodoxy or 
popularity of t:heir political or social views." Brooks 
v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. at 194. To sustain 
such censorial practices, a University would at the 
very least have to demonstrate a strong probability 
of the kind ,of material disruption spoken of in the Tink-
er case. 
The district .court found only that the litigiousness 
of the national and state Civil Liberties Unions was 
a "barely tenable ground for denying the charter to 
the [USM] Chapter". Serious, bona fide litigation car-
ried on by a minority group as a peaceful means of 
guaranteeing its rights in a larger community is a form 
of expression and association protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. NAACP v. Button, 1963, 
371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405. As such, it 
cannot serve as a justification for keeping the Civil 
Liberties Union off the campus of the University un-
less the litigation itself would result in the kind of dis-
ruption spelled out in Tinker. 
Only litigation conducted in bad faith could fill that 
bill. The lower court expressed the thought that if the 
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Student Activity Committee were to make a new inves-
tigation, the Committee might turn up some support 
for the assertion that the Chapter's litigation would 
be vexatious and frivolous. This bare possibility, un-
supported by any evidence in this record, does not jus-
tify a drastic curtailment of constitutionally favored 
expression. T'he assertion of novel and so,metimes 
threatening positions through recourse to litigation 
might all too easily be characterized as vexatious or 
harassing by the individuals so threatened or sur-
prised - and in perfectly good faith. 
But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to 
overcome the right to freedom of expression. 
Any departure from absolute regimentation 
may cause trouble. Any variation from. the ma-
jority'·s oipin,ion may inspire fea:r. Any word 
spoken, in dass, in the lunchroo•m, or on the 
campus, that deviates from the views of an-
other person may start an argument o•r cause 
a disturbance. But our Constitution says we 
must take this risk, Terminiello v Chicago, 337 
US 1, 93 L Ed 1131, 69 S Ct 894 (19491); and our 
history says that it is this so,rt of hazardous 
freedom - this kind of openness - that is the 
basis of our national strength and of the inde-
pendence and vigor of Amedcans who grow 
up and live in this relatively permissive, often 
disputatious, society. 
Tinker at 393 U .S. 508-09, 21 L.Ed.2d 739. We think it 
far more compatible with free expression to relegate 
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the University to its rights if the litigative activities 
of the Chapter should turn out to be carried on with 
disruptive intentions and do result in substantial dis-
ruption to the life of the University. In that event, the 
:riecognition granted the Chapter could be challenged 
and withdrawn in a fair proceeding based upon evi-
dence of actual, and not vaguely predictive, miscon-
duct. 
'I1he University has cited us to a recent case decided 
in the Second Circuit, Healy v. James, No. 733, July 
15, 1971. In Healy, the court approved a denial of of-
ficial recognition to the Central Connecticut Chapte·r 
of the Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS"). 
Without in any way implying our approval of the Healy 
decision, we need note only that it is factu:ally distin-
guis'hable fr:om the present case in two respects. First, 
SDS has not expressed any commitment to a policy 
of litigat1on, and certain members of SDS have ad-
vocated disruption as a means of achieving its goals. 
Second, in Healy, SDS actually demonstrated a refusal 
to abide by university procedures for dispute re•solu-
tion when it behaved defiantly during a court-struc-
tured hearing to determine its status. The denial in 
Healy was therefore based at least in part upon some 
evidenee of actual misbehavior and not upon unfound-
ed prognostication of future conduct. 
Finally, the University argues that the Chapter has 
in effect waived its right to relief fr.om this Court by 
failing to resort to the procedure for rehearing outlined 
by the district court. But we are unwilling to find fault 
with the Chapter for its impatience to achieve recogni-
8 U. OF SO. MISS. C.L.U. v. U. OF SO. MISS. 
tion for its constitutional prerogatives. It has now been 
more than a year since the Chapteir was denied the 
same place in the sun on the campus of the Universi-
ty of Southern Mississippi a.ccorded to other student 
organizations - without any justification at all, so far 
as we are able to discern. 
We find it ulllilecessary to consider the adequacy of 
the prooedure afforded the Chapter by the Unive,rsity, 
since even that procedure failed to produce any per-
missible justification for denying the Chapter's appli-
cation. For t'he reasons stated herein, the judgment 
of the district court will be REVERSED, and the case 
REMANDED to the district court for the prompt is-
suance of an order requiring the University of Southern 
Mississippi to grant immediate appro•val to the appli-
cation for recognition of the University chapter of the 
Mississippi Civil Liberties Union. 
COLEMAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring Specially. 
I am of the opm10n that this is not purely a First 
Amendment cas,e. The primary purpose of the pro-
posed organization appears to be litigious rather than 
the right to receive and dispense information and 
ideas. I, therefore, would decide this appeal on Four-
teenth Amendm·ent ( equal protection) groun:ds. 
I do agree, in general, with the rationale of American 
Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Inc. v. Radford Col-
lege, 315 F.Supp. 893 (W.D. Virginia, 1970). In that case 
it was held .that a tax suppo,rted college cannot apply 
restrictions to outside organizations "When such facili-
u 
l 
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ties have been made previously available to outside 
organizations". The record shows the exis,tence of such 
outside organizations, as "Young Democrats" and 
"Young Republicans" on the Southern campus. 
I agree heartily with what Judge Dalton wrote in 
Radford, 
"Student organizations do not have an un-
qualified rig'ht to be recognized by a college 
administration. College officials properly have 
wide discreti-on in operating the school and in 
determining what actions are most compati-
ble with its educational objectives * * *. This 
Court has no desire to interfere with the op-
erations of any school OT to give encourage-
ment to the trenld of in1creasing challenges to 
the considered dedsions of university admin-
istrators." 315 F. Supp. 896. 
On the reoord compiled below, ho,weveT, Mississippi 
Southern failed to develop constitutionally permissible 
ground for the exclusion of A.C.L.U. 
In this state of affairs I can only point to the language 
in Radford, supra, 315 F. Supp. at 899·: 
"If their conduct as a campus 0 1rganization 
is unduly disruptive of the orderly funct1oning 
of the institution, this Court will be the first to 
reconsider its decision." 
With this comment, I concur in the opinion prepared 
for the Oourt by Judge WISDOM. 
Adm. Office, U.S. Courts-Scofields' Quality Printers, Inc., N. 0., La 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Larry A. Hammond DATE: June 1, 1972 
FROM: Powell, Jr. 
Healy 
Here is the manuscript. I think you have done a superb job 
in restructuring the 3rd session. I also think the opinion is one of 
which we can be proud - provided we get a court. 
Attached hereto - on a yellow sheet - · are a few things to do, 
in addition to running through the manuscript to note my few changes. 
= -· .1 
I will be glad to discuss any of this with yoli: 
..... 
-
June 8, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE; 
Re: No. 71-452 Healy v. James 
Here is my circulation in the above case. 
The Conference vote was 5 to 4 for reversal. ' My opinion is 
in accord with that vote. In addition, I concluded that with respect to 
one issue the case should be remanded for further consideration. 
It is clear to me that First Amendment associational rights 
of the student group which sought recognition were infringed by the 
action of the College, as sustained by the courts below. Yet, upon 
a careful reexamination of the record, I conclude that there was a 
significant ambiguity as to whether the student group was willing to 
agree to abide by the College's rules and regulations, the reasonable-
ness of which was not challenged. 
In my view, a college is entitled before it accords official 
recognition to any organization to have the minimal assurance of an 
intention and willingness to abide by reasonable rules and regulations 
applicable to all student organizations and activities. 
It is apparent from what the College President said in this 
case that he was concerned, in view of petitioners' ambiguous state-
ments as to disruption, as to whether petitioners intended to comply 
with the rules embodied in the "Student Bill of Rights. " This concern 
may well have been a significant factor in his decision. Yet, this 
issue was not a subject of consideration at the court-ordered hearing; 
nor was it focused upon in either of the opinions below. It can be 




- . . -------~~-~~----
- 2 -
In view of the r eversal and remand, I have tried to write the 
opinion in a way that will afford appropriate guidance to college 
administrators and student organizations in this case and in the 
future. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
- CHAMBERS OF I 
~1i:µrtmt Q}c:url cf tlrt ~ttittb .jtaug 
~a:sJrin:ghm. IO. QJ. 2lTffe'1' 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
June 8, 1972 I 
i · 
\ MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: No. 71-452 Healy v. James 
Here is my circulation in the above case. 
The Conference vote was 5 to 4 for reversal. My opinion is 
in accord with that vote. In addition, I concluded that with respect to 
one issue the case should be remanded for further consideration. 
It is clear to me that First Amendment associational rights 
of the student group which sought recognition were infringed by the 
action of the College, as sustained by the courts below. Yet, upon 
· a careful reexamination of the record, I conclude that there was a 
significant ambiguity as to whether the student group was willing to 
agree to abide by the College's rules and regulations, the reasonable-
ness of which was not challenged. 
In my view, a college is entitled before it accords official 
recognition to any organization to have the minimal assurance of an 
intention and willingness to abide by reasonable rules and regulations 
applicable to all student organizations and activities. 
It is apparent from what the College President said in this 
case that he was concerned, in view of petitioners' ambiguous state-
ments as to disruption, as to whether petitioners intended to comply 
with the rules embodied in the "Student Bill of Rights. " This concern 
may well have been a significant factor in his decision. Yet, this 
issue was not a subject of consideration at the court-ordered hearing; 
nor was it focused upon in either of the opinions below. It can be 
resolved quite simply on remand. 
.... , .... 
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In view of the reversal and remand, I have tried to write the 
opinion in a way that will afford appropriate guidance to college 





JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
j;uµumt (!Jautt 1tf tfyt '!\tnift~ j;tatts 
~aslrittgfon, ~. QJ. 20ffeJ!2 
June 12, 1972 
71-452 - Healy v. James 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion 
for the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
0~ , (/. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
.§u:prttru <!}cud cf flrt ~b j,ta±t.s 
'lla.sirhtgtcn:. ~- <!}. 2!lffe'-1~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 12, 1972 
Re: No. 71-452 - Healy v. James 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely; / 
~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: Conference 
- ~u:pTtuU <!}curt of t!rt ~t~ ~tattg ~iudp:nghm. J. QI. 2.llffeJl..;l 
CHAM BERS OF 
.JUST ICE W M . .J. BRENN A N . JR. June 13, 1972 
RE : No. 71-452 - Healy v. James 
Dear Lewis: 
I fully agree, of course, that the judgment below must be 
reversed for the First Amendment reasons your opinion so 
finely sets out. But I have some trouble with a few matters in 
your opinion and I take the liberty of mentioning them for your 
consideration. 
First, would you consider dropping footnote 8? A complete / 
ban on student organizations seems to me to be of very doubtful u f , 
constitutionality for the same cogent reasons your opinion gives 
for reversal here. Moreover, as you indicate, it is unlikely that 
any college would ever want to attempt such a prohibition. 
Second, might the discussion (at, e.g., pages 14-15, 20, and 
22) be revised to state merely that petitioners have not argued 
either that they were improperly required to file an application for 
recognition, or that the standards for recognition were invalid, and 
that we therefore do not address those questions? It seems to me 
that Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 
U.S. 449, and Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, counsel that those 
issues be left open, and we may do so since petitioners have not 
raised them. 
Third, could the first sentence in the paragraph beginning on ,, .• 
page 17 be omitted, since the rule stated in the preceding sentence 
would seem to indicate that recognition could not be denied simply 
because of affiliation with a national organization dedicated to un-
lawful conduct? 
• 
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Fourth, could the last phrase quoted from Esteban on page 
23 be omitted? I suggest that it appears overbroad and indefinite. 
Fifth, I am unclear why the case is to be remanded. Is it 
for a determination (1) whether the college has a rule denying 
recognition to groups that refuse to affirm that they will abide by 
time, place and manner restrictions on their associational activities 
and (2) whether petitioners were denied recognition for failure to 
comply with such a rule? Or is it for a determination whether 
petitioners are now prepared to make the affirmation? If the latter, 
it would seem (even though not intended) that the remand is for a 
determination whether petitioners failed to comply with a rule 
established not by the college, but by this Court. 
If the former, your premise must be that the record is 
ambiguous as to whether the college has a rule denying recognition 
to groups that refuse to affirm and also as to whether petitioners 
were denied recognition for failure to comply with the rule. But 
if the record is ambiguous as to the existence of a rule, would not 
Staub v. Baxley require the holding that the denial of recognition 
in petitioners' case would be unconstitutional whether they had made 
the affirmation or not? In other words unless the record before us 
shows that the college had a clearly established rule which was ap-
plied against petitioners, Staub v. Baxley would be authority that 
this Court should not even address the question of affirmation rules, 
let alone approve such rules in general terms. Rather we should 
at most reserve discussion of the problem until it is presented in 
an appropriate context in which its ramifications may be assessed. 
I suggest this may be the appropriate course for the following reasons: 
1. As your opinion states, "a 'heavy burden' rests on the 
college to demonstrate the appropriateness of11 a prior restraint on 
associational freedom, and recognition regulations may possibly not 
be "an appropriately related and narrow response" to the state's 
interest in controlling disruption on the campus. If so, can we say 
at this juncture that any affirmation rule in implementation of those 
regulations satisfies, regardless of its content, First Amendment 
requirements .? Moreover, wouldn't such a statement be particularly 
inappropriate when the constitutional validity of an affirmation rule 
apparently hasn't been briefed or argued here? 
- . 
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2. On the assumption that an affirmation rule may be valid 
in some circumstances, its precise terms may have an important, 
and perhaps crucial, bearing on its validity. Would we, for ex-
ample, uphold a rule requiring "willingness to abide by campus 
regulations" without some requirement that those regulations 
themselves be constitutional? Or a rule calling for an affirmative 
promise to comply rather than an indication of present intent? Or 
a rule making the applicants for recognition responsible for the 
intent or conduct of all members of the group? The consequences 
of failure to abide by the affirmation (e.g., revocation of recognition 
versus perjury conviction) may be no less significant. 
3. In view of these questions, would a general approval of 
affirmation rules at this time open up a host of issues rather than 
help resolve the difficulties that colleges must face in drawing the 
fine line between protected freedoms and unprotected conduct? 
Moreover, would it cause colleges to focus, not on the drawing of 
that fine line, but on affirmation rules that, like loyalty oaths, 
must at best be an ineffective solution to controlling future conduct? 
In sum, I wonder whether the case should be reversed and 
not remanded. Under that disposition your discussion in section 
IIID indicating the four th basis for the denial of recognition here 
could be modified to say that even if petitioners refused to affirm, 
still recognition could not be refused since the college had not 
previously established an affirmation rule. If it had, the validity 
of the rule would present an important question, which, however, 
need not be addressed in this case. If you have the time, perhaps 
we can get together and talk about these comments. 
Sincerely, 
/4d 
Mr. Justice Powell 
... 
C H AM B E R S O F 
J5u:pumt (qourt ttf "rt 'Jttitt~ J5tatts 
Jraa4ittghm. !l. (q. 211,;i)l.~ 
J USTICE W M . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. Jwie 14, 1972 
RE: No. 71-452 - Healy v. James 
Dear Lewis: 
Further reflection on my suggestions in my memorandum 
yesterday prompts me to suggest the possible resolution of 
Point Fifth in my memo along the following lines: 
1. Petitioners have not challenged any procedural or sub-
stantive aspects of CCSC's requirement that proposed organiza-
tions file for official campus recognition. 
2. CCSC may have, as part of that requirement, a rule 
calling for an affirmation by the proposed organization that it 
intends to comply with reasonable regulations governing campus 
associational activities. 
3. The case may be remanded, then, to consider whether 
CCSC, in fact, has such a rule and, if so, whether petitioners 
are willing to comply with it. Only if the rule exists and petition-
ers are not willing to comply with it need the lower courts address 
the constitutional validity of the application of the affirmation rule 
to this case. 
I suggest this because with that treatment I think I can join 
your disposition to remand. 
Sincerely, 
;5u) 
Mr. Justice Powell 
-
CHAM BERS O F 
.:§upunu Q}Ottrl of t4.t ~ttit.t~ ~tat.ts 
,rtt:slp:n:gfott. ~. Q}. 2.(Jffe'l-, 
JU STICE HARRY A . BLAC KMU N 
June 19, 1972 
Re: No. 71-452 - Healy v. James 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Jiu. 4. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
- j;uµrmu <!fcurl of tlre ~ttitt~ j;tattg ._rudpngfon. ti}. QJ. 2llffeJ!,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
June 16, 1972 
Re: No. 71-452 - Healy v. James 
Dear Lewis: 
Subject to our conversation, 
I join your opinion in this case. 
Sincerely, 
~,__.,,, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
-
~Up,-- C!/-, af U,, ~lt St-
'J/li. ft.;...._ - • «-li°_g ""•"'JI'°"'~- l!f. 2Uffe4;, C>-;4MSt::Rs 01"" JUs-,-,Cf::: WA-f J 1:3,-, 
· · rrf:::NNAN, J~. 
June 16, 1972 
Fl.II:: No. 71.452 • lieaJy ~. J. 
"• ames 
Dear Lewis: 
'I'hanJr You so Very lnuch fo• 
~ Your con-Sideration of lny suggest;ons. 
trisions I am trery ,._ . --v___ .,. J.CJJ Your re-
iiappy to Join. 
l\ffr • Justice PoweJJ 




- .:§uputttt {!JllUrl o-f tJrt ~tti:tt~ ~tattg 'JIIJa:gftmgtttn. ,. <lf. 21Tffe'!.J 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. June 16, 1972 
RE: No. 71-452 - Healy v. James 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you so very much for your 
consideration of my suggestions. With 
your revisions, I am very happy to join. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
- .§upumt <!fc-urt cf tfyt ~ttit.t~ .§taug ~itsfrittghm. ~. <!f. 2.0ffeJ!, 
C HAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS June 13, 1972 
Dear Lewis: 
In No . 71-452 - Healy v . James, 
I had a talk this morning with Bill 
Brennan and he listed some of the diffi-
culties he has had with the opinion that 
you circulated . 
It seemed to me on listening to 
him and knowing what your general position 
is that an accommodation can be made 
between your views and his . 
I am dropping this note before 
catching a plane to express my desire 
that you and Bill Brennan sit down and 
work out something that is mutually 
satisfactory . Whatever the two of you 
decide upon is O. K. with me . 
l<_VJ 
William O. Douglas 
Mr . Justice Powell 
CC : Mr . Justice Brennan 
-
,, 
~u;rumt <!}onrt cf tltt ~trittb ~tatt.s 
'Jl'a.sltingtcn. ~- (ij. 2llffeJ.l,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. June 21, 1972 
RE: No. 71-452 - Healy v. James 
Dear Lewis: 
I am not going to file or indeed even 
circulate the attached if you think I should 
not. As the draft states, I prepared this 
only in response to the concurring opinions, 
but the last thing I want to do is upset your 
applecart. I'll hold it until I hear from you. 
SJJ:; 
Mr. Justice Powell 
~/~C.j, 
/ 
- ~u.pum.e {!Jcttt"t cf tfyt ~b ~ta.us 'JlWasfp:ttgfon. ~. Qj:. 2.0ffeJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS O F 
..JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS June ninth 
l.972 
Re: No . 71- 452 - Healy v . James 
Dear Lewis : 
Pl.ease join me in your opinion . 
I may fil.e a separate opinion which in 
no way wil.l. derogate from yours. 
Mr . Justice Powell. 
CC : The Conference 
v,uJ 







Re, Healy v. James 
Judge, 
Justice Brennan's concurrence does three things, (1) it 
highlights the things in the opinion which he favors, em-
phasizing the ~zior restraint and the notions in footnote 
21; (2) it responds to Rehnquist's assertions that the First 
Amendment applies in a different manner on college campuses; 
and (3) he underlines that the Court does not today approve 
any particular prior affirmation rule as the CJ's concurrence 
suggests. 
There is nothing that we can do further to our opinion as 
I see it that will further underline Brennan's concern to a 
sufficient extent to make his statement unnecessary from his 
point of view. His focus is simply different than yours 
although you both are in basic agreement. 
I think his answer to Rehnquist is unnecessary since 
in our opinion we alre~dy state unequivocally that there is 
no room for the argument that the "First Amendment pro-
tections should apply with less force on college campuses 
than in the community at large." 
On the Chief's point, I rather thought that in light of 
our change made at Brennan's request the CJ might slighly 
alter his concurrence. If he does then that note is un-
necessary by Brennana if he does not then Brennan's comment 
is fair. 
At any rate, I do not think that such separate state-
ments harm the opinion and I guess they are to be antici-
pated whenever one gathers a coalition in a close and 
difficult First Amendment case. 
LAH 
No. 71-452 Healy v. James 
This case involves a controversy/between Central 
Connecticut State College/and a group of students who desired 
to form a local chapte7 of students for a Democratic Society. 
The student group applied for ~ al recognitioryas a 
campus organization. Recognition would confer certain 
privileges. These included the right (i) to use campus facilities - .. 
for meetings, ( ii) to use various campus bulletin boards, and -
( iii) to use the student newspaper for announcements of meetings 
and activities. 
The application for recognition was filed in September 
1969. At that time, a climate of unrest prevailed on many 
college campuses. Some SOS chapters had been actively 
I 
involved in the unrest., A.t,:r.-(. J...,...._«h,11t-c.A,, , 
Although the student Affairs Committee/ recommended 
granting official recognition,/he President of the College 
denied it. He was concerned with the group's relationship -
wl,th J_DS;f e thought the philosophy of national SOS was abhorrent; 
ard tH.aatPllaGf~Jie jos of thu '1 eHoge; and he feared that a 
~ • ,,_ ~-"5~ e "-" 
~-k.___ 
eL:&A' .. ,._~ ~a&v-t.A 
,.,,,._ Crdl-c.,,lcM-.,_ 
3. 
The record in this case is ambiguouf s to whether 
t!!.is collJ ge/imposed such a requiremeny and - if so - whether 
this group/was willing to acknowledge its obligation to comply. 
For reasons more fully stated in our opinion, we reverse 
the decisionjand remand the case for reconsideration/ in light 
of the standards we have set forth. 
TL.- c.. I· Orts J.,. ~-}-~~ 
~ ~ 
"-" lc,4 ,. • l'AJ ~,c,c-.,~.J..A,f 
+~~.: .. ~ .;v.S 
~ . ~ . ~r-f ,a.-
j.JJ.. - A • ,. 0 • .j;J.A# 01' • J c:,;.,< ,,.,.,.,,,, '7 
~ ~ ..,~p__i-. 
2. 
local chapter would be a disruptive influence on the campus. 
The District Courtjafter ordering further hearings, / 
approved the President's decisiof nd the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed. 
We hold that associational rights,/ protected by the First - --------- -
AmendEJentf"ere infringed. A state college may ;;2_t deny 
recognition to a student grour/merely because it is associated 
with an objectionable organization. Nor may denial be based 
on an apprehensiorfas to f~e campus disruption. 
The college presidenf ailed to dravjche c.Jjtical 1me/ 
between mere advocacy,/and advocacy directed to producing 
imminent lawless action. -
On the other hand, we also holf hat student activities 
;1:e subjecf to reasonable rules and regulations,/ and that a 
college may impQ.Se a requirement that a group,/ seeking official 
recognition,/ must affirm in advance/ its willingness to adhere 
to reasonable campus law. 
n.,._~~~ 
C.o •• - '-'--"' 
• - • 
THE C. J. W. 0. D. W. J.B. P. S. B. R. W. T. M. H. A. B. L. F. P. W. H. R. 
.... 4/ 3/ 72 
c~~ 
. . 
t:1 ~(' ~ ~ 1.j;f ~ ~ x~~ x~f 1 :rf 
~ /II"'- r./1!t//1 v ~~ ,;,11,lv- f//v/7 ✓ ,1,~ /1_, 6/<~/1'>"' 1, f,•h,,, t . __ J ... -. - ,,,.. !'" fJ 
~ 
t I if~'""' 
--
71-452 He, ly v. James 
- CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIE:F JUSTICE 
.§.u:prmtt (!JGud Gf t4t 'Janilt~ .§tattG 
~aidringhttt, ~ - <!J. 20.;iJl..;l 
June 22 , 1972 
Re: No. 7 1-452 - Healy v . James 
Dear. Lewis : 
I have made changes on my conurrence as 
per the attached . 
Regards, 
Mr . Justice Powell 




- Re: No. 71-452 - Healy v. James 
.To: Mr. Justice DoU:tl~t! 
Mr. Just:oe BronnAn 
Mr. Justioo Stown~t 
Mr. Justi oo \ihita 
Mr. Just~oo L""rsha11 
Mr. Justloe Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell ✓ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
From: The Ciliet' Justice 
.Circulated: 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concur ring. -------
Becirculated: JUN 2 2 197 
I am in agreement with what is said in the Court's opinion and I · 
join in it. I do so because I read the basis of the remand as requiring that 
student organizations seeking the privilege of official campus recognition 
must be willing to a bide by valid rules of the institution applicable to all 
such organizations. This is a reasonable requirement so long as it 
dis avows res ort to force and disruption or interference with the rights of 
others. 
The District Judge was troubled by the lack of a comprehensive 
procedur a 1 scheme that would inform students of the steps to be ta ken to 
secure acer edited standing and by the la ck of articulated criteria to be used 
in evaluating eligibility for accreditation. It was for this reason, as I read 
the record, that he remanded the matter to the college for a factual inquiry 
and for a more orderly processing in a de novo hearing within the college ---
administrative s true ture. It is within that structure and with in the academic 
community that problems such as these should be resolved. The courts, 
state or federal, should be a last resort. Part of the educational experi-




government and this must be a joint enterprise of students and faculty. It 
should not be imposed unilaterally from above nor can the terms of the 
relations hip be dictated by students. Here, in spite of the wisdom of the 
District Court in sending the case back to the college, the is sue identified 
by the Court's opinion today was not adequately addressed in the hearing. 
The relatively placid life of the college campus of the past has not 
prepared either administrators or students for their respective responsi-
bilities in maintaining an atmosphere in which diver gent views can be 
asserted vigorously but civilly to the end that those who s eek to be heard 
accord the same right to all others. The "Statement of Rights, Freedoms 
and Responsibilities of Students," sometimes called the "College Bill of 
Rights, " in effect on this campus, and not questioned by petitioners, appear 
to reflect a ra tiona 1 adjustment of the competing interests. But it is im-
possible to know from the record in this case whether the student group 
was willing to acknowledge an obligation to abide by that "Bill of Rights." 
Against this background the action of the Court in remanding on this 
issue is appropriate. 
• 
f 
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From: The Chief Just~ce 
Circulated: _______ _ 
Recirculated: JUN 2 2 1972 
I am in agreement with what is said in the Court's opinion and I 
join in it. I do so because Ir ead the basis of the remand as requiring that 
student or ga niza tions seeking the privilege of officia 1 campus recognition 
must be willing to a bide by valid rules of the institution applicable to all 
such organizations . This is a reasonable requirement so long as it 
dis avows resort to force and disruption or interference with the rights of 
others. 
The District Judge was troubled by the lac k of a comprehensive 
procedur a 1 scheme that would inform students of the steps to be ta ken to 
secure acer edited standing and by the la ck of articulated criteria to be used 
in evaluating eligibility £or accreditation. It was for this reason, as I read 
the record, that he remanded the matter to the college for a factual inquiry 
and for a more orderly processing in a de~ hearing within the college 
administrative s true ture . It is within that structure and with in the academic 
community that problems such as these should be resolved. The courts, 
state or federal, should be a last resort . Part of the educational experi-
ence of every college student should be an experience in responsible self-
• 
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government and this must be a joint enterprise of students and faculty. It 
should not be imposed unilaterally from above nor can the terms of the 
relations hip be dictated by students. Here, in spite of the wisdom of the 
District Court in sending the case back to the college, the is sue identified 
by the Court's opinion today was not adequately addressed in the hearing. 
The relatively placid life of the college campus of the past has not 
prepared either administrators or students for their respective responsi-
bilities in maintaining an atmosphere in which diver gent views can be 
asserted vigorously but civilly to the end that those who s eek to be heard 
accord the same right to all others . The "Statement of Rights, Freed oms 
and Responsibilities of Students, 11 sometimes called the "College Bill of 
Rights," in effect on this campus, and not questioned by petitioners, appear 
to reflect a ra tiona 1 adjustment of the competing interests. But it is im-
possible to know from the record in this case whether the student group 
was willing to acknowledge an obligation to abide by that "Bill of Rights." 
Against this background the action of the Court in remanding on this 







SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Jl'1-v.. 
No. 71-452 - October Term 1971 
Catherine J. Healy, et al., 
Petitioners; 
v. 








On Writ of Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. 
[ June_, 1972] 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court and address these few words to 
certain statements made by my other concurring Brethren. 
The gist of the Court's decision today is "that the effect of the 
College's denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying 
to petitioners' organizat:in [ a] range of [ constitutionally protected] 
associational activities . • •. " Ante, p, 15. As a result, certain 
well-established First Amendment doctrines are implicated. First, 
as the Court states, "a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate 
the appropriateness of that action." Ibid. Secondly, as the Court further 
states, the College "must demonstrate that the action taken is reasonably 
related to protection of [ its legitimate interest in avoiding material 
campus disruption] and that 'the incidental restriction on . . . First 






of that interest. ' 11 Ante, p. 20 n. 20. 
Contrary to my Brother Rehnquist's view, these principles come 
into play with full force, notwithstanding the fact that "the government 
[ is acting] in its capacity as employer'' or college administrator rather 
than "in its capacity as the sovereign executing criminal laws." Post, 
p. __ • Indeed, the very cases on which my Brother Rehnquist relies 
for these distinctions -- Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 -- reject them. 
In the first case public school students were suspended from school for 
wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam war, and in the second a 
teacher was dismissed for writing and publishing in a newspaper a letter 
critical of the school board's policies. In both cases the Court held that 
no governmental interest overrode the impairment of First Amendment 
rights caused by those actions. See also, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (informal administrative censorship scheme held 
unconstitutional). Thus, neither the role in which the government acts 
nor the sanctions it seeks to impose lessen the forc e of our First Amend-
ment principles.~/ 
Applying those principles to the facts of this case, the Court today 
holds that the College has failed to sustain the "heavy burden" of justifi-
cation for the denial of recognition to petitioners' organization with one 
possible exception. The exception concerns (1) whether the College had 






advance their willingness to abide by valid campus regulations and 
(2), if so, whether petitioners were unwilling to comply with it. 
Normally, the ambiguity in the record on the first question would, 
I think, require outright reversal. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. 
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147; Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313. Petitioners' 
failure, however, to challenge the procedural or substantive aspects of 
the college's established recognition scheme suggests that they might 
not object to affirming their intent to follow valid campus rules. The 
case is, accordingly, remanded to determine, first, whether the college 
has an affirmation requirement; second, whether petitioners are willing 
to comply with it; and, third, if the answer to the first question is "yes" 
and to the second, "no", whether the requirement, as drawn and applied, 
is constitutionally permissible. Contrary to the Chief Justice's position, 
the Court does not now decide whether any affirmation rule comports 
with the First Amendment principles re-affirmed in the opinion and 
certainly does not uphold a requirement "cast in broad general terms." 
Ante, p. __ . As the Court states, "Since we do not have the terms of 
a specific prior affirmation rule before us, we are not called on to decide 
whether any particular formulation would or would not prove constitutionally 
I 




* / This is not to say that subordinating governmental interests such 
as concern for order on the campus or efficiency in the public service 
do not exist. These interests may, of course, in appropriate circum-
stances justify some curtailment of First Amendment freedoms. They 
do so, however, not because the government's role or the sanctions 
imposed are different, but because the interests themselves warrant it. 
Moreover, even where those interests are at work, we have always in-
sisted that they be implemented with the least impingement possible on 
protected freedoms. Here, again, the capacity in which the government 
acts, though not the sanctions imposed, is immaterial to the inquiry. 
f ;-, ." c,ha11,e.f' t711,; l) '-I> 0 K, 11 IO, l J , 1 ;~: The Chief Justice l,{r. Justi ce Douglas 
Mr. Just ice Br ennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
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., ~ Mr. Just.-c .3 ga:cshall 
Mr. Justico B:..ackmun 
Mr. Justice Behn~uist 
Jnd DRAFT From: Powell, J .. , 
Ja 9 IU2 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA,-TFJSi.la.t ed: ____ _ 
No. 71-452 
hcoiroulated: ______ _ 
Catherine J. Healy et al.,) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Petitioners, United States Court of 
v. Appeals for the Second 
F. Don James et al. Circuit. 
[June -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the op1mon of the· 
Court. 
This case, arising out of a denial by a state college 
of official recognition to a group of students who desired 
to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS), presents this Court with questions re-
quiring the application of well-established First Amend--
ment principles. While the factual l;>ackground of this 
particular case raises these constitutional issues in a 
manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only 
infrequently presented to lower federal courts, our de-
cision today is governed by existing precedent. 
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the· 
academic community, we approach our task with special 
caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, fac-
ulty members, and administrators in an environment free 
from disruptive interference with the educatio1tprocess. 
We also are mindful of the equally significant interest 
in the widest latitude for free expression and debate 
consonant with the maintenance of order. \Vhere these 
interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made 
binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment~ 




HEALY v. JAMES 
I 
,ve mention briefly at the outset the setting in 1969-
1970. A climate of unrest prevailed on many college 
campuses in this country. There had been widespread 
civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by 
the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson. Some 
colleges had been shut clown altogether, while at others 
files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chap-
ters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic 
force during this period.1 Although the causes of cam-
pus disruption were many and complex, one of the prime 
consequences of such activities was the denial by the 
few of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights 
to the majority of students. Indeed, many of the most 
cherished characteristics long associated with institutions 
of higher learning appeared to be endangered. J;"'or-
tunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere 
and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet, 
it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case 
arose. 
Petitioners are students attending Central Connec-
ticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution 
of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook 
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chap-
ter" of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) . Pur-
suant to procedures established by the College, peti-
tioners filed a request for official recognition as a. campus 
organization with the Student Affairs Committee, a com-
mittee composed of four students, three faculty members 
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request speci-
fied three purposes for the proposed organization's exist-
ence. It would provide "a forum of discussion and 
1 See Report of th r Prr~idrnt';;: Comm'n on C:1rnpu, Umr~t (1070): 
Report of the ABA Cornrn·11 on C:irnpu, Go,·'t ;ind St11cl('nt Di,,cnt 
(1970). 
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self-education for students developing an analysis of 
American society"; it would serve as an "agency for 
integrating thought with action so as to bring about 
constructive changes"; and it would endeavor to pro-
vide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of 
leftist students" with other interested groups on cam-
pus and in the community." The Committee, while 
satisfied that the statement of purposes \Vas clear and 
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the 
relationship between the proposed local group and the 
National SDS organization. In response to inquiries, 
representatives of the proposed organization stated that 
they would 11ot affiliate ,Yith any national organiza-
tion and that their group would remain "completely 
independent." 
In response to other questions asked by Committee 
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus dis-
ruption , the applicants made the following statements, 
which proved significant during the later stages of these 
proceedi11gs: 
"Q. How would you respond to issues of violence 
as other SDS chapters have? 
"A. Our action "·ould have to be dependent upon 
each issue. 
"Q. Would you use any means possible? 
"A. No I can't say that; "·ould not kno,Y until 
"·e know what the issues are. 
"Q. Could you env1s10n the S. D. S. interrupt-
ing a class? 
"A. Impossible for me to say." 
With this information before it, the Committee re-
~ The st:1tement of purposes is set out in full in the dissenting 
opinion from the deci~ion of the Second Circuit. Healy Y. James, 445 






HEALY v. JAMES 
quested an additional filing by the applicants, includ-
ing a formal statement regarding affiliations. The 
amended application filed in response stated flatly that 
"CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under 
the dictates of any National organization." 3 At a sec-
ond hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the 
question of relationship with the National organization 
was raised again. One of the organizers explained that 
the National SDS was divided into several "factional 
groups," that the national-local relationship ,ms a. loose 
one, and that the local organization accepted only "cer-
tain ideas" but not all of the National organization's 
aims and philosophies. 
By a vote of six to t,rn the Committee ultimately 
approved the application and recommended to the Pres-
ident of the ,Qpllege, Dr. James, that the organization -be accorded official recognition. In approving the ap-
plication, the majority indicated that its decision was 
premised on the belief that varying vie·wpoints should 
be represented on campus and that since the Young 
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the 
Young Republican s, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed 
recognized status, a group should be available with which 
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also 
noted and relied on the organization's claim of inde-
pendence. Finally, it admonished the organization that 
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's 
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies 
against interference with the privacy of other students 
3 445 F. 2d, at 1137. During the Committee's consideration of 
petitione~application, one of the group's representatives was asked 
·why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a 
nationally known name. The witnPss' response was that "the name 
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across, 
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested 
in such to express themselves." 
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or destruction of property. The two dissenting mem-
bers based their reservation primarily on the lack of 
clarity regarding the organization's independence. 
Several days later, the President rejected the Com-
mittee's rtcommendation, and issued a statement indi-
cating that petitioners' organization ·was not to be ac-
corded the benefits of official campus recognition. His 
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the 
margin,4 indicate several reasons for his action. He 
4 The President stated: 
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Af-
fairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the 
majority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students 
fo r a Democratic Society, it is my judgment that the statement of 
purpose to form n !or-al chapter of Student,, for a Dcmocrn1 ic f?ociety 
canie.o full and unmistakable adherence to at lea$t somE' of the 
mnjor tenets of the national organization. loo~e and divided though 
that orgrrniza.tion may be. The published aims and 11hilo,ophy of 
tbe Students for a Democrat ic Society, which include clisrnption 
and violence, are cont rary to the approYed polic)· (b)· faculty, 
students, and administ ration) of Central Connecticut State Collegfr 
which states : 
"'Students do not lrn Ye tlrn right to invade the prime)· of others, 
to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and es-
sential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of 
others.' 
"The further statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSC 
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any 
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends to, 
follow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a 
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a 
policy. 
"Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the campus, the· freedom. 
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms 
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities 
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have 
the righ t to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to 
express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by 
orderly means. They m:1y organize public demon~trations and pro-
test gatherings and utilize the right of petition'-these are all precious 
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found that the organization's philosophy " ·as antithetical 
to the school's policies," and that the group's independ-
ence ,vas doubtful. He concluded that approval should 
freedoms that we cherish and arc freedoms on which we stand. To 
approve any organization or individual who joins with an org:miza-
tion which open!>· repudiatrs those principles is rontrary to those 
freedoms and to the appron'ci 'Statement on the Rights, Freedoms, 
and ReRponRibili t ie~ of Stud ent~• a t Centrnl.'" 
5 In 1969, CCSC adopted . as have man>· other rolleges and uni-
rnrsities, a Statement of Right", Freedom~. and Responsibilities of 
Students. This st.ntement , common!>· referred to 11s thr "R1urlent 
Bill of Right,-," is printed ns nn Appendix to the Second Circuit's 
majority opinion in this case, H ealy Y. James, 445 F. 2d, at 1132-1136 
(1971). Part Y of th[lt statement e~tnblishe~ the ~bnd,ucl~ for ::ip-
prornl of campus organizations and imposes se,·ern 1 b::t sic limita t ions 
on their c::impns activities: 
"A. Care shall be taken in the establi~hment ::i nd organization 
of c:unpus groups so that the ba-~ie rights, freedoms and responsi-
bilities of students will be presen-ed. 
"B . Student organizations shall submit a clea r statement of pur-
po~e. criteria for membership, rule~ of procedurr~ and a li"t of 
officers as a condition of institutionnl recogni tion. The>· shall not be 
required to submi t a membership list as a condition of institu tional 
recognition. 
"C. l\Iembcrship in campus organiz:itions shall be limited to 
matriculated studrnts (d:1>· or eYening) at the college. M embership 
shall not be rn,tricted b~- rnce. religion or nat ionalit>·· The members 
shall have sole power to determine organization polic>· consistent with 
the regulations of the college. 
"D . Each org;1nization is free to choose its own adYiser. AdYisers 
to orgnnizations shall ach·i~e bu t not control t he orgnnizations and 
their policies. 
"E. College students and student organiza.tions shall have the right 
to examine and cfocu ~~ [l II que~tions of interest to them . to express 
opinion publicly and pri,·atrl>·, and to support causes by orderly 
mea ns. They ma>' organize public demonst rat ions nnd protest 
gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not have 
the right to depriYe others of the opportunit>· to speak or be hea rd, 
to invade the prime>' of others. to damage the propert>' of others, 
1o di8rupt the re11:ula r and essenrial opcrntion of th r eoll r~r; or to 
intrrfere with the rights of others." 
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+-noc..+-
not be granted to any group ~ "openly repudiates" 
the ~ollege's dedication to academic freedom. 
D~nial of official recognition posed serious problems 
for the organization's existence and gro"·th. Its mem-
bers \Yere depriYed of the opportunity to place announce-
ments regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in 
the student newspaper; they were precluded from using 
various campus bulletin boards; and-most impor-
tantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus 
facilities for holdi11g meetings. This latter disability 
was brought home to petitioners shortly after the Pres-
ident's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice 
calling a meeting to discuss ,yhat further action should 
be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The 
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center 
("Devil's Den") but ,rnre disbanded on the President's 
order since nonrecognized groups ,Yere not entitled to 
use such facilities. 6 
Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ulti-
mately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the 
burden of nonrecognition , petitioners resorted to the 
courts. They filed a suit in the Federal District Court 
in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief against the President of the ..college. other admin-
istrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners' 
6 During the meeting petitioners were approached by two of the 
,&.ollegr's clcnn,: who scrYed petitioners with a rncrnornnchun from 
TI1e Presiclen t stating: 
"Notice has been receiYed by this office of a meeting of the 
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrday-Nowmber 6 at 7:00 p. m. at 
the Devils' Den.' 
"Such meeting ma~· not take place in the DeYils Den of the Stu-
dent Center nor in or on any other property of the college since the 
C. C. S.~.-S. D. S. is not a duly recognized college organization. 
"You are hereby notified by this action to cease and desist from 
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primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amend-
ment rights of expression and association arising from 
denial of campus recognition. The cause "·as submitted 
initially on stipulated facts and, after a short hearing, 
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied pro-
cedural due process because the President had based 
his decision on conclusions regarding tlrn applicant's 
affiliation which "·ere outside the record before him. 
The court concluded that if the President wished to act 
on the basis of material outside the application he must 
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity 
f r • • , ~ r, ho. r ,o-,, ~. ..._ _ 7..,_ t.._o....,~e fl.@IM'~ 311 F. Supp., at 1276, 1281. While re-
taining jurisdiction over the case, the District Court 
ordered respondents to hold a hearing in order to clarify 
the several ambiguities surrounding the President's de-
c1s1on. One of the matters to be explored was ·whether 
the local organization, true to its repeated affirmations, 
vms in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at 
1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two 
were not separable. the respondents were instructed that 
they might then review the "aims and philosophy" of 
the National organization. Ibid. 
Pursuant to the court's order, the President desig-
nated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve 
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The 
hearing, which spanned t\vo dates and lasted approxi-
mately two hours, added little in terms of objective 
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Peti-
tioners introduced a statement offering to change the 
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS" 
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Con-
necticut State College." They further reaffirmed that 
they would "have no connection whatsoever to the 
structure of an existing national organization." 7 Peti-
'319 F. Supp. , at 114. The hearing officer, owr petit ioner~' ob-
jection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the 
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tioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty 
adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations 
elsewhere were unaffiliated with any national organiza-
tion. The hearing officer, in addition to introducing 
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Com-
mittee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions 
of a transcript of hearings before the United States 
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee 
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were of-
fered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities 
had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demon-
strate that there existed a national organizat-ion that 
recognized and cooperated with regional and local college 
campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the as-
serted existence of a National SDS, nor did they ques-
tion that it did have a system of affiliations of some· 
sort. Their contention was simply that their organiza-
tion would not associate with that network. Through-
out the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes. 
What seemed relevant to one appeared completely im-
material to the other. This failure of the hearing to• 
advance the litigation was, at bottom, the consequence 
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considera-
tions that should control the President's ultimate deci-
sion, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing· 
section . 
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits, 
the P resident reaffirmed his prior decision to deny peti-
tioners'? recognition as a campus organization. The-
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were· 
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at 
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the 
orderly process of change" on the campus. 
cation and would be beyond the permissible scope of the hearing _ 
Whatenr the merits of thi~ ruling, it was still in the record re-
Yirwc<l by t he PresiJrnt and ,ms relied on in the subsequent Dist rict 
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After the President's second staternen t issued, the case 
then returned to the District Court where it was ordered 
dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal 
requisites of procedural due process had been complied 
"·ith, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their 
burden of showing that they could function free from 
the National organization, and, third , that the college's 
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an o1ganiza-
tion whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts 
of disruption" did not violate petitioners' associational 
rights. 319 F. Supp. 113. 
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals where, by a two-to-one vote, the District Court's 
judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not 
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the 
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves 
of the due process accorded them and had failed to meet 
their burden of complying with the prevailing stand-
ards for recognition. 445 F . 2d, at 1131-1132. Judge 
Smith dissented, disagreeing "·ith the majority's refusal 
to address the merits and finding that petitioners had 
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id., 
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the 
reasons - follow, we conclude that the judgment 
of the courts below must be reversed and the case re-
manded for reconsideration. 
II 
G At the outset we note thaVcolleges and universities re not enclaves immune from the s,Yeep of the First 
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dent-s or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse ga.te." Tinker 
v. Des Jvl oines Independent Conimunity School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Jus-
tice Fort.as made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights 
sra..+e 
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must always be applied "in light of the special charac-
teristics of the .. . environment" in the pa.rticular case. 
Ibid. And, where state-operated educational institu-
tions are involved, this Court has long recognized "the 
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials, consistent ,Yith fundamental 
constitutional safeguards. to prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools." Id., at 507. ~ precedents of 
this Court leave no room for the view that. because of 
the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment pro-
tections should apply with less force on college cam-
puses than in the community at large. Quite to the 
contrary, " [ t] he vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community 
of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 314 U. S. 
470. 487 ( 1960) . The college classroom ,Yith its sur-
munding environs is peculiarly the "market place of 
ideas" and we break no new constitutional ground in 
reaffirming this Kation's dedication to safeguarding aca-
demic freedom. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 
U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. J.Vew Hampshire, 354 
U. S. 234, 249-250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Warren). 262 (1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion). 
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is 
the right of individuals to associate to further their per-
sonal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not ex-
plicitly set out in the Amendment. it has long been held 
to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and 
petition. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
430 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
366 U. S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan 
for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that 
denial without justification of official recognition to col-
, , e. +-, rk 
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lege organizations burdens or abridges that associa-
tional right:l. The primary impediment to free associa- /c 
tion flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of 
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate 
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was 
demonstrated in this case ·when, several clays after the 
President's decision was announced, petitioners were not 
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop 
because ' they were not an approved group. 
Petitioners' associational interests also were circum-
scribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards 
and the school newspaper. If an organization is to re-
main a viable entity in a campus community in which 
new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess 
the means of communicating with these students. More-
over, the organization's ability to participate in the in-
tellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue 
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the 
customary media for communicating with the ~dmin- ;g 
istration, faculty members, and other students_?....--Such 
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial. 
8 ~ It i~ unclectr on this re~d ,;.bet.br r rcc-ognition al~o carries 11·ith 
it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners' counsel 
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group 
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg., 
71-452-OPINION 
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Respondents and the courts below appear to have 
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this 
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District 
Court concluded that, 
"President James' discretionary action in deny-
ing this application cannot be legitimately magni-
fied and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable 
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of 
any segment of the college students; neither does 
his action deter in any material way the individual 
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action 
be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or 
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 319· 
F. Supp., at 116. 
In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was 
~ ~~dministrative seal of official college respectabil-
ity."...,;, Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals 
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "col-
lege's stamp of approval." 445 F . 2d, at. 1131. Re-
spondents take that same position here, arguing that 
petitioners st.ill may meet as a group off campus, that 
they still may distribute written material off campus, 
and that they still may meet together informally on 
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS. 
We do not agree with the characterization by the-
courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. Vi!e 
at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that 
"[r]ecognition does not thereby entitle an organization to college· 
financial support." 311 F. Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that, 
at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds, 
and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating 
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational 
aspect of nonrecognition in this case. r ...._,.........\!'These statements are in contrast to ihe fir~t opinion by the 
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitu--
tional significance of petitioners' claim. 311 F. Supp., at 1280-12S2 .. 
14 
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may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous 
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 ( 1958), that the admin-
istration "has taken no direct a.ction .. . to restrict the 
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But 
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct 
interference with fundamental rights. The requirement 
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership 
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect, 
infringement of the members' associational rights. Like-
wise. in this case, the group's possible ability to exist 
outside the campus community does not ameliorate sig-
nificantly the disabilities imposed by the President's 
action. ,Ve are not free to disregard the practical reali-
ties. MR. Ju sTICE STEWART has made the salient point: 
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against 
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled 
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v. 
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960). See 
also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234. 263 (1957) 
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); Watkin s v. 
United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 (1957) . 
not- (;.h0:-llen 3 e:.<.f +he. 
,Oi-cJc.eJt1,.._' I-CJ<11•4 • 
"(: e.,, .,.. .;-),()., +- ..,._-~ e L The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had 
/~ the QQ_rden of she.Ying entitlement to recognition by the 
o olleg<''t WJ,ile petitimwcs have ""uocdod 1~,1 tb',iJI 
;u·ere p1=operJy requirQ~ tijt file an application in con- ~ I I 
:/ ormity with the '""""""\?' rules of the iollegc,-'!hey°'- ~ 
/0 ~ -+-+5 F. 2d , at 11 31: :119 F. Supp .. at 11G. ~ 
//~Tho stand:i rds for official recop:n i1ion require :ipplicnnb to 
proYide a clear st:itement of purposes, crit eria for membership, rules 
of procedure, and :i list of officers. Applicants must limit member-
ship to "matriculated s tudents" and m::t~· not discrimin:ite on the 
basis of race. religion or nationalit_,·. The standards fur ther state 
that groups may "examine and discuss all questions of interest," 
they may conduct demonstrations and utilize their right of petition , 
but they are prohibited from interfering with the rights of other 
=It/ 
=/ 
,., .. ,.J.ty; 
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el'it.dlon~ the view of the courts below that final rejec-
tion could rest on their failure to convince the admin-
istration that their organization ,ms unaffiliated with 
the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in 
this opinion, ,Ye do not consider the issue of affiliation 
to be a controlling one. But apart from any particu-
lar issue. once petitioners had filed an application in 
conformity with college requirements, the burden was 
upon the .£._ollege administration to justify its decision 
of rejectio;. See, e. g., Law Studenf Civil R1'ghts Re-
search Council Y. Tradmoncl, 401 U. S. 154. 162-163 
(1971); United States Y. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 
(1968); Speiser Y. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It 
is to be remembered that the effect of the college's denial 
of recognition was a form of prior restra~t, denying to 
petitioners' organization the range of associational activ-
ities described above. While a college has a legitimate 
interest in preventing disruption on the campus, ,Yhich 
under circumstances requiring the rnfeguarding of that 
interest may justify such restraint , a "heavy burden" 
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness 
of that action. See Near v. lvlinnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 
713-716 (1931); Orgam·.wtion for a Better Austin v. 
Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U. S. 51, 57 (1965). 
III 
These fundamental errors-discounting the existence 
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplac-
ing the burden of proof-require that the judgments 
below be reversed. But ,rn are unable to conclude that 
no basis exists upon ,Yhich nonrecognition might be ap-
propriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of 
students. See n. 5, supra. Petitioners ha ,·e not challenged these 
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the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be 
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial 
of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the 
record we conclude that the case should be remanded, 
aniin an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts 
upob reconsideratior~ it is appropriate to discuss the 
several bases of President James' decision. Four pos-
sible justifications for nonrecognition , all closely related, 
might be derived from the record and his statements. 
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate 
his decision: a fourth, ho-wever, has merit. 
A 
From the outset the controversy in this case has cen-
tered in large measure around the relationship, if any, 
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The 
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its 
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue; 
the court-ordered hearing also ,rns directed primarily 
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners 
and their counsel that the local group was in fact inde-
pendent of the National organization, it is evident that 
President James was significantly influenced by his ap-
prehension that there was a connection. Aware of the 
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with 
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently 
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient just,ifica~ ~ / ~ 
tion for denying recognition.~ ___________ _,./ 
Although this precise issue has not come before the 
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved 
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or de-
nying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's 
association with an unpopular organization. See, e. g., 
United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); K eyishian 
/ ~ J T See n. 4, supra, for the complete text of the Prc,:iclcnt 'E ,t :1tenwnt . 
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Y. Board of R egents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-610 (1967); 
Elfbran dt Y. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v. 
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961). In these cases 
it has been established that "guilt by association alone, 
·without [establishing] that an individual's association 
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an im-
permissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment 
rights. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The 
Government has the burden of establishing a kno"·ing 
affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims 
J J and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal 
~
omc1a: _ 
tr- -- ause of its affiliation ; l'tM 1 ... gani~ edj,cated tQ JJJa J ala1fi ;j 7Mt11Im) 
J+ode>a+..s j'(),. as conceded by the College and the lower courts,. 
[) ~ ,.,.o<;. .. ca-+ .. e. 
JrJe.1e-ly 
is loosely organized, having various factions and pro- / "-
moting a number of diverse social and political views,J / 
only some of which call for unlawful action."irf Not only 
did petitioners proclaim their complete independence 
,s from this orgamzafaon,liii but they also indicated that 
they shared only some of the beliefs its leaders have 
/ 3 ~ Tn addit ion to t he cases cited in the t ext above. see also Law 
Students Civil R ights R esearch Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 
164-166 (1971) ; In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23, 28 (1971); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); N oto v. United States,. 
/ 'f 367 u. S. 290, 299-300 (1961) . 
..,____l!!See FBI, Appropriation 59-60 (1972), in which t he fo rmer Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation , J. Edgar Hoover , states 
that while violent factions have spun off from SDS, its present 
leadership is "critical of bombing and violence." 
/ ,5 .__.....--w P etitioners asserted their independence bot h orall:· and in a 
written submission before the Student Affairs Commit tee. They re-
stated their nonaffiliation in a formal statement filed prior to the 
court -ordered hearing. The onl:· indication to the cont rary is their 
unwillingness to eschew use of t he SDS name altogether. But see 
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expressed."t- On this record it is clear that the rela-
tionship was not an adequate ground for the denial 
of recognition. 
B 
Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with, 
or at least retained an affinity for, National SDS, Presi-
dent James attributed what he believed to be the philos-
ophy of that organization to the local group. He 
characterized the petitioning group as adlwr;»~ •- " 
"f • L - -
p, .@ (11P' ~ 
He further emphasized that the petitioners' 
"philosophies" 
were "ci0unter to the official policy of the college," 
I 
__ .," ..,,:t1nes' responsibility, 
__ ---~· ~ ,_,,~1J1 e:;:;1011 of them would not justify the denial 
of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did 
in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus be-
comes immaterial. The JlOllege, acting here as the in-
strumenta.lity of the State, may not restrict speech or 
association simply because it finds the views expressed 
by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black 
put it most simply and clearly: 
"I do not believe tha.t it can be too often repeated 
that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and 
/t~~ReprP~rnt:1ti1"C'., of the ·group ~btccl during: tlw Student Affair~ 
Committee meetings that they did not identify with all of the K:1-
tionnl's statements, but " ·ished simply to "pick . . . C'ertain ideas" 
from that organization. 
1 ~ See n. 4; supra. 
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assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must 
be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later 
they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." Com-
munist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 
367 U. S. 1, 137 (1961). 
C 
As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a 
third rationale for President James' decision-beyond 
the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to 
emerge. His second statement, issued after the court-
~; 0 rdered &dffiiRistFatize hearing, indicates that he based 
J rejection on a conclusion that this particular group would 
be a "disruptive influence at CCSC." This language 
was underscored in the second District Court opinion. 
In fact, the Court concluded that the President had 
determined that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus activ-
ities were likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC." 
~19 F. Supp., at 116. 
If this reason, directed at the organization's activities 
rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by 
the record, this Court's prior decisions would provide 
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition. 
The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the 
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere 
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite 
or produce such action." Brandenberg Y. Ohio, 395 U. S. 
444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiarn opinion). See 
also Scales Y. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232 
(1961); Noto"· United States, 367 U.S. 289,298 (1961); 
Yates Y. United States, 354 U. S. 298 ( 1957). In the 
/ t '--- context of the "special characteristics of the school 
environment,"~ the power of the government to pro-
/K ___,,,--..T!fTinkcr Y. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S., 
at 506. 
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hibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal 
nature. Also prohibitable are actions which "materially 
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school." Tinker v. Des lYI oines Independent Commu-
nity School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational 
activities need not be tolerated where they infringe rea-
sonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially 
interfere with the opportunity of other students to ob-
tain an education. 
The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which 
great emphasis was placed by the President. dra,Ys pre-
cisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It 
purports to impose no limitations on the right of col-
lege student organizations "to examine and discuss all 
questions of interest to them." But it also states that 
students have no right ( 1) "to deprive others of the op-
portunity to speak or be heard ," (2) "to invade the 
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of 
others," ( 4) "t,-0 disrupt the regular and essential opera-
J 1.,_ tion of the college," or (5) "to interfere with the rights 
of others."-$ The lin e between permissible speech and 
impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional require-
ment, and if there were an evidential basis to suppor.t 
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat 
of material disruption in violation of that command the 
Jf President's decision should be affirmed~ ;;l O 
'-----=;:Seen. 5, supra. 
J ~It m:1y not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a lrgiti-
20 mate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to 
regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights-as 
nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate that the action 
faken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and 
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest. 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968). See also NAACP 
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida 
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The record, however, offers no substantial basis for 
that conclusion. The only support for the vie,,- ex-
pressed by the President, other than the repudiated 
affiliation with~ is to be found in the 
ambivalent responses offered by the group's representa-
tives at the Student Affairs Co1runittee hearing, during 
which they stated that they did not know whether they 
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same man-
ner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses. 
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could 
never "envision ... interrupting a class." Whatever-
force these statements might be thought to have is 
largely dissipated by the following exchange between 
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs 
during the court-ordered hearing: 
"Counsel: I just read the document that you're 
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee 
meeting] and I can't see that there's anything in 
it that intimates that these students contemplate 
any illegal or disruptive practice. 
"Dean: No. There's no question raised to that, 
counsel." 
Dean Judd's remark reaffirms, in accord with the full 
record, that there was no substantial evidence that 
these particular individuals acting together would con-
stitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar 
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted 
little more than the sort of "undifferentiated fear -ei. /a r 
apprehension of disturbance [ v,·hich] is not enough to· 
overcome the right of freedom of expression." Tinker 
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record, absent a 
showing of any likelihood of disruption or um1·illingne;;;; to recognize 
reasonable rules governing campus conduct, it is not necessary for 
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related 
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Y. Des iv! oines Independent Community School D1·s-
trict, 393 U. S., at 508. 
D 
These same references in t record to the group's 
equivocation regarding how i night respond to "issues 
of violence" and whether · . could ever "envision 
interrupting a class," sug est a fourth possible reason 
why recognition might ha, been denied to these peti-
tioners. These remarks rnigh well have been read as 
announcing petitioners' unw· lingness to be bound by 
reasonable school rules go erning conduct.2 " The col-
lege's Statement of Rights Freedoms and Responsibili-
ties of Students, contains, ,Ye have seen, an exp1icit 
statement with respect to c mpus disruptioll. The reg-
ulation, carefully differen ating between advocacy and 
action, is a reasonable one and petitioners have not 
questioned it directly. 2" T et their statements raise con-
siderable question whether they intend to abide by the 
prohibitions contained th Tein/• 
"" The Comt of _\ppenls read th0 record :1,: ~hrrn·ing th:1t peti-
tioners "failed cnndidl>· to r ~pond to inquiries whether the>· would 
resort to Yiolence and disruJ ion on the CCSC campus, including 
interruption of rlasoe~." 44 F. 2d. at 1131. °\Yhile petitioner's 
statements may be read :is · 1timnting a rejection of re::isonable col-
lege regubtions in adrn.nce. hrre is substantinl ambiguity on this 
point. Petitioners appear to nrede the appropriateness of those 
standards and the Student AJfa · s Committee neyer asked specifically 
whether they were willing to abide b_v these rules. l\Ioreornr, the 
issue was not among t hose eferred b>· the Dist rict Court to the 
administrative hearing and either part:,· pursued this problem at 
that time. Indeed , the failur of the District Court to identify this 
as a significant subject of ii uir>· lends support for the ,·iew that 
remnnd is necessary. 
"" S0e n . .5. supra. 
"' -:'\or did the admini~tr:ttje hr:uing rhrif? this que~tion. It wns 
then addressed only tnngenti. Hy ; the petitioners who had gi,·en the 




+-h 1'.s en f-1~-<:-
rc:::c. +1on 
71-452-0PINION 
HEALY v. JAMES 23 
As we have already statectii1 Parts B and C, the 
critical line for First -4-mend ent purposes must be 
drawn between advocacy, w 1ch is entitled to full pro-
tection, and action, which i not. Petitioners may, if 
they so choose, preach the opriety of amending or 
even doing away with any all campus regulations. 
They ma.y not, however, un ertake to flaunt these rules. 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, a the time he was a circuit 
judge on the Eighth Circuit stated: 
"We ... hold that a col} ge has the inherent power 
to promulgate rules al d regulations; that it has 
the inherent power pr, perly to discipline; that it 
has power appropriate y to protect itself and its 
property; that it may e, )ect that its students adhere 
to generally accepted tandards of conduct." Es-
teban v. Central Mu; uri State College, 415 F. 2d 
1077, 1089 (CA8 19 ) , cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965, 
(1970). 
Just as in the communit at large, reasonable regula-
tions with respect to the tiI ie, the place, and the manner 
in which student groups conduct their speech-related 
activities must be respect . ~" A college administration 
may impose a requiremen , such as the one apparently 
imposed in this case, that group seeking official recog-
nition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to rea-
sonable campus law. St h a requirement does not 
impose an impermissible ondition on the students' as-
sociational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to as-
to clarify their position; andt teir counsel, whose tactics were char-
acterized as "disruptive" by t · Court of Appeals, elected to make 
argumentative statements rath r than elicit relevant testimony. 445, 
F. 2d, at 1126. 
"·' See, e.g., City of Chicag1v. Mosley, - U.S.-, - (19,2); 
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. · . 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana,. 
379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); ,ouisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
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sernble, or to petition for c nges in school rules is in 
no sense infringed. It mer y constitutes an agreement 
to conform with reasonabl standards respecting con-
duct. This is a miuimal quirement, in the interest 
of the entire academic con rnnity, of any group seek-
ing the privilege of offici recognition. Quite apart 
from the question ,,.·hether 1ese petitioners pose a pres-
ent threat to campus order, ve conclude that they may 
be denied the benefits of p ticipation in the internal 
life of the college communi if on remand it becomes 
clear that petitioners reserv the right to violate any 
rules with which they disa 
IV 
We think the above discussion establishes the appro-
priate frame,rnrk for consideration of petitioners' re-
quest for campus recognition. Because respondents 
failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment 
principles, the judgment below approving respondents' 
denial of recognition must be reversed. Since we can-
n ot conclude from this record that petitionerf: 1;1~et tih• w~re. 
4ihi,:0i;iRe,td I e~.trer1<Jenb--~ " ·illing~ to abide by reason-
able campus rules and regulation¾embg~iet"l it, ek "Stet;. 
EloRt Ei.U gf Rig,ht.r " ·e order the case remanded for 
reconsideration. We note. in so holding, that the wide 
latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms 
~c In addition to 1 he coll ege admini,tr:1ti011 ·., broad rnl r rna king 
power to assure that t he traditional academic atmosphere is safe-
guarded, it may also impose sanctions on those who Yiolil te the rules. 
·we find , for instmice, the Student Affairs Committee's admonition to 
petitioners in this case to suggest one permissible practice-recogni-
tion, once accorded, ma~· be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners 
fa il to respect campus law. See, e. g., Mississippi Civil Liberties 
Union Y. University of Southern Mississippi, No. 71-1801 (CA5 
1971) ; American Civil L iberties Union Y. Rad/ ord College, 315 F. 
Supp. 893 (WD Va. 1970). 
,. 
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of expression and association is not without its costs 
in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and 
an ordered society. Indeed, this latitude often has re-
sulted, on the campus and elsewhere, in the infringe-
ment of the rights of others. Though we deplore the 
tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional priY-
uleges they invoke, and although the infringement of rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, we reaffirm this Court's dedication to the principles of the 
Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society 
is founded. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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MR. J USTICE POWELL delivered the opuuon of the-
Court. 
This case, arising out of a denial by a state college 
of official recognition to a group of students who desired 
to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS), presents this Court with questions re--
quiring the application of well-established First Amend-
ment principles. While the factual background of this 
particular case raises these constitutional issues in a 
manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only 
infrequently presented to lower federal courts, our de--
cision today is governed by existing precedent. 
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the· 
academic community, we approach our task with special 
caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, fac-
ulty members, and administrators in an environment free · 
from disruptive interference with the education process. 
We also are mindful of the equally significant interest 
in the widest latitude for free expression a11d debate 
consonant with the maintenance of order. Where these-
interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made 
binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
strikes the required balance. 
2 
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I 
We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 1969-
1970. A climate of unrest prevailed 011 many college 
campuses in this country. There had been widespread 
civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by 
the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson. Some 
colleges had been shut clown altogether, while at others 
files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chap-
ters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic 
force during this periocl.1 Although the causes of cam-
pus disruption were many and complex. one of the prime 
consequences of such activities was the denial by the 
few of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights 
to the majority of students. Indeed, many of the most 
cherished characteristics long associated with institutions 
of higher learning appeared to be endangered. For-
tunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere 
and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet, 
it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case 
arose. 
Petitioners are students attending Central Connec-
ticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution 
of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook 
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chap-
ter" of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Pur-
suant to procedures established by the College, peti-
tioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus 
organization with th e Student Affairs Committee, a com-
mittee composed of four students. three faculty members 
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request speci-
fied three purposes for the proposeJ organization 's exist-
ence. It would provide "a forum of discussion and 
1 Sec RC'pon of thr Prn::idcnt'~ Comm'n on C:1mp11~ Unmst (19i0); 
Rrport of the AR .\ Comm 'n on Cmnpu~ Go,··t and Student Di~~cnt 
(1970). 
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self-education for students developing an analysis of 
American society"; it ,vould serve as an "agency for 
integrating thought with action so as to bring about 
constructive changes"; and it would endeavor to pro-
vide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of 
leftist students" with other interested groups on cam-
pus and in the community." The Committee, while 
satisfied that the statement of purposes was clear and 
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the 
relationship betv,·een the proposed local group and the 
National SDS organization. In response to inquiries, 
representatives of the proposed organization stated that 
they would not affiliate ,1·ith any national organiza-
tion and that their group would remain "completely 
independent." 
In response to other questions asked by Committee 
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus dis-
ruption , the applicants made the following statements, 
,Yhich proved significant during the later stages of these 
proceedillg:1: 
"Q. How "·ould you respond to issues of violence 
as other SDS chapters have? 
"A. Our action would have to be dependent upon 
each issue. 
"Q. Would you use any means possible? 
"A. No I can't say that; would not know until 
we know what the issues are. 
"Q. Could you envision the S. D. S. interrupt-
ing a class? 
"A. Impossible for me to say." 
With this information before it, the Committee re-
2 The statement of purposes is set out in full in the dissenting 
opinion from the cleci~ion of the Second Circuit. H ealy Y. James, 445 
F. 2d 1112, 1136-1137 (1971). 
4 
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quested an additional filing by the applicants, includ-
ing a formal statement regarding affiliations. The 
amended application filed in response stated flatly that 
"CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not w1der 
the dictates of any National organization." 3 At a sec-
ond hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the 
question of relationship with the National organization 
was raised again. One of the organizers explained that 
the National SDS was divided into several "factional 
groups," that the national-local relationship was a loose 
one, and that the local organization accepted only "cer-
tain ideas" but not all of the National organization's 
aims and philosophies. 
By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately 
approved the application and recommended to the Pres-
ident of the college, Dr. James, that the organization 
be accorded official recognition. In approving the ap-
plication, the majority indicated that its decision was 
premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should 
be represented on campus and that since the Young 
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the 
Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed 
recognized status, a group should be available with ·which 
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also 
noted and relied on the organization's claim of inde-
pendence. Finally, it admonished the organization that 
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's 
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies 
against interference with the privacy of other students 
3 445 F. 2d, at 1137. During the Committee's consideration of 
petitioner's application, one of the group's representatives was asked 
why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a 
nationally known name. The witness' response was that "the name 
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across, 
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested 
in such to express themselves." 
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or destruction of property. The two dissenting mem-
bers based their reservation primarily on the lack of 
clarity regarding the organization's independence. 
Several days later, the President rejected the Com-
mittee's rEocommendation, and issued a statement indi-
cating that petitioners' organization was not to be ac-
corded the benefits of official campus recognition. His 
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the 
margin,• indicate several reasons for his action. He 
4 The President stated: 
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Af-
fairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the 
majority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students 
fo r a Democratic Society, it is my judgment t hat the statement of 
purpose t o form n ]o('al chapter of Students for a Democratic Society 
carries full and unmi,;takablc adherence to at le:1st some of the 
major tenets of the national organization, loose and divided though 
that organization mny be. The published aims and philo,ophy of 
the Students for a Democratic Society, which include disrupt ion 
and violence, are contra ry to the approved polic~· (by faculty, 
students, and administration) of Central Connecticut State CollegE; 
which states: 
"'Students do not have the right to invade the privac~· of others, 
to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and es-
sential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of 
others.' 
"The further statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSC 
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any 
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends to-
follow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a 
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a 
policy. 
"Freedom of speech, aeademic freedom on the campus, the freedom 
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms 
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities 
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have 
the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to 
express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by 
orderly menns. They mny organize public demonstrations and pro-
test gatherings and ut ilize the right of petition'-these are all precious 
6 
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found that the organization's philosophy was antithetical 
to the school's policies/ and that the group's independ-
ence wa.s doubtful. He concluded that approval shou]d 
freedoms that we cherish and arc frerdoms on which we stand. To 
approve any organization or incli,·idual who joins with an organiza-
tion which openly repudiates those prinriplcs is rontrary to those 
freedoms and to the apprO\·ed 'Statement on the Rights , Freedoms, 
:me! Responsihilitie~ of Students' ::it Central.'" 
5 In 1969, CCSC adopted. as haYc man_\· other colleges and uni-
Yersities, a Statement of Rights, FrPedoms, and Responsibilities of 
Stuclrntf'. This st.aterneJJ1, common I.'· referred to 118 the "Student 
Bill of Rights," ir- printed ::is an Appcndi.'\ to the Second Circuit's 
majority opinion in this cnse, Healy v. James, 445 F. 2d, at 1132-1136 
(1971). Part V of that statement e~tabli8hcs the r-tandarcb for ap-
prov[ll of campus organization" [lnd imposes se,·era I b[lsic limitations 
on their campns activities: 
"A. Care shall be ta ken in 1 he est.1 blishment and organization 
of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsi-
bilities of students will be presen·cd. 
"B. Student org[lniz:1tions shnll submit a clear statement of pur-
pose, criteria for member~hip, rule.-; of procedures :ind a li~t of 
officers as a condition of insti tutional recognition. The.'' shall not be 
required to submit a membership list as a condition of institutional 
recognition. 
"C. l\fombership in campus organizations shall be limited to 
matricnbted students (day or ewning) at the college. Membership 
shall not be restricted by r:1cc , religion or nationalit)·. The members 
shall have sole po1,·cr to determine organization policy consistent with 
the regulations of the colJcge. 
"D. Each organization is free to choose its own ad,·iser. Ach·isers 
to organizatio11s shall advice but not control the organizations and 
their policies. 
"E. Colleire student,: and student organizations shall ham the right 
to examine and discuss all que~tions of interest to them. to express 
opinion publicly and privately, and to cupport causes by orderly 
means. They may organize public demonst rations and protest 
gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not have 
the right to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard, 
to invade the privacy of others, to damage the property of others,. 
1o di3rupt the ref!,'ular and essential operation of the rollegc\ or to, 
interfere with the rights of others." 
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not be granted to any group which "openly repudiates" 
the college's dedication to academic freedom. 
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems 
for the organization's existence and growth. Its mem-
bers were deprived of the opportunity to place announce-
ments regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in 
the student newspaper; they were precluded from using 
various campus bulletin boards; and-most impor-
tantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus 
facilities for holdillg meetings. This latt-er disability 
was brought home to petitioners shortly after the Pres-
ident's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice 
calling a meeting to discuss "·hat further action should 
be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The 
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center 
("Devil's Den") but were disbanded on the President's 
order since nonrecognized groups "·ere not entitled to 
use such facilities." 
Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ulti-
mately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the 
burden of nonrecognition , petitioners resorted to the 
courts. They filed a suit in the Federal District Court 
in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief against the President of the college, other admin-
istrators. and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners' 
6 During the meeting petitioners were approached by two of the 
coll ege's dcnns who scn·cd petitioner;; wi t h ;:i memorandum from 
1he President st:1ting: 
"Kotice has been received by this office of a meeting of the 
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrda~·-Nowmber 6 at 7:00 p. m. at 
the DeYils' Den.' 
"Such meeting may not take place in the DeYils Den of the Stu-
dent Center nor in or on an~r other property of the college since the 
C. C. S. D.-S. D. S. is not a duly recognized college organization. 
"You are hereby notified by this action to cease and desist from 
meeting on the college property." 
8 
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primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amend-
ment rights of expression and association arising from 
denial of campus recognition. The cause ·was submitted 
initially on stipulated facts and, after a short hearing, 
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied pro-
cedural due process because the President had based 
his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant's 
affiliation which "·ere outside the record before him. 
The court concluded that if the President wished to act 
on the basis of material outside the application he must 
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity 
to be heard. 311 F. Supp. , at 1276, 1281. While re-
taining jurisdiction over the case, the District Court 
ordered respondents to hold a hearing in order to clarify 
the several ambiguities surrounding the President's de-
c1s10n. One of the matters to be explored was whether 
the local organization, true to its repeated affirmations, 
was in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at 
1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two 
·were not separable, the respondents were instructed that 
they might then revie,v the "aims and philosophy" of 
the National organization. Ibid. 
Pursuant to the court's order, the President desig-
nated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve 
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The 
hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approxi-
mately two hours, added little in terms of objective 
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Peti-
tioners introduced a statement offering to change the 
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS" 
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Con-
necticut State College." They further reaffirmed that 
they would "have no connection whatsoever to the 
structure of an existing national organization." 7 Peti-
7 319 F. Supp., at 114. The hearing officer, owr petit ioner~' ob-
jection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the 
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original appli-
71-452-0PINION 
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tioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty 
adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations 
elsewhere were una.fliliated with any national organiza-
tion. The hearing officer, in addition to introducing 
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Com-
mittee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions 
of a transcript of hearings before the United States 
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee· 
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were of-
fered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities 
had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demon-
strate that there existed a national organization that 
recognized and cooperated with regiona.1 and local college-
campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the as-
serted existence of a National SDS, nor did they ques-
tion that it did have a system of affiliations of some-
sort. Their contention was simply that their organiza-
tion would not associate with that network. Through--
out the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes. 
What seemed relevant to one appeared completely im-
material to the other. This failure of the hearing to 
advance the litigation was, at bottom, the consequence· 
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considera-
tions that should control the President's ultimate deci-
sion, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing· 
section. 
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits, 
the President reaffirmed his prior decision to deny peti--
tioners' recognition as a campus organization. The 
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, ,vere 
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at 
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the 
orderly process of change" on the campus. 
cation and would be beyond the permissible scope of the hea ring. 
Whatever the merits of this ruling, it was still in the record re--
Yirwed by the PresiJent and was relied on in the sub~equcnt Dis.t rict 
Court opinion without reference to its prior exclusion. Ibid. 
71-452-0PINIO~ 
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After the President's second statement issued, the case 
then returned to the District Court where it ,vas ordered 
dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal 
requisit-es of procedural due process had been complied 
with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their 
burden of showing that they could function free from 
the Kational organization, and, third, that the college's 
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an organiza-
tion whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts 
of disruption" did not viola.te petitioners' associational 
rights. 319 F. Supp. 113. 
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals where, by a t,rn-to-one vote, the District Court's 
judgment was affirmed . The majority purported not 
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the 
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves 
of the due process accorded them and had failed to rneet 
their burden of complying with the prevailing stand-
ards for recognition. 445 F. 2d, at 1131- 1132. Judge 
Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal 
to address the merits and finding that petitioners had 
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id., 
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the 
reasons which follo,v, we conclude that the judgment 
of the courts below must be reversed and the case re-
manded for reconsideration. 
II 
At the outset we note that colleges and universities 
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First 
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker 
v. Des 111 oin.es Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Jus-
tice Fortas made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights 
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must always be applied "in light of the special charac-
teristics of the ... environment" in the particular case. 
Ibid. And, where state-operated educational institu-
tions are involved, this Court has long recognized "the 
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials, consistent "·ith fundamental 
constitutional safeguards. to prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools." Id., at 507. The precedents of 
this Court leave no room for the view that, because of 
the acknO\dedged need for order, First Amendment pro-
tections should apply ,vith less force on college cam-
puses than in the community at large. Quite to the 
contrary, " [ t]he vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community 
of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 314 U. S. 
479. 487 (1960). The college classroom with its sur-
rounding environs is peculiarly the "market place of 
ideas" and we break no new constitutional ground in 
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding aca-
demic freedom. Keyishicm v. Board of Regents, 385 
U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hanipshire, 354 
U. S. 234_, 249-250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Jus-
tice ,Yarren) , 262 (1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion). 
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is 
the right of individuals to associate to further their per-
sonal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not ex-
plicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held 
to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and 
petition. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Hutton, 371 U. S. 415, 
430 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. 1VAACP, 
366 U. S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Pa.tterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan 
for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that 
denial without justification of official recognition to col-
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lege organizations burdens or abridges that associa-
tional right.8 The primary impediment to free associa-
tion flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of 
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate 
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was 
demonstrated in this case when, several days after the 
President's decision was announced, petitioners ,vere not 
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop 
because they were not an approved group. 
Petitioners' associational interests also were circum-
scribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards 
and the school newspaper. If an organization is to re-
main a viable entity in a campus community in which 
nev\' students enter on a regular basis, it must possess 
the means of communicating with these students. More-
over, the organization's ability to participate in the in-
tellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue 
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the 
customary media for communicating with the admin-
istration, faculty members, and other students. 9 Such 
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial. 
8 \Ve nerd not decide whether a college or univer-,it~· might close 
its campus to al,l student organizations since it is quite clear that 
CCSC contemplated no such action, haYing accorded official status 
to numerous other political organizations. Indeed, in the conte:ict 
of the goal of full academic freedom which characterizes institutions 
of higher education in this country, it is unlikely that we wlll be 
called on to decide whether a school might close its doors to all 
student associations . See Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 
22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027 (1969) ; DeYelopments in the Law-Academic 
Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Re,·. 1045 (1969); Comment, Freedom of 
Political Association on the Campus: The Right of Official Recogni-
tion, 46 N. Y. U. L. 1149 (1971) . 
!• It i;; unclea r on this record whet.her recognition abo ca rries with 
it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners' counsel 
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group 
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg., 
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Respondents and the courts below appear to have 
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this 
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District 
Court concluded that, 
"President James' discretionary action in deny-
ing this application cannot be legitimately magni-
fied and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable 
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of 
any segment of the college students; neither does 
his action deter in any material way the individual 
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action 
be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or 
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 3Hr 
F. Supp., at 116. 
In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was 
the "administrative seal of official college respectabil-
ity." 10 Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals 
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "col-
lege's stamp of approval." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. Re-
spondents take that same position here, arguing that 
petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that 
they still may distribute written material off campus, 
and that they still may meet together informally on 
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS. 
We do not agree with the characterization by the 
courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. We 
at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that 
"[r]ecognition docs not thereby entitle an organization to college· 
financial support." 311 F. Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that, 
at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds, 
and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating· 
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational 
aspect of nonrecognition in this case. 
10 These statements arc in contrast to the fir~t opillion by tbe 
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitu-
tional significance of petitioners' claim. 311 F. Supp., at 1280-1282 _ 
14 
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may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous 
opinion for the Court in NAACP \'. Alaba1na ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 (1958), that the admin-
istration "has taken no direct action ... to restrict the 
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But 
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct 
interference with fundamental rights. The requirement 
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership 
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect, 
infringement of the members' associational rights. Like-
wise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist 
outside the campus community does not ameliorate sig-
nificantly the disabilities imposed by the President's 
action. vVe are not free t-o disregard the practical reali-
ties. MR. J"C"STICE STEWART has made the salient point: 
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against 
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being sti fled 
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates Y. 
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960). See 
also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234. 263 (1957) 
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); Watkins v. 
United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 (1957). 
The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had 
the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the 
college.11 While petitioners ha ,·e conceded that they 
\Yere properly required to file an application in con-
formity with the reasonable rules of the college,'" they 
11 445 F. 2d , at 1131: 319 F . Supp .. at llG. 
1 ~ The l"tand:nds for offiria l rcrognition requirc- :tppliC'ant~ to 
pro\·ide a clear st:1temcnt of purposes, criteria for membership , rules 
of procedure, and a fr,t of officers. Applicants must limit member-
ship to "matricuhtcd students" and may not discriminate on the 
basis of race. religion or nationalit~·- The standards further state 
that groups may ''examine and discuss nil questions of interest," 
they may conduct demonstrations and utilize their right of petition, 
but they are prohibited from interfering with the rights of other 
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challenge the view of the courts below that final rejec-
tion could rest on their failure to convince the admin-
istration that their organization was unaffiliated ·with 
the Xational SDS. For reasons to be stated later in 
this opinion, ,Ye do not consider the issue of affiliation 
to be a controlling one. But apart from any particu-
lar issue. once petitioners had filed an application in 
conformity with college requirements, the burden was 
upon the college administration to justify its decision 
of rej ection. See, e. g., Law Student Civil Rights Re-
search Council Y. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154. 162-163 
(1971); United States Y. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376- 377 
(1968); Speiser Y. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It 
is to be remembered that the effect of the college's denial 
of recognition ·was a form of prior restraint, denying to 
petitioners' organization the range of associational activ-
ities described above. While a college has a legitimate 
interest in preventing disruption on the campus, whirh 
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that 
interest may justify such restraint , a "heavy burden" 
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness 
of that action. See Near v. 1\!linnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 
713-716 (1931); Organi:zation for a B etter Austin v. 
K eefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 ( 1971 ) ; Freedman Y. Mary-
land, 380 U. S. 51, 57 ( 1965). 
III 
These fundamental errors--discounting the existence 
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplac-
ing the burden of proof-require tha.t the judgments 
below be reversed. But we are unable to conclude that 
no basis exists upon ,Yhich nonrecognition might be ap-
propriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of 
students. See n. 5, supra. Petitioners h:l\"e not challenged these 
standards and their adequac~· is not here in question . 
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the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be 
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial 
of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the 
record we conclude that the case should be remanded, 
and in an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts 
upon reconsideration it is appropriate to discuss the 
several bases of President James' decision. Four pos-
sible justifications for nonrecognition , all closely related, 
might be derived from the record and his statements. 
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate 
his decision : a fourth , however, has merit. 
A 
From the outset the controversy in this case has cen-
tered in large measure around the relationship, if any, 
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The 
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its 
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue; 
the court-ordered hearing also was directed primarily 
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners 
and their counsel that the local group was in fact inde-
pendent of the National organization, it is evident that 
President James vrns significantly influenced by his ap-
prehension that there ,,vas a connection. Aware of the 
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with 
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently 
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient justifica-
tion for denying recognition.1 3 
Although this precise issue has not come before the 
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved 
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or de-
nying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's 
association with an unpopular organization. See, e. g., 
United States ,·. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 ( 1967); K eyishian 
"' Seo n. 4, supra, for the complete text of the Pre~ident'~ stn tement. 
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Y. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-610 (1967); 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v. 
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961). In these cases 
it has been established that "guilt by association alone, 
without [ establishing] that an individual's association 
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an im-
permissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment 
rights. United St.ates v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The 
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing 
affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims 
and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal 
aims. 14 
We need not decide in this case whether a group might 
be denied official recognition on a state college campus 
solely because of its affiliation as a local chapter of a 
national organization dedicated to unlawful conduct. 
SDS, as conceded by the College and the lower courts,. 
is loosely organized, having various factions and pro-
moting a number of diverse social and political views, 
only some of which call for unlawful action.1 5 Not only 
did petitioners proclaim their complete independence-
from this organization ,rn but they also indicated that 
they shared only some of the beliefs. its leaders have 
14 Tn addition to the cases cited in the text aboH. see also Law 
Students Civil Rights R esearch Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 
164-166 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23, 28 (1971); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United States, . 
367 U. S. 290, 299-300 (1961). 
15 See FBI, Appropriation 59-60 (1972) , in which the former Di-
roctor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, states 
that while violent factions have spun off from SDS, its present 
leadership is "critical of bombing and violence." 
in Petitioners asserted their independence both orally 11 nd in a 
written submission before the Student Affairs Committee. They re-
stated their nonaffiliation in a formal statement filed prior to the 
court-ordered hearing. The on!:, indication to the contrary is their 
unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether . But see· 
n. 3, supra. 
18 
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expressed." On this record it is clear that the rela-
tionship was not an adequate ground for the denial 
of recognition. 
B 
Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with, 
or at least retained an affinity for, National SDS, Presi-
dent James attributed "·hat he believed to be the philos-
ophy of that organization to the local group. He 
characterized the petitioning group as adhering to "some 
of the major tenets of the national organization," includ-
ing a philosophy of violence and disruption.18 Under-
standably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an 
article signed by President James in an alumni period-
ical, and made a part of the record belo,v, he announced 
his mnvillingness to "sanction an organization that openly 
advocates the destruction of the very ideals and freedoms 
upon which the academic life is founded." 
The mere disagreement of the President with the 
group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recogni-
tion. As repugnant as these views may have been, 
especially to one with President James' responsibility, 
the mere expression of them would not justify the denial 
of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did 
in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus be-
comes immaterial. The college, acting here as the in-
strumenta.lity of the State, may not restrict speech or 
association simply because it finds the views expressed 
by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black 
put it most simply and clearly: 
"I do not believe that it can be too often repeated 
that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and 
"Repre~entntiH·~ of the group ~t:11ed during the Stndf'nt Affoir~ 
Committee meetings that they did not identify with all of the Na-
tional's statements, but wished simply to "pick ... certain ideas" 
from that organization. 
H See r1. 4, supra. 
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assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must 
be accorded to the ideas ",:e hate or sooner or later 
they will be denied to the ideas ,ve cherish." Com-
munist Party v. Subversive Act'ivities Control Board, 
367 U. S. 1, 137 (1961). 
C 
As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a 
third rationale for President James' decision-beyond 
the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to 
emerge. His second statement, issued after the court-
ordered administrative hearing, indicates that he based 
rejection on a conclusion that this particular group ·would 
be a. "disruptive influence at CCSC." This language 
was underscored in the second District Court opinion. 
In fact , the Court concluded that the President had 
determined that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus activ-
ities were likely to cause a disruptive influence a.t CCSC." 
319 F. Supp., at 116. 
If this reason, directed at the organization's activities 
rather than its philosophy, "·ere factually supported by 
the record, this Court's prior decisions ,rnuld provide 
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition. 
The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the 
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere 
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite 
or produce such action." Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 
444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam opinion). See 
also Scales Y. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232' 
(1961); Noto Y. United States, 367 U.S. 289,298 (1961); 
Yates Y. United States, 354 U. S. 208 (1957) . In the 
context of the "special characteristics of the school 
environment," 1 ~ the po,rnr of the government to pro-
1
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hibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal 
nature. Also prohibitable are actions which "materially 
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational 
activities need not be tolerated where they infringe rea-
sonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially 
interfere with the opportunity of other students to ob-
tain an education. 
The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which 
great emphasis ,ms placed by the President, dra,Ys pre-
cisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It 
purports to impose no limitations on the right of col-
lege student organizations "to examine and discuss all 
questions of interest to them." But it also states that 
students have no right (1) "to deprive others of the op-
portunity to speak or be heard," (2) "to invade the 
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of 
others," ( 4) "to disrupt the regular and essential opera-
tion of the college," or (5) "to interfere with the rights 
of others." w The line bet,veen permissible speech and 
impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional require-
ment, and if there vvere an evidential basis to support 
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat 
of material disruption in violation of that command the 
President's decision should be affirmed. 21 
co Seen. 5; supra. 
21 It may not be sufficient merely to show the existrnce of a lrgiti-
mate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to-
regulate prohibitable action also restri cts associational rights-as 
nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate that the action 
taken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and 
t hat "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest. 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See also XAACJ> 
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama 
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The record, however, offers no substantial basis for 
that conclusion. The only support for the view ex-
pressed by the President, other than the repudiated 
affiliation with SDS National, is to be found in the 
ambivalent responses offered by the group's representa-
tives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during· 
which they stated that they did not know " ·hether they 
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same man-
ner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses .. 
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could 
never "envision ... interrupting a class." Whatever-
force these statements might be thought to have is 
largely dissipated by the following exchange between 
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs 
during the court-ordered hearing: 
"Counsel: I just read the document that you're 
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee 
meeting] and I can't see that there's anything in 
it that intimates that these students contemplate 
any illegal or disruptive practice. 
"Dean : No. There's no question raised to that. 
counsel." 
Dean Judd's remark reaffirms, in accord ·with the full 
record, that there was no substantial evidence that 
these particular individuals acting together would con-
stitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar 
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted 
little more than the sort of "undifferentiated fear of 
apprehension of disturbance [ which] is not enough to-
overcome the right of freedom of expression." Tinker 
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record, absent a 
showing of any likelihood of cli~ruption or mmilli11gnc::;s to recognize 
reasonable rules goYerning campus conduct, it is not necessary for 
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related 
and narro\v response. 
~-
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v. D es Jl,f oines Independent Comniunity School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S., at 508. 
D 
These same references in the record to the group's 
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues 
of violence" and whether it could ever "envision . . . 
interrupting a class," suggest a fourth possible reason 
why recognition might have been denied to these peti-
tioners. These remarks might well have been read as 
announcing petitioners' umYillingness to be bound by 
reasonable school rules governing conduct."" The col-
lege's Statement of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibili-
ties of Students, contains, as we have seen, an explicit 
statement with respect to campus disruption. The reg-
ulation , carefully differentiating behveen advocacy a.nd 
action, is a rea.sonable one and petitioners have not 
questioned it directly. 2" Yet their statements rajse con-
siderable question whether they intend to abide by the 
prohibitions contained therein. 24 
cc ThP Court of Appmls mi d thr rC'l'ord n,: ::: ho11·inl,! thnt pPti-
tioner~ "fo iled candid]~· to rrspond to inquiries whether t he~· would 
resort to violence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including 
interruption of cl::isses." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. While petitioner's 
statements may be read ::is int imn ting a rejection of reasonable col-
lege regulations in nch·ance. t here is substantial ambiguity on this 
point . Petitioners appea r to concede the appropriateness of those 
standards and the Student AJfo irs Committee neYer asked specifically 
whether they were willing to abide b.v these rul e:=:. l\1ore0\·er, the 
issue was not among those referred by the Dist rict Court to the 
administrative hcn ring and neither part~· pursued this problem at 
that time. Indeed. the failure of the Dist rict Court to identify this 
as a signifi cant subject of inquir~· lends support for the Yiew that 
remand is neeessar.\·. 
20 Sec n. ii. supra. 
"
4 :'\or did the adniini.-tr:1tiw hrnring chrif~· t his quc~tion. It ,rns 
t hen addressed on!~· tangentiall)·; t he peti tioners \\·ho had giwn the 
nmbiguous responses before t he St udent Affairs Committee failed 
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As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the 
critical line for First Amendment purposes must be 
drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full pro-
tection, and action, which is not. Petitioners may, if 
they so choose, preach the propriety of amending or 
even doing away with any or all campus regulations. 
They may not, however, undertake to flaunt these rules. 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, at the time he was a circuit 
judge on the Eighth Circuit, stated: 
"We ... hold that a college has the inherent power 
to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has 
the inherent power properly to discipline; that it 
has power appropriately to protect itself and its 
property; that it may expect that its students adhere 
to generally accepted standards of conduct." Es-
teban v. Central M-issouri State College, 415 F. 2d 
1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965 
(1970). 
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regula-
tions with respect to the time, the place, and the manner 
in which student groups conduct their speech-related 
activities must be respected. 2 " A college administration 
may impose a requirement, such as the one apparently 
imposed in this case, that a group seeking official recog-
nition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to rea-
sonable campus law. Such a requirement does not 
impose an impermissible condition on the students' as-
sociational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to as-
to clarify their position; and their counsel, whose tactics were char-
acterized as "disruptive" by the Court of Appeals, elected to make 
argumentative statements rather than elicit relevant testimony. 445 
F. 2d, at 1126. 
"' See, e.g., City of Chicag0 v. Mosley, - U.S.-, - (HJ72) ; 
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47--48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
366 U. S. 293, 397 (1961). 
24 
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semble, or to petition for changes in school rules is in 
no sense infringed . It merely constitutes an agreement 
to conform with reasonable standards respecting con-
duct. This is a millimal requirement, in the interest 
of the entire academic community, of any group seek-
ing the privilege of official recognition. Quite apart 
from the question whether these petitioners pose a pres-
ent threat to campus order, we conclude that they may 
be denied the benefits of participation in the internal 
life of the college community if on remand it becomes 
clear that petitioners reserve the right to violate any 
rules with which they disagree.2c 
IV 
"\Ve think the above discussion establishes the appro-
priate framework for consideration of petitioners' re-
quest for campus recognition. Because respondents 
failed t-0 accord due recognition to First Amendment 
principles, the judgment below approving respondents' 
denial of recognition must be reversed. Since "·e can-
not conclude from this record that petitioners met the 
threshold requirement of willingness to abide by reason-
able campus rules and regulations embodied in the "Stu-
dent Bill of Rights," we order the case ren1anded for 
reconsideration. ·we note, in so holding, that the wide 
latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms 
20 Tn addit ion to the college :i drni11i8trnhon'~ broad rul cmak ing 
power to assure that the traditional academic ntmosphere is safe-
guarded, it may :.dso impose sanctions on those who Yiolnte the rul es. 
We find , for instance, the Student Affairs Committee's admonition to 
petitioners in this cnse to suggest one permissible practice-recogni-
tion , once accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners 
fail to respect campus law. See, e. g., Mississippi Civil Liberties 
Union v. University of Southern Mississippi, No. 71-1801 (CA.5 
1971); American Civil Liberties Union "· Radford College, 315 F. 
Supp. 893 (WD Va . 1970) . 
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of expression and associaticm is not without its costs 
in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and 
an ordered society. Indeed, this latitude often has re-
sulted, on the campus and elsewhere, in the infringe-
ment of the rights of others. Though we deplore the 
tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional priv-
ileges they invoke, and although the infringement of 
rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, we 
reaffirm this Court's dedication to the principles of the 
Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society 
is founded. 
Reversed and remanded. 
D 
These same references in the record to the group's 
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues of 
violence" and whether it could ever "envision . . . interrupting 
a class, " suggest a fourth possible reason why recognition might 
have been denied to these petitioners. These remarks might 
well have been read as announcing petitioners' unwillingness 
to be bound by reasonable school rules governing conduct. 
The <.College's Statement of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities 
/ 
of Students, contains, as we have seen, an explicit statehlent 
~ 
with respect to campus disruption. The regulation, carefully 
differentiating between advocacy and action, is a resonable 
;J./ 
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one and petitioners have not questioned it directly. Yet their 
statements raise considerable question whether they intend 
to abide by the prohibitions contained therein. 
~ ~A-
As we have already stated in Parts Band C, the critical 
line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn between 
D-2 
advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and action, which 
is not. Petitioners may, if they so choose, preach the propriety 
of amending or even doing away with any or all campus regulations. 
They may not, however, undertake to flout these rules. MR. 
a 
JUSTICE BLACKMON, at the time he was/circuit judge on the 
Eighth Circuit, stated: 
"We ... hold that a college has the inherent power 
to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has 
the inherent power properly to discipline; that it 
has power appropriately to protect itself and its 
property; that it may expect that its students adhere 
to generally accepted standards of conduct." 
Esteban v. Central Missouri state College, 415 
F. 2d .1077, 1089 (CAB 1969), cert denied, 
398 u. s. 965 (1970). 
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regulations with 
respect to the time, the place, and the manner in which student 
groups conduct their speech-related activities must be 
~ 
respected. ~ A college administration may impose a requirement, 
such as the one apparently imposed in this case, that a 
group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness 
to adhere to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does 
not impose an impermissible condition on the students' 
D-3 
associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to assemble, 
or to petition for changes in school rules is in no sense infringed. 
It merely constitutes an agreement to conform with reasonable 
standards respecting conduct. This is a minimal requirement 
in the interest of the entire academic community, of any group 
seeking the privilege of official recognition. ~ 
Petitioners have not challenged in this litigation the 
procedural or substantive aspects of the College's requirements 
governing applications for official recognition. Although the 
record is unclear on this point, CCSC may have, among its 
requirements for recognition, a rule that prospective groups 
affirm that they intend to comply with reasonable campus 
regulations. Upon remand it should first be determined whether 
the College recognition procedures contemplate any such 
requirement. If so, it should then be ascertained whether 
petitioners intend to comply. Since we do not have the terms 
of a specific prior affirmation rule before us, we are not called 
,, 




not prove constitutionally acceptable. Assuming the existence 
of a valid rule, however, we do conclude that the benefits of 
participation in the internal life of the college community may 
be denied to any group that reserves the right to violate any 
campus rules with which they disagree. ~ 
~) 
~ See n. 5, supra. 
:iz 
'2l, The Court of Appeals found that petitioners "failed 
candidly to respond to inquiries whether they would resort to 
violence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including interruption 
of classes." 445 F. 2d at 1131. While petitioners' statements 
may be read as intimating a rejection of reasonable regulations 
in advance, there is in fact substantial ambiguity on this point. 
The questions asked by members of the Student Affairs Committee 
do not appear to have been propounded with any clear distinction 
in mind between that which the petitioners might advocate and 
the conduct in which they might engage. Nor did the Student 
Affairs Committee attempt to obtain a clarification of the 
petitioners' ambiguous answers by asking specifically whether 
the group was willing to abide by the Student Bill of Rights 
governing all campus organizations. 
Moreover, this question was not among those referred 
by the District Court to the administrative hearing, and it was 
there addressed only tangentially. The group members who 
ii. 
had made statements before the Student Affairs Committee 
did not testify and their position was not clarified. Their 
counsel, whose tactics were characterized as "disruptive" 
by the Court :of Appeals, elected to make argumentative state-
ments rather than elicit relevant testimony. Id., at 1126. 
Indeed, the District Court's failure to identify the question 
of willingness to abide by the College's rules and regulations 
as a significant subject of inquiry, coupled with the equivocation 
on the part of the group's representatives, lend support to our 
view that a remand is necessary. 
~J 
-2?J See, ~- ~-, City of Chicago v. Mosley, U. s: 
---' 
( 1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (19 66); 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. 
Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 397 (1961). 
;l'f 
-2¢ In addition to the College administration's broad 
rulemaking power to assure that the traditional academic 




those who violate the rules. We find, for instance, that the 
Student Affairs Committee's admonition to petitioners in this 
case suggests one permissible practice--recognition, once 
accorded~may be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners fail 
to respect campus law. See, ~- ~- Mississippi Civil Liberties 
Union v. University of Southern Mississippi, No. 71-1801 
(CA5 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 
315 F. Supp. 893 (WD Va. 1970). 
-zJ 
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PowELL delivered the op1mon of the 
This case, arising out of a denial by a state college 
o official recognition to a group of students who desire~ 
to form a- poli-tiea,l asseci:ttiie-n, presents this Court with 
questions requiring the application of well-established 
First Amendment principles. While the factual back-
ground of this particular case raises these constitutional 
issues in a manner not heretofore passed on by the 
Court, and only infrequently presented to lower fed-
era courts, our , · today is governed by 
existing precedent. ~ e-i~t1ie:t1s 
correerning--f,lre--ma-mte:nooee--of..-.QFtHW-i~ aca ernic 
community, we approach our task with special caution, 
recogmzing the mutua mterest o stu ents and admin-
istrators in an environment free fror~ · 
ference with the educational process. f We also are ~ 
· -eogci1~ant. of the equally significant interest ef studei,~ y-
an dmin:istratorn alike in the widest latitude for free 
expression and debate consonant with the maintenance 
of order. Where these interests appear to compete the 
First Amendment, made ~ inding on the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, strikes the required balance. f_-
, ~ a review t e ~tuahnatrix--m:rt o_f _w. hicli7 
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We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 1969-70. 
A climate of unrest prevailed on many college campuses in this 
country. There had been widespread civil disobedience on some 
campuses, accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism 
and arson. Some colleges had been shut down altogether, while 
at others files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS 
chapters on some of those campuses had been~ 
1 
~ a catalytic force during this period. Although 
the causes of campus disruption were many and complex, one of 
the prime consequences of such activities was the denial by the 
few of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights to the majority 
of students. Indeed, many of the most cherished characteristics 
long associated with institutions of higher learning appeared to be 
endangered. Fortunately, with the passage of time, a calmer 
atmosphere and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. 
Yet, it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case arose. 
t 
l/See Report of the President's Comm'n on Campus Unrest (1970); 






2 HEALY v. .T A:VIES 
I 
Petitioners are students attending Central Connec-
ticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution 
of higher learning~ In September 1969, they undertook 
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chap-
ter" of Student for a Democratic Society (SDS). Pur-
suant to proc~dures established by the ~ollege, peti-
tioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus 
organization with the Student Affairs Committee, a com-
mittee composed of four students, three faculty members 
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request speci-
fied three purposes for the proposed organization's exist-
ence. It ,rnuld provide "a forum of discussion and_.., 
self-educa.tion for students developing an analysis of 
American society" ; it " ·ould serve as an "agency for 
integrating thought with action so as to bring about 
constructive changes"; and it ,yould endeavor to pro-
vide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of 
leftist students" ,,..ith other interested groups on cam-
pus and in the comrnunity. 2 The Committee, while 
satisfied that the statement of purposes ,ms clear a11d 
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the 
relationship between the proposed local group and the 
National SDS organization. In response to inquiries, 
representatives of the proposed organization stated that 
oral argument in tills Csprt some 
\YO of the plnintiff,: were ,; till 
of purposes is ~et out in full in the dis;,enting 
opinion from the deeision of the Second Circuit. Healy v. James, 445 
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they ,rnuld not affiliate with any national organiza-
tion and that their group vvould remain "completely 
independent." 
In response to other questions asked by Committee 
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus dis-
ruption, the applicants made the following statements, 
which proved significant during the later stages of these 
proceedi11gs : 
"Q. How would you respond to issues of violence 
as other SDS chapters have? 
"A. Our action would have to be dependent upon 
each issue. 
"Q. Would you use any means possible? 
"A. No I can't say that; would not know until 
we know what the issues are. 
"Q. Could you env1s10n the S. D. S. interrupt-
ing a class? 
"A. Impossible for me to say." 
With this information before it, the Committee re:.,/ 
quested an additional filing by the applicants, includ-
ing a formal statement regarding affiliations. The 
amended application filed in response stated flatly that 
"CCSC Students for°J)emocratic Society are not under 
the dictates of any National organization." " At a sec-
ond hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the 
question of relationship with the national organization 
# 
was raised again. One of the organizers explained that. 
the ~ational SDS was divided into several "factional 
:i 445 F. 2d, at 1137. During the Committee's consideration of 
petitioner's application, one of the group's representatives was asked 
why, if it indeed desired to remain independent , it chose to use a 
nationally known name. The witness' response was that "the name 
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across, 
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested 
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groups," that the national-local relationship ,vas a. loose 
one, and that the local organization accepted only "cer-
tain ideas" but not all of the u.ational organization's 
aims and philosophies. -
By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately 
approved the application and recommended to the Pres-
ident of the college, Dr. James, that the organization 
be accorded official recognition. In approving the ap-
plication, the majority indicated that its decision was 
premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should 
be represented on campus and that since the Young 
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the 
Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed 
recognized status, a group should be available with which 
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also 
noted and relied on the organization's claim of inde-
pendence. Finally, it admonished the organization that 
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's 
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies 
against interference with the privacy of other student~ 
or destruction of property. The two dissenting mem-
bers based their reservation primarily on the lack of 
clarity regarding the organization's independence. 
Several days later, the President rejected the Com-
mittee's rtcommendation, and issued a statement indi-
cating that petitioners' organization was not to be ac-
corded the benefits of official campus recognition. His 
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the 
margin,• indicate several reasons for his action . He 
4 The President stn t ed: 
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Af-
fairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the 
!!¥!jority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students 
for a Democratic Societ}~ carries full and unmistakable adherence to 
nt. least some of the maJor tenets of the national organization, loose 
and divided though that organization may be. The published aims 
and philosophy of the Students for a Democratic Society, which in-
71-452-0PINION 
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found that the organization's philosophy was antithetical 
to the school's policies,5 and that the group's independ-
ence was doubtful. He concluded that approval should 
U
lude disruption and violence, are contrary to the approved policy 
(by faculty, students, and administration) of Central Connecticut 
State College which states: 
"'Students do not have the right to invade the privacy of othrrs, 
to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and es-• 
sential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of 
others.' 
"The further statement on the request for recognition t hat 'CCSC 
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any 
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends to, 
follow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a 
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a 
policy. 
"Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the campus, the freedom 
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms 
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities 
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have 
the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to 
express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by 
orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and pro-
test gatherings and utilize the right of petition'-these are all preciouy 
freedoms that we cherish and are freedoms on which we stand. To 
approve any organization or individual who joins with an organiza-
tion which openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those· 
freedoms and to the approved 'Statement on the Rights, Freedoms,. 
and Responsibilities of Students' at Central.' " 
5 In 1969, CCSC adopted, as have many other colleges and uni-
versities, a Statement of Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of 
Students. This statement, commonly referred to as the '·Student 
Bill of Rights," is printed as an Appendix to the Second Circuit's 
majority opinion in thi~ case, Healy v. James, 445 F. 2d, at 1132-1136 
(1971). Part V of that statement establishes the standards for ap-
proval of campus organizations and imposes several basic limitations 
on their campus activities: 
"A. Care shall be taken in the establishment and organization 
of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsi-
bilities of students will be preserved. 
"B. Student organizations shaJl submit a clear statement of pur-
pose, criteria for membership, rules of procedures and a list of 
71-452-0PINION 
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not be granted to any group which "openly repudiates" 
the college 's dedication to academic freedom. 
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems 
for the organization's existence and growth. Its mem-
bers were deprived of the opportunity to place announce-
ments regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in 
the student newspaper; they ,rnre precluded from using 
various campus bulletin boards; and-most impor-
tantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus 
facilities for holding meetings. This latter disability 
was brought home to petitioners shortly after the Pres-
ident's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice 
calling a meeting to discuss what further action should 
be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The 
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center 
("Devil's Den") but were disbanded on the President's 
officers as n condition of institutionnl recognition. They shall not be 
required to submit n membership list as a condition of institutional 
recognition. 
"C. Membership in campus organizntions shalJ be limited to 
matriculated students ( day or evening) at the colJege. Membership 
8hall not be restricted by race, religion or nationality. The members 
shall have sole power to determine organiz::ition policy consistent with 
the regulations of the college. 
D. Each orgnnization is free to choose its own adviser. Ad,·isers 
to organizations slrnll advise but not control the organizations nnd 
their policies. 
"E. College students and student orgnnizations shall hnve the right 
to examine and discuss nlJ questions of interest to them, to express 
opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by orderly 
means. The~· may organize public demonstrations and protest. 
gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not haYe 
the right to deprin others of the oppo1iunity to speak or be hea rd, 
to invade the prirncy of others, to damage the property of others, 
to disrupt the regular and e~senti:tl operation of t lie collc!l;C'; or to 
interfere with the rights of others." 
1/ 
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order since nonrecognized groups were not entitled to 
use such facilities.G 
Their efforts to gain recog111t1011 having proved ulti-
mately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the 
burden of nonrecognition, petitioners resorted to the 
courts. They filed a suit in the Federal District Court 
in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief against the President of the college, other admin-
istrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners/ 
primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amend-
ment rights of expression and association arising from 
denial of campus recognition. The cause was submitted 
initially on stipulated facts and, after a short hearing, 
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied pro-
cedural due process because the President had based 
his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant's 
affiliation which were outside the record before him. 
The court concluded that if the President wished to act 
on the basis of material outside the application he must 
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity 
to be heard. 311 F. Supp., at 1276, 1281. While re-
taining jurisdiction over the case, the District Court 
ordered respondents to hold a hearing in order to clarify 
the several ambiguities surrounding the President's de-
6 During the meeting petitioners were approached by two of the 
rollege's demf who served petitioners with a memorandum from 
the Pre~ident stating: 
"Notice has been received by this office of a meeting of the 
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrday-November 6 at 7:00 p. m. at, 
the Devils' Den.' 
"Such meeting may not take place in the Devils Den of the Stu-
dent Center nor in or on any other property of the college since the 
C. C. S. D.-S. D. S. is not a duly recognized college organization. 
"You are hereby notified by this action to cease and desist from 
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c1s10n. One of the matters to be explored was whether 
the local organization, true to its repeated affirmations, 
was in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at 
1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two 
were not separable, the respondents were instructed that 
they might then review the "aims and philosophy" of 
the Nationa1 organization. I bid. 
Pursuant to the court's order, the President desig-
nated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve 
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The 
hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approxi-
mately two hours, added little in terms of objective 
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Peti-/ 
tioners introduced a statement offering to change the 
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS" 
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Con-
necticut State College." They further reaffirmed t at 
th0 1688¼; would "have no connection whatsoever to the 
structure of an existing national organization.' 7 et~ 
tioners also introduced the testimony of their aculty 
adviser to the effect tha.t some local SDS organizations 
elsewhere were unaffiliated with any national organiza-
tion. The ,hearing officer, in addition to introducing 
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Com-
mittee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions 
of a transcript of hearings before the United States 
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee 
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were of-
fered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities 
7 319 F. Supp. , at 114. The hea ring officer, over petitioners' ob-
jection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the/ 
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original appli-
cation and would be beyond the permissible scope of the hearing . 
Whatever the merits of this ruling, it w~s still in the record re-
viewed by the President and was relied on. \t' the subsequent District 
Court opinion without reference to its prior exclusion. Ibid. 
71-452-0PINION 
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had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demon-
strate that there existed a national organization that 
recognized and coopera.ted with regional and local college 
campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the as-
serted existence of a National SDS, nor did they ques-
tion that it did have a system of affiliations of some 
sort. Their contention was simply that their organiza-
tion would not associate with that network. Through-
out the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes. 
What seemed relevant to one appeared completely im-
material to the other. This failure of the hearing to, 
advance the litigation was, at. bottom, the consequence 
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considera-
tions that should control the President's ultimate deci-
sion, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing 
section. 
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits, 
the President reaffirmed his prior decision to deny peti-
tioners' recognition as a campus organization. The 
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were 
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at 
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the 
---- orderly process of change" on the campus. In the cli 
liYmteof i:inrest 6n'"'mal 1y · colle'ge "'Ca:mpuse 111 1969, Presi 
dent James' concern was not unfounded. There ha 
been widespread civil disobedience on some campuses 
accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism and1 
arson. Some colleges had been shut down altogether, 
while at others files were looted and manuscripts de-==i 
stroyed. SDS chapters on some of those campuses ha, 
been a catalytic force during this period. 8 Althoug 
the causes of campus disruption were many and comple 
8 See Report of the President's Comm'n on Campus Unrest (1970) 
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ne- of- t-he,»·ime mrneequcrrces of such activitie~ was 
1e denial by the few of lawful exercise of First Amencl-
nent rights to the majority of students. Indeed, many 
of the privileges long and peculiarly associa.tecl with 
institutions of higher learning were jeopardized: the 
rights to attend classes, to hear a broad spectrum of 
vie,Ypoints, and to enjoy the pursuit of truth and knowl-
edge were obstructed." In view of the experience on 
other campuses, and in an atmosphere referred to by 
the Second Circuit majority in this case as one of "tick-
ing tirnebombs," '0 tl --Afte_l)-. second statement issued, the case then reo--
turned to the District Court where it was ordered dis-
missed. The court concluded, first, that the formal 
requisites of procedural due process had been complied 
with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their 
burden of showing that they could function free from 
the i3-,tional orga.nization, and, third, that the college's 
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an organiza-
tion whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts 
of disruption" did not violate petitioners' associational 
rights. 319 F . Supp. 113. 
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals where, by a two-to-one vote, the District Court's 
judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not 
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the 
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves 
of the clue process accorded them and had failed to meet 
their burden of complying with the prevailing stand-
ards for recognition. 445 F. 2d, at 1131-1132. Judge 
71-452-0PINION 
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Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal 
to address the merits and finding that petitioners had 
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id., 
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the 
reasons which follow, we conclude tha.t the judgment 
of the courts below must be reversed and the case re-
manded for reconsideration. 
II 
At the outset we note that colleges and universities 
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First 
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent C01nmunity School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Jus~ 
tice Fortas made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights 
must ahvays be applied "in light of the special charac.:-
teristics of the .. . environment" in the particular case. 
Ibid. And, where state-operated educational institu-
tions are involved, this Court has long recognized "the 
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools." Id., at 507. The precedents of 
this Court leave no room for the view that, because of 
the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment pro-
tections should apply with less force on college 9am-
puses than in the community at large. Quite to the 
contrary, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community 
of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 314 U. S. 
479, 487 (1960). The college classroom with its sur-
rounding environs is peculiarly the "market place of 
ideas" and we break no new constitutional ground in 
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding aca-
-r/ 
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demic freedom. Keyi,shian v. Board of Regents, 385 
U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 
U. S. 234, 249- 250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Warren) , 262 ( 1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion) . ? J. o f e. c..f e c£ J. y_ 
Among the ~ ights comprehended u-i1v the 
First Amendment1 :;u;i,d. wade Qi.Meling 8tt tho ~b"e&. 
th.rough the Frn1rtoo1,1th "1uondmo~ is the right of in-
dividuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. 
While the freedom of association is not explicitly set 
out in the Amendmenut, it has long been held to be 
implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and peti-
tion. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 40.!.--
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
430 ( 1963); Loui,siana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
366 U. S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan 
for a unanimous Court). There can be ro doubt tnat O 
denial without justification of official recognition to col-
6) 
8 '- lege organizations burdens or "abridges,. £hat asSocia:-~ 
tional right.¼: The primary impediment to free associa--tion flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of 
campus facili t ies for meetings and other appropriate 
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was 
demonstrated in this case when, several days after the 
g', 
~ We need not decide whether a college or university might close 
its campus to all student organizations since it is quite clear that 
CCSC contemplated no such action, having accorded official status 
to numerous other political organizations. Indeed, in the conteA't 
of the goal of full academic freedom which characterizes institutions 
of higher education in this count ry, it is unlikely that we wIII be 
called on to decide whether a school might close its doors to all 
student associations. See Wright , The Constitution on the Campus, 
22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027 (1969) ; Developments in the Law-Academic 
Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1969); Comment, Freedom of 
Polit ical Association on the Campus : The Right of Official Recogni-
tion, 46 N. Y. U. L. 1149 (1971) . 
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President's decision was announced, petitioners were not 
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus co:ff ee shop 
because they were not an approved group. 
~ Petitioners' associational interests also J°"'circum-
scribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards .r-
and the school newspaper. If an organization is to re-
main a viable entity in a campus community in which 
new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess 
the means of communicating with these students. More-
over, the organization's ability to participate in the in-
tellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue 
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the 
customary media for communicating with the a_QmiE..::J 1 
istration, faculty members, and other students.~ h / 
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial. 
Respondents and the courts below appear to have 
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this 
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District 
Court concluded that, 
"President James' discretionary action in deny-
ing this application cannot be legitimately magni-
fied and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable 
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of 
any segment of the college students; neither does 
his action deter in any material way the individual r advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action 
'--=;:i:; It is unclea r on this record whether recognition also carries with 
~ 
it a right to seek func!'s from the school budget. Petit ioners' counsel ~ 
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group 
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg., 
at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that _ 
" [ r] ecognition docs not thereby entitle an organi zation to college 
financial support ." 311 F . Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that , 
at the least , recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds, 
and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocat ing 
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational 
aspect of nonrecognit ion in this case. 
14 
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be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or 
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 319 
F. Supp., at 116. 
In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was 
/0 the "administrative seal of official college respectabil-
~ Ibid. A ma.jority of the Court of Appeals_ 
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "col-
lege's stamp of approval." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. Re-
spondents ~'U'ii~@ Hu~,t 1eorn@ -eomsEXhere, argmng that _ 
petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that 
they still may distribute written material off campus, 
and that they still may meet together informally on 
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS. 
We do not agree with the characterization by the:--
courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. We 
may concede, as did lVIr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous_ 
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 ( 1958) , that the admin-
istration "has taken no direct action .. . to restrict the 
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But 
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct 
interference with fundamental rights. The requirement 
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership 
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect, 
infringement of the members' associational rights. Like-
wise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist 
outside the campus community does not ameliorate sig-
nificantly the disabilities imposed by the President's 
action. We are not free to disregard the practical reali-
ties. MR. JUSTICE STEWART has made the salient point: 
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against 
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled 
I() by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v. _ 
'---==; These statements are in contrast to the first opinion by the ..... 
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitu-
tional significance of petitioner~' claim. 311 F. Supp., at 1280-1282. 
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City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960) . See 
also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) 
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); Watkins v. 
United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 ( 19·57). .--
The opinions below also assumed that petitioners ha.cl 
} ) '--0e bu~den of showing entitlement to recognition by the _ 
college."'e While petitioners have conceded that they 
were properly required to file a.n application in .£_On-~/ l.. 
formity with the reasonable rules of the college,~ ----
challenge the view of the courts below that final rejec-. 
tion could rest on their failure to convince the admin-
istration that their organization was unaffiliated with 
the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in 
this opinion, we do not consider the issue of affiliation 
to be a controlling one. But apart from any particu-
lar issue, once petitioners had filed an application in 
conformity ,vith college requirements, the burden was 
upon the college administration to justify its decision 
of rejection. See, e. g., Law Student Civil Rights Re-
search Council v. Wadmcmd, 401 U. S. 154. 162-163 
(1971 ) ; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376- 377 
(1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958) . It 
is to be remembered that the effect of the college's denial 
of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to 
petitioners' organization the range of associational activ-
ities described above. While a college has a legitimate 
~ 
/ / "'ft 445 F. 2d, nt 1131; 319 F. Supp., at 116. __, 
/ 2._ ~ The standnrds for official recognit ion require applicnnts to ./ 
provide a clc:i r sb trment of purposes, crit eria for membership , rules 
of procedure, and n list of officers. Applicants must limit member- _ 
ship to "matriculntcd students" and may not discriminate on the 
bnsis of rnce, religion or 1rntionality. The standards further state 
that groups may "examine and discuss all questions of interest," 
t hey may conduct demonst rations and utilize their right of petition, 
but they are prohibited from interfering with the rights of other 
students. See n. 5, supra. Petitioners have not challenged these-
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interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which 
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that 
interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden" 
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness 
of ~ action. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 
713-716 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v. 
Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U. S. 51, 57 (1965). 
r 
III 
These fundamental errors-discounting the existence 
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplac- .._ 
ing the burden of proof-require that the judgments 
below be reversed . But we are unable to conclude that 
no basis exists upon which nonrecognition might be ap-
propriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of 
the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be --
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial _ 
of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the 
record we conclude that the case should be remanded, 
and in an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts 
upon reconsideration it is appropriate to discuss the 
several bases of President James' decision. Four pos-
sible justifications for nonrecognition, all closely related, 
might be derived from the record and his statements. 
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate 
his decision: a fourth, however, has merit. 
A 
From the outset the controversy in this case has cen---
tered in large measure around the relationship, if any, 
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The 
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its 
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue; 
the courtAordered hearing also was directed primarily-=-
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners 
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and their counsel that the local group was in fact inde-
-: / pendent of the .uational organization, it is evident that 
::::/ President James=was significantly influenced by his ap- -
prehension that there was a connection. Aware of the -
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with · 
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently 
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient justifiv / 3 
tion for denying recognition.""" _....- _ 
Although this precise issue has not come before the 
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved 
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or de-
nying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's 
association with an unpopular organization. See, e. g., 
United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian/ 
v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-610 (1967); 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v. 
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961). In these cases 
it has been established that "guilt by association alone, 
without [ establishing] that an individual's association 
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an im-
permissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment 
rights. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The 
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing 
affiliation with an organization posseSl5ing unlawful aims 
and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal ir ~ 
We need not decide in this case whether a group might 
be denied official recognition on a state college campus 
solely because of its affiliation as a local chapter of a 
national organization dedicated to unlawful conduct. 
~ IL '---- • Seen. 4, supra, for the complete te:,,.1; of the President 's sta tement . 
} T ......__..- -S:: In addition to the cases cited in the t ext above, see also Law 
Students Civil Rights R esearch Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 
164-166 (1971) ; In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23, 28 (1971) ; Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U . S. 500 (1964) ; Noto v. Unit ed States,. 
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SDS, as conceded by the ~Hege and the lower courts, 
is loosely organized, havirig various factions and pro-
moting a number of diverse social and po~ /.S' 
ouly some of ,Yhich call for unlawful action. · Not only 
did petitioners proclaim their complete independence 
from tfilsorgamzafaon,"'" but they also indicated that 
they shared only some of the beliefs its leaders havy 
expressed~ On this record it is clear that the rela-
tionship ·was not an adequate ground for the denial 
of recognition. 
B 
Having concluded that petitioners ·ere affiliated with . 
or at least retained an affinity for, SDS National resi-
dent James attributed what he believed to be the philos-
ophy of that organization to the local group. He-
characterized the petitioning group as adhering to "some 
of the major tenets of the national organization,~ / f' 
ing a philosophy of violence a!1d disruption.""t. Under-__..,....---
standably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an· 
article signed by President James in an alumni period-
ical , and made a part of the record below, he a1mounced 
his unwillingness to "sanction an organization that openly 
/ s~~ P..cc FBI, Appropriation 59-60 (1972). in whi<'h the former Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Im·estigat ion, .T. Edgar Hooyer , states 
that while Yiolent fact ions have spun off from SDS, its present 
leadership is "critical of bombing and Yiolence." 
/(. - WPetitioners asserted their independence both orall~• and in a 
written submission before the Student _Affairs Committee. They re-
sta.ted their nonaffi liation in a formal statement filed prior to the 
court-ordered hearing. The only indiration to the contrary is their 
unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether. But see 
n. 3, supra. 
/ / ✓ ,_,, Representati ,·es of the group stated during the Student Affairs 
Committee meetings that the.,· did not identify with all of the Na- -
tional's statements, but wished simply to "pick ... certain ideas"' 
from that organization. 
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The mere disagreement of the President with the group's 
philslophy affords -aBSd · •,~, no reason to deny it recognition. 
As repugnant as these views may have been, especially to one 
with President James' responsibility, the mere expression 
of them would not justify the denial of First Amendment rights. 
Whether petitioners did in fact advocate a ~ philosophy of 
"destruction" thus becomes immaterial. The College, acting 
here as the instrumentality of the state, may not restrict speech 
or association simply because it finds the views expressed by 
any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black put it most 
simply and clearly: 
V 
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C 
As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a _ 
third rationale for President J a.mes' decision-beyond 
the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to 
emerge. His second statement, issued after the court-
ordered administrative hearing, indicates that he based 
rejection on a conclusion that this particular group would 
be a "disruptive influence at CCSC." This language 
was underscored in the second District Court opinion. 
In fact, the Court concluded that the President had 
determined that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus activ-
ities were likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC." 
319 F . Supp., at 116. 
If this reason, directed at the organization's activities 
rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by 
the record, this Court's prior decisions would provide 
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition. 
. The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the 
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere 
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or pro-_....--
ducing imminent lawless action and . .. likely to incite 
or produce such action." Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 
444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam opinion). See 
also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232 
(1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 289, 298 (1961); 
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957). In the 
context of the "special characteristics of the school 
/f '-.!;_nvironme~~ the power of the government to pro- -::: 
hibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal 
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nature. Also prohibitable are actions which "materially 
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school." Tinker v. Des Af oines Independent Commu-
nity School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational 
activities need not be tolerated where they infringe rea-
sonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially 
interfere with the opportunity of other students to ob-
tain an education. 
The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which_ 
great emphasis was placed by the President, draws pre-
cisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It 
purports to impose no limitations on the right of col-
lege student organizations "to examine and discuss all 
questions of interest to them." But it also states that 
students have no right ( 1) "to deprive others of the op-
portunity to speak or be heard," (2) "to invade the 
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of 
others," ( 4) "to disrupt the regular and essential opera-
' tion of the college," or ( 5) "to interfere with the rights_., 
'20 , ~ The line between permissible speech and_ 
impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional require-
ment, and if there were an evidential basis to support 
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat 
of material disruption in violation of that command the· 
President's decision e affirmed:"!.----
2CI - it!-See n. 5, supra. 
z.. j -·,~It may not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a legiti-....... 
mate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to 
regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights-as 
nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate that the action 
taken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and 
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest.' 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968). See also NAACP 
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama 
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The record, however, offers no substantial basis for 
that conclusion. The only support for the view ex-
pressed by the President, other than the repudiated 
affiliation with SDS National, is to be found in the 
ambivalent responses offered by the group's representa-
tives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during 
which they stated that they did not know whether they 
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same man-
ner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses. 
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could 
never "envision . . . interrupting a class." Whatever 
force these statements might be thought to have is 
largely dissipated by the following exchange between 
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs 
during the court-ordered hearing: 
"Counsel: I just read the document that you 're 
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee 
meeting] and I can't see that there's anything in 
it that inti.mates that these students contemplate 
any illegal or disruptive practice. 
"Dean: No. There's no question raised to that, 
counsel." 
Dean Judd's remark 
record, that -- -,, 
these particular individuals acting together would con-
stitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar 
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted 
little more than the S'Ort of "undifferentiated fear of 
apprehension of disturbance [ which] is not enough to 
overcome the right of freedom of expression." Tinker 
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record , absent a 
sho\\'ing of an~· likelihood of disruption or unwilli1ign0:;,; to rerog11ize 
reasonable rules governing cmnpus conduct, it is not necessa ry for 
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related'. 
and narrow response. 
l 4& t 1-t..t., •-
~ ~ 
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v. Des Moines Independent Conimunity School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S., at 508. 
D 
These same references in the record to the group's 
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues 
of violence" and whether it could ever "envision ... 
interrupting a class," suggest a fourth possible reason 
why recognition might have been denied to these peti-
~ 
tioners. These remarks might well have been read as. 
announcing petitioners' unwillingness to be b~ Z. l. 
reasonable school rules governing conduct.~The co:r=--
lege's Statement of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibili--
ties of Students, contains, as we have seen, an explicit 
statement with respect to campus disruption . The reg-
ulation, carefully differentiating between advocacy and 
action, is a reasonable one and petitioners have not 
questioned 1£ ctll'ectly~ Yet their statements raise con- -
siderable question whether they intend to abide by the 
prohibitions contained therein_-..._ ________ -,,,'.-- 2.. J 
?L. - '"CI'he Court of Appeals read the rerord as showing tha.t peti- _ 
tioners "foiled candidly to respond to inquiries whether they would _,, 
resort to violence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including 
interruption of clas8e~." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. While petitioner's 
statements may be read as intimating a rejection of reasonable col-
lege regulations in advnnce, there is substantial ambiguity on this 
point. Petitioners appear to concede the appropriateness of those 
standards and the Student Affairs Committee never asked specifically 
whether they were willing to abide by these rules. Moreover, the 
issue was not among those referred by the District Court to the 
administrative hearing and neither party pursued this problem at 
that time. Indeed, the failure of the District Court to identify this 
as a significant subject of inquiry lends support for the view that 
remand is necessary. 
z_J __....--,.csee 11. 5, supra. 
/"'1' Nor did the administrative hearing clarify this question. It was 
1-f __,,,,then addressed only tangentiall)·; the petitioners who had given the :--
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As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the 
critical line for First Amendment purposes must be 
drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full pro-
tection, and action, which is not. Petitioners may, if 
they so choose, preach the propriety of amending or 
even doing away with any or all campus regulations. 
They may not, however, undertake to flaunt these rules. 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, at the time he \vas a circuit 
judge on the Eighth Circuit, stated: 
"We ... hold that a college has the inherent power 
to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has 
the inherent power properly to discipline; that it 
has power appropriately to protect itself and its 
property; that it may expect that its students adhere 
to generally accepted standards of conduct." Es-
teban v. Central M'issouri State College, 415 F. 2d 
1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965 
(1970) . 
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regula-
tions with respect to the time, the place, and the manner 
in which student groups conduct their s eech-relate 2.S 
activities must be respected. uc a requirement oes 
not impose an impermissible condition on the students' 
associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to as-
semble, or to petition for changes in school rules is in 
no sense infringed. It merely constitutes an agreement 
to conform with reasonable standards respecting con--
duct. This is a minimal requirement, in the :interest 
to clarify their position; and their counsel, whose tactics were char-. 
acterized as "disruptive" by the Court of Appeals, elected to make 
argumentative statements rather than elicit relevant testimony. 445 
F. 2d, at 1126. 
~ ::JB See, e. g., City of Chicago v. Mosley, - U. S. -, - (1972); 
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, -
379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) ; Louisiana e.-i; rel. Gremillion v. NAACPr 
366 U.S. 293, 397 (1961). 
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of the entire academic community, of any group seek-
ing the privilege of official recognition . Quite apart 
from the question whether these petitioners pose a pres-
ent threat to campus order, we conclude that they may 
be denied the benefits of participation in the internal 
life of the college community if on remand it becomes 
clear that petitioners reserve the right to violate a.ny.,.,. 
rules with which they disagree. 
IV 
---
We think the above discussion establishes the appro-
priate framework for consideration of petitioners' re- .___ 
quest for campus recognition. Because respondents 
failed to accord clue recognition to First Amendment 
principles, the judgment below approving respondents' 
denial of recognition must be reven~ed. Since we can-
not conclude from this record that petitioners met the 
threshold requirement of willingness to abide by reason-
able campus rules and regulations embodied in the "Stu-
dent Bill of Rights," we order the case remanded for 
reconsideration. We note, in so holding, that the wide 
latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms 
of expression and association is not without its costs 
in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and 
an ordered society. Indeed, this latitude often has re-
sulted, on the campus and elsewhere, in the infringe-
___,, 
'2 ' ~ , rn addition to the college administration's broad rulemaking· 
power to assure that the t radit ional academic atmosphere is safe-~ 
guarded, it may also impose sanctions on those who violate the rules . 
We find , for instance, the Student Affairs Committee's admonit ion to 
petit ioners in this case to suggest one permissible practice-recogni--
t ion, once accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended if petit ioners 
fa il to respect campus law. See, e. g., Mississippi Civil Liberties 
Union v. Universit y of Southern Mississippi, No. 71-1801 (CA5 
1971) ; American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F _ 
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ment of the rights of others. Though we deplore the 
tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional priv-
iiege"s they invoke1,we reaffirm this Court's dedication 
to the principles of the Bill of Rights upon which our 
vigorous and free society is founded. 
D -
Rider A, p. 26 
~:..-~ 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opnuon of the 
Court. 
This case, arising out of a denial by a state college 
of official recognition to a group of students who desired 
to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS), presents this Court with questions re-
quiring the application of well-established First Amend-
ment principles. While the factual background of this 
particular case raises these constitutional issues in a 
manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only 
infrequently presented to lower federal courts, our de-
cision today is governed by existing precedent. 
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the 
academic community, we approach our task with special 
r ' caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, fac-
ulty members, and administrators in an environment free 
from disruptive interference with the educational process. 
We also are mindful of the equally significant interest 
in the widest latitude for free expression and debate 
consonant with the maintenance of order. Where these 
interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made 
binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
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I 
We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 1969-
1970. A climate of unrest prevailed on many college 
campuses in this country. There had been widespread 
civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by 
the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson. Some 
colleges had been shut down altogether, while at others 
files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chap-
ters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic 
force during this period.1 Although the causes of cam-
pus disruption were many and complex, one of the P-..:.r:..;.in.::.:.1.:::.e-&-c:--1 
consequences of such activities was the denial ~~~ 
~ of the lawful exerci~e._, of First Amendment rights 
r '1 '\:itotl:e majority of _st~dent~ Inde_ed, mar:y ~f tl:e m ... o_s_t __ 
"'-"' ,_ chenshed characteristics long associated with mshtutions 
of higher learning appeared to be endangered. For-
tunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere 
and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet, 
it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case 
arose. 
Petitioners are students attending Central Connec-
ticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution 
of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook 
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chap-
ter" of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Pur-
suant to procedures established by the ColJege, peti-
tioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus 
organization with the Student Affairs Committee, a com-
mittee composed of four students, three faculty members 
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request speci-
fied three purposes for the proposed organization's exist-
ence. It would provide "a forum of discussion and 
1 Sec Report. of the ]~rc;:idcnt';:: Comm'n on Camp11~ Unrp,.:t (1070): 
Report of the ABA Comm ·n on Cmnpu;: GoY't and Stucknt Di~~cnt 
(1970). 
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self-education for students developing an analysis of 
American society"; it would serve as an "agency for 
integrating thought "·ith action so as to bring about 
constructive changes"; and it would endeavor to pro-
vide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of 
leftist students" with other interested groups on cam-
pus and in the comrnunity. 2 The Committee, while 
satisfied that the statement of purposes was clear and 
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the 
relationship between the proposed local group and the 
~ational SDS organization. In response to inquiries, 
representatives of the proposed organization stated that 
they ,rnuld not affiliate with any national organiza-
tion and that their group would remain "completely 
independent." 
In response to other questions asked by Committee 
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus dis-
ruption, the applicants made the following statements, 
which proved significant during the later stages of these 
proceeding::1: 
"Q. HmY would you respond to issues of violence 
as other SDS chapters have? 
"A. Our action ,rnuld have to be dependent upon 
each issue. 
"Q. Would you use any means possible? 
"A. No I can't say that; would not know until 
we knmY what the issues arc. 
"Q. Could you env1s10n the S. D. S. interrupt-
ing a class? 
"A. Impossible for me to say." 
With this information before it, the Committee re-
~ 
~ The statement of purposes is set out in full in the ~nt-mr-
pinicm}from the clcci.,ion of the Second Circuit. Healy v. James, 445-
F . 2d TI12, 1136-1137 (1971). 
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quested an additional filing by the applicants, includ-
ing a formal statement regarding affiliations. The 
amended application filed in response stated flatly that 
"CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under 
the dictates of any National organization." 3 At a sec-
ond hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the 
question of relationship with the National organization 
was raised again. One of the organizers explained that 
the National SDS was divided into several "factional 
groups," tha.t the national-local relationship was a loose 
one, and that the local organization accepted 011ly "cer-
tain ideas" but not all of the National organization's· 
aims and philosophies. 
By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately 
approved the application and recommended to the Pres-
ident of the College, Dr. James, that. the orga.nization 
be accorded official recognition. In approving the ap--
plication, the majority indicated that its decision ""as 
premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should 
be represented on campus and that since the Young 
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the 
Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed 
recognized status, a group should be available with which 
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also 
noted and relied on the organization's claim of inde-
pendence. Finally, it admonished the organization that 
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's 
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies 
against interference with the privacy of other students 
3 445 F. 2d, at 1137. During the Committee's consideration of 
1,etitioners' application, one of the group's representat ive"' ,rn~ :vkcd 
why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a 
nationally known name. The witness' response was that "the name· 
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across, 
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested 
in such to express themselves." 
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or destruction of property. The two dissenting mem-
bers based their reservation primarily on the lack of 
clarity regarding the organization's independence. 
Several days later, the President rejected the Com-
mittee's rtcommendation, and issued a statement indi--
cating that petitioners' organization was not to be ac-
corded the benefits of official campus recognition. His 
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the· 
margin,4 indicate several reasons for his action. He 
4 The President stated: 
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Af-
fairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the-
majority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students 
for a Democratic Socict>·, it is m>· judgment that the statement of 
purpose to form a local ch::iptcr of Students for a Democratic Soriet>· 
carries full and unmistak::ible adherence to at !C'a~t ~ome of the 
major tenets of the national organization , loose and divided though 
that org::111ization ma>· be. The published aims and philo,oph>· of 
the Students for a Democratic Societr, which include di~ruption 
nnd violence, are contrar>· to the ::i.pproved polic>· (by forult>·, 
students, and administrntion) of Central Connecticut State Colleg0 
which states: 
"'Students do not have the right to invade the prime>· of others, 
to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and es-
sential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of 
others. ' 
"The further statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSC' 
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any 
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends to-
follow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a 
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a 
policy. 
"Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the cnmpus, the freedom 
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms 
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities 
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have 
the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to 
express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by 
orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and pro-
test gatherings and utilize the right of petition'-these are all precious 
6 
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found that the organization's philosophy ,ms antithetical 
to the school's policies,5 and that the group's independ-
ence was doubtful. He concluded that approval should 
freedoms that "·e cherish and are freedoms on which we stand. To 
approve any organization or indiYidual who joins with an org:miza-
tion which openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those 
freedoms and to the approved 'Statement on the Rights, Freedoms, 
and nr~ponsibilitir.,;; of Student~' at Crntral. '" 
5 In 1969, CCSC adopted. as han m:rny other colleges and uni-
versities , a Statement of Rights, Freedoms. and Responsibilities of 
Student• . This st.at rrnrnt, common\~, referrl'd to as the "Studrnt 
Bill of Rights," is printed as an Appendix to the Second Cirruit',: 
majori t~· opinion in this cnse, H ealy v. James, 445 F . 2d, at 1132-1136 
(1971). Pmi Y of t hat statement establishr.• the sta ndards fo r np-
proval of campus organizations and imposes se,·eral basic limitations 
on their campus actiYities : 
''A. Cnre shall be taken in the establishment and organization 
of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsi-
bilities of students will be preserved. 
"B. Student orgnnizations shall submi t a clea r statement of pur-
po~e. cri teria for membrr~hip, rulrs of prorrdurcs and a li~t of 
officers as a condition of inst itu tional recognition. They shall not be 
required to submit a membership list ns a condition of institut ional 
rcco~nition. 
"C. Membership in rampus organizations shall be limited t o 
matriculated studrnts ( da? or evening) at the college. Membership-
shall not be rest ricted b~· race, religion or nationalit~'. The members 
shall haYe sole power to determine orgnniza tion polic~, consistent with 
the regulations of the collrge. 
"D . Each organizntion is free to choose its own adviser. AdYisers 
to organizations sh:1 11 ach·ise but not control the organizations and 
their policies . 
"E. Collrge students :ind student organizations shall have the right 
to examine and discuss all questions of interest to t hem. to express 
opinion publicl)' and pri,·atel)·, and to support causes b~· orderly 
means. The)· ma)· org:rni3r public demonst rations and protest 
gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not ham· 
the right to depri,·c others of the opportunit)' t o speak or be heard , 
t o invade the privac)' of others, to damage the proper t~· of others, 
10 di~ru pt the regular and essential opera tion of t he col lrgr, or to 
in terfere with the rights of others." 
lr" .... , l 
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not be granted to any group that "openly repudiates" 
the College's dedication to academic freedom. 
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems 
for the organization's existence and growth. Its mem-
bers were deprived of the opportunity to place announce-
ments regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in 
the student newspaper; they were precluded from using 
various campus bulletin boards; and-most impor-
tantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus 
facilities for holding meetings. This latter disability 
was brought home to petitioners shortly a.ftBr the Pres-
ident's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice 
calling a meeting to discuss what fu rther action should 
be taken in light of the group's official rejection . The 
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center 
("Devi~ Den") but were disbanded on the President's 
order since nonrecognized groups were not entitled to 
use such facilities.6 
Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ulti-
mately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the 
burden of nonrecognition, petitioners resorted to the 
m'l ?ourts. They filed a suit in the FedF l District=Court 
~ Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief against the President of the College, other admin-
istrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners' 
6 During the meeting petitioners were approached by t\rn of the 
Collr_gc',; dcn n, who ~c1Tecl pet itioner, "·i1 h a mrmornndum from 
the Preside11t stating: 
"Notice has been reccind by this office of a meeting of the 
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrcla.~·-NoYember 6 at 7:00 p. Ill . at 
t he De\·ils' Den.' 
"Such meeting rnny not take place in the Devils Den of the Stu-
dent Center nor in or on :rny other property of the college since the 
C. C. S. C.-S .. D. S. i, not n du!~- rccoµ:ni7. ed rollcgr org:rnization. 
"You are hcreb~0 notified by this action to cease and desist from 
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prima.ry complaint centered on the denial of First Amend-
ment rights of expression and association arising from 
denial of campus recognition. The ca.use was submitted 
imtially on stipulated facts l and, after a short hearing, 
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied pro-
cedural due process because the President had based 
his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant's 
affiliation which "·ere outside the record before him. 
The court concluded that if the President wished to act 
on the basis of material outside the application he must 
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity 
to introduce evidence as to their affiliations. 311 F. 
Supp., at 1276, 1281. While retaining jurisdiction over 
the case, the District Court ordered respondents to hold 
a hearing in order to clarify the several ambiguities sur-
rounding the President's decision. One of the matters to 
be explored was whether the local organization, true to its 
repeated affirmations, was in fact independent of the Na-
tional SDS. Id., at 1282. And if the hearing demon-
strated that the two were not separable, the respondellts 
were instructed that they might then revie"· the "aims 
and philosophy" of the K ationa1 organization. Ibid. 
Pursuant to the court's order, the President desig-
nated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve 
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The 
hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approxi-
mately two hours, added little in terms of objective 
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Peti-
tioners introduced a statement offering to change the 
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS" 
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Con-
necticut State College." They further reaffirmed that 
they would "have no connection whatsoever to the 
structure of an existing national organization." 7 Peti-
7 319 F. Supp ., at 114. The hearing officer, oYcr petitioner;;' ob-
jection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the 
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original appli-
71-452-0PINION 
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tioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty 
adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations 
elsewhere were unaffiliated with any national organiza-
tion. The hearing officer, in addition to introducing 
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Com-
mittee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions 
of a transcript of hearings before the United States 
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee-
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were of-
fered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities. 
had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demon-
strate that there existed a national organization that 
recognized and cooperated with regional and local college-
campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the as-
serted existence of a National SDS, nor did they ques-
tion that it did have a system of affiliations of some 
sort. Their contention was simply that their organiza-
tion would not associate with that net·work. Through-
out the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes. 
What seemed relevant to one appeared completely im-
material to the other. This failure of the hearing to· 
advance the litigation was, at bottom, the consequence 
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considera-
tions that should control the President's ultimate deci-
sion, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing 
section. 
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits, 
the President reaffirmed his prior decision to deny peti-
tioners recognition as a campus organization. The 
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were-
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at 
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the 
orderly process of change" on the campus. 
cation and would be be~1ond the permissible scope of the hearing. 
-wfia'tever the merits of this ruling, ~j;jll in the record re- -
viewed b1:.J he l?l·esiucnt and ,ms relied ou in the sub,:cquent District 
''ourt opinion without reference to its prior exclusion. Ibid. 
10 
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After the President's second statement issued, the case 
then returned to the District Court where it was ordered 
dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal 
requisites of procedural due process had been complied 
with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their 
burden of showing that they could function free from 
the Ka.tional organization, and, third, that the College's 
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an organiza-
tion whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts 
of disruption" did not violate petitioners' associational 
rights. 319 F. Supp. 113. 
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals where, by a t,rn-to-one vote, the District Court's 
judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not 
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the 
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves 
of the due process accorded them and had failed to meet 
their burden of complying with the prevailing stand-
ards for recognition. 445 F . 2d, at 1131-1132. Judge 
Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal 
to address the merits and finding that petitioners had 
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id., 
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the 
reasons that follO\Y, \Ye conclude that the judgment 
of the courts below must be reversed and the case re-
manded for reconsideration. 
II 
At the outset we note that state colleges and universi-
ties are not enclaves immune from the S\Yeep of the First 
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that eith er stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate." T·inker 
"· Des J.1Joines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Jus-
tice Fortas made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights 
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must always be applied "in light of the special charac-
teristics of the ... environment" in the particular case. 
Ibid. And, " ·here state-operated educational institu-
tions are involved, this Court has long recognized "the 
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials, consistent ,Yith fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools." Id .. at 507. Yet, the precedents of 
this Court leave no room for the view that, because of 
the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment pro-
tections should apply ,vith less force on college cam-
puses than in the community at large. Quite to the 
contrary, " [ t] he vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community 
of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 314 U. S. 
479, 487 ( 1960) . The college classroom with its sur-
rounding environs is peculiarly the "market place of 
ideas" and ·ffe break no ne,Y constitutional ground in 
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding aca-
demic freedom. K eyishian Y. Board of R egents, 385 
U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 
U. S. 234, 249-250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Warren ), 262 (1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion). 
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is 
the right of individuals to associate to further their per-
sonal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not ex-
plicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held 
to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and 
petition. See, e. g. , Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
430 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
366 U. S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan 
for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that 
;---.... "'<"'--:::i,....e1uazwit.hout justificationE f official~ col- @ 
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lege organizations burdens or abridges that associa-
tional right. The primary impediment to free associa-
tion flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of 
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate 
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was 
demonstrated in this case when, several days after the 
President's decision ,ms announced, petitioners were not 
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop 
because they were not an approved group. 
Petitioners' associational interests also ,vere circum-
scribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards 
and the school ne"·spaper. If an organization is to re-
main a viable entity in a campus community in which 
ne,v students enter on a regular basis, it must possess 
the means of communicating with these students. More-
over, the organization's ability to participate in the in-
tellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue 
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the 
customary media for communicating with the admin-
istration, faculty members, and other students.8 Such 
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial. 
Respondents and the courts below appear to have 
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this 
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District 
Court concluded that,-'L-
"President James' discretionary action in deny-
s It is unclear on this record whetlwr recognition al~o carric::: "·ith 
it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners' counsel 
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group 
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg.,. 
at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that 
" [ r] ecognition docs not thereby entitle an organization to college· 
financial support." 311 F. Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that, 
at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds, 
and since the record is silent as to the criteria. used in allocating-
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational 
aspect of nonrecognition in this case. 
~ 
71-452-0PINION 
HEALY v. JAMES 13: 
ing this application cannot be legitimately magni-
fied and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable 
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of 
any segment of the college students; neither does 
his action deter in any material way the individual 
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action 
be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or 
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 319' 
F. Supp., at 116. 
In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was 
the "administrative seal of official college respectabil-
ity." 9 Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals 
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "col-
lege's stamp of approval." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. Re-
spondents take that same position here, arguing that 
petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that 
they still may distribute written material off campus,. 
and that they still may meet together informally on 
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS. 
We do not agree with the characterization by the 
courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. We 
may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous 
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 (1958), that the admin-
istration "has taken no direct action . . . to restrict the 
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But 
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct 
interference with fundamental rights. The requirement 
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership 
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect, 
infringement of the members' associational rights. Like--
wise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist 
outside the campus community does not ameliorate sig-
" The.;e stn,tement.s arc in contrast to the fir~t op imon by t he 
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitu-
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nificantly the disabilities imposed by the President's 
action. We are not free to disregard the practical reali-
ties. MR. JUSTICE STE\VAHT has made the salient point: 
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against 
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled 
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v. 
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960) . See 
also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) 
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); Watkins v. 
United States, 354 U . S. 178, 197 (1957). 
The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had 
the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the 
fpllege. 10 While petitioners have not challenged the 
procedural requirement that they file an application 
in conformity ,,·itli'I rules of the College,11 they do 
question the view of the courts belo"· that final rejec-
tion could rest on their failure to convince the admin-
istration that their organization was unaffiliated with 
the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in 
this opinion, we do not consider the issue of affiliation 
to be a controlling one. But apart from any particu-
lar issue, once petitioners had filed an application in 
conformity ,vith college requirements, the burden was 
upon the College administration to justify its decision 
"'-!-1-:'5 F. 2d. at 1131: 319 F. Supp ., at 116. 
11 Thr ~t:11Jd:1nl~ fo r official recognition rrquirr. .ipplicant~ to 
prO\·ide a clear st.itcment of purposes, criteria for membership , rules 
of procedure, and a li,t of officers. Applicants must limit member-
ship to "matriculated students" and ma:v not discriminate on the 
basis of race, religion or nationalit_v. The standards further state 
that groups may "examine and discuss all questions of interest," 
they may conduct demonstrations and uti lize their right of petition , 
but they are prohibited from interfering with the rights of other 
students. See n . 5, supra. Petitioners have not challenged these 
~tnnchrcl., and their rnlidit.>- i~ not, here in qurHion. 
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of rejection. See, e. g. , Law Students Civil Rights R e-
search Council v. TV admond, 401 U. S. 154, 162-163 
( 1971); United States Y. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 
( 1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It 
is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial 
of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to 
petitioners' organization the range of associational activ-
ities described above. While a college has a legitimate 
interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which 
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that 
interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden" 
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness 
of that action. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 
713-716 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v. 
K eefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freedman Y. Mary-
land, 380 U. S. 51 , 57 (1965). 
III 
These fundamental errors-discounting the existence 
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplac-
ing the burden of proof-require that the judgments 
belo"· be reversed. But we are unable to conclude that 
no basis exists upon ·which nonrecognition might be ap-
propriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of 
the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be 
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial 
of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the 
record we conclude that the case should be remanded, 
and, in an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts 
upon reconsideration, it is appropriate to discuss the 
several bases of President James' decision. Four pos-
sible justifications for nonrecognition , an closely related, 
might be derived from the record and his statements. 
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate 
his decision: a fourth , however, has merit. 
16 
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A 
From the outset the controversy in this case has cen-
tered in large measure around the relationship, if any, 
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The 
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its 
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue; 
the court-ordered hearing also was directed primarily 
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners 
and their counsel that the local group ,,vas in fact inde-
pendent of the K ational organization, it is evident that 
President James was significantly influenced by his ap-
prehension that there was a connection. Aware of the 
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with 
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently 
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient justifica-
tion for denying recognition.1 2 
Although this precise issue has not come before the 
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved 
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or de-
nying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's 
association with an unpopular organization. See, e. g. , 
United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 ( 1967); Keyishian 
v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-610 (1967); 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v. 
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961) . In these cases 
it has been established that. "guilt by association alone, 
without [establishing] that an individual's association 
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an im-
permissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment 
rights. United St.ates v. Robel, 389 U. S. , at 265. The 
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing 
affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims 
1" See 11. 4, supra, for the complete text of the Prc~idcnt',, statement .. 
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and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal 
aims.1 3 
Students for a Democratic Society, as conceded by the 
College and the lower courts, is loosely organized, having 
various factions and promoting a number of diverse social 
and political views, only some of which call for unlawful 
action. 14 Not only did petitioners proclaim their com-
plete independence from this organization,15 but they also 
indicated that they shared only some of the beliefs its 
leaders have expressed.rn On this record it is clear that 
the relationship was not an adequate ground for the 
denial of recognition. 
B 
Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with, 
or at least retained an affinity for, National SDS, Presi-
dent James attributed what he believed to be the philos-
ophy of that organization to the local group. He 
1
" In .1-ddition to the cases cited in the text abow,, see also Law 
Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 
164-166 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23, 28 (1971); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United States, 
367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961). 
14 See FBI, Appropriation 59-60 (1972), in which the former Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, states 
that while violent factions have spun off from SDS, its present 
leadership is "critical of bombing and violence." 
15 Petitio11ers asserted their independence both oral!>· :rnd in a 
written submission before the Student Affairs Committee. They re-
stated their nonaffiliation in a formal statement filed prior to the 
court-ordered hearing. The only indication to the contrary is their· 
unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether. But see· 
n. 3, supra. 
16 Representatives of the group stated during the Student Affair,; 
Committee meetings that they did not identify with all of the Na-
tional's statements, but wished simply to "pick ... certain ideas"· 
from that organization. 
18 
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characterized the petitioning group as adhering to "some 
of the major tenets of the national organization," includ-
ing a philosophy of violence and disruption.11 Under-
standably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an 
article signed by President James in an alumni period-
ical, and made a part of the record belovY, he announced 
his mrn·illingness to "sanction an organization that openly 
advocates the destruction of the very ideals and freedoms 
upon "·hich the aca.demic life is founded." He further 
emphasized that the petitioners' "philosophies" were 
"counter to the official policy of the college." 
The mere disagreement of the President \\·ith the 
group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recogni-
tion. As repugnant as these views may have been, 
especially to one with President James' responsibility, 
the mere expression of them would not justify the denial 
of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did 
in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus be-
comes immaterial. The College, acting here as the in-
strumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or 
association simply because it finds the views expressed 
by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black 
put it most simply and clearly: 
"I do not believe that it can be too often repeated 
that the freedoms of speech, press. petition and 
assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must 
be accorded to the ideas "·e hate or sooner or later 
they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." Com-
munist Party,·. Subversive Activities Control Board, 
367 u. s. 1, 137 (1961). 
C 
As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a 
third rationale for President James' decision-beyond 
17 See n. 4, supra. 
1 
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the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to 
emerge. His second statement, issued after the court-
ordered hearing. indicates that he based rejection on 
a conclusion that this particular group would be a "dis-
ruptive influence at CCSC." This language ,vas under-
scored in the second District Court opinion. In fact, 
the Court concluded tha.t the President had determined 
that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus a.ctivities were 
likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC." 319 
F. Supp., at 116. 
If this reason, directed at the organization's activities 
rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by 
the record , this Court's prior decisions would provide 
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition. 
The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the 
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere 
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent la"·less action and ... likely to incite 
or produce such action." Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 
444. 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam opinion). See 
also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232 
(1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 289, 298 (1961); 
Yates Y. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957). In the 
context of the "special characteristics of the school 
environment~' l R the po,Yer of the government to pro-
hibit "la,vless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal 
nature. Also prohibitable are actions " ·hich "materially 
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school." T'inker v. Des J.vf oines Independent Commu-
nity School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational 
activities need not be tolerated where they infringe rea-
sonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially 
interfere v.:ith the opportunity of other students to ob-
tain an education. 
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The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which 
great emphasis was placed by the President, draws pre-
cisely this distinction between advocacy and action . It 
purports to impose no limitations on the right of col-
lege student organizations "to examine and discuss all 
questions of interest to them." But it also states that 
students have no right ( 1) "to deprive others of the op-
portunity to speak or be heard," (2) "to invade the 
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of 
others," ( 4) "to disrupt the regular and essential or:iera-
tion of the colle e" or (5) "to interfere with the rights 
o o ers." rn The Iii between permissible speech and 
impermissible conduct racks the constitutional require-
ment, and if there were an evidential basis to support 
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat 
of material disruption in violation of that command the 
President's decision should be affirmed.~0 
The record, however, offers no substantial basis for 
that conclusion. The only support for the view ex- / A 
pressed by the President, other than the repu~ted . · ,,_ -c-p v f ecf 
affiliation with Kational SDS, is to be found in the r 
rn Seen. 5,. supra. 
00 It, may not be sufficient merely t,o show the existence of a le~iti-
mate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to· 
regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights- as 
nonrecognition does- the State must demonstrate that the action 
taken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and 
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms~ 
rs no greater than ~ssential to the furtherance of that interest.~ '--..,/ 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367,377 (1968). See also NAACP 
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539,546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama 
ex rel . Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record, absent a 
showing of any likelihood of disruption or unwillingne~s to recognize 
reasonable rules governing campus conduct, it is not necessary for 
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related 
and narrow response. 
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ambivalent responses offered by the group's representa-
tives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during 
which they stated that they did not know whether they 
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same man-
ner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses. 
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could 
never "envision ... interrupting a class." Whatever 
force these statements might be thought to have is 
largely dissipated by the following exchange between 
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs 
during the court-ordered hearing: 
"Counsel: I just read the document that you're 
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee 
meeting] and I can't see that there's anything in 
it that intimates that these students contemplate 
any illegal or disruptive practice. 
"Dean: No. There's no question raised to that, 
counsel." 
Dean Judd's remark reaffirms, in accord with the full 
record, that there was no substantial evidence that 
these particular individuals acting together would con-
stitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar 
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted 
little more than the sort of "undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance [ which] is not enough to-
overcome the right of freedom of expression." Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S., at 508. 
D 
These same references in the record to the group's 
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues 
of violence" and ·whether it could ever "envision . . . 
interrupting a class," suggest a fourth possible reason why 
recognition might have been denied to these petitioners. 
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petitioners' unwillingness to be bound by reasonable 
school rules governing conduct. The College's State-
ment of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Stu-
dents, contains, as we have seen, an explicit statement 
with res,pect to campus disruption . The regulation, 
carefully differentiating between advocacy and action, is 
a reasonable one}and petitioners have not questioned 
it directly. "1 Yet their statements raise considerable 
question whether they intend to abide by the prohibi-
tions contained therein. 2 2 
As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the crit-
ica.l line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn 
between advocacy, 1Yhich is entitled to full protection, 
" 1 See 11. 5. supra. 
"" The Court of A )pe:1ls found th:1t petit,ioner, "failed cnndidl_\· 
to respon o inqui s whether they would resort to Yiolenre and 
cli:;;ruption on the CC ... C rmnpus, including interruption of rlni',e.,." 
4--J..5 F. 2d, at 1131. 1''hile pet ii ioner:;' stntRmeuts mn_\· be read ns 
intim:1ting ::i. rejection of ren,onnblc regulntion~ in ndrnnce, 1 here is 
in fact substantinl ambiguity on t,his point. The que~tion~ :1,ked 
by member,:; of the Student Affoirs Committee do not appear to ban 
been propounded ,rith a.n_\· clear di81inction in mind be.h,·ern thnt 
"·hich the pet-itioner, might ndrncn,te n.nd the conduct in whirh 
th\j)might. eng,1ge. ::'\or did the St,udent Aff:1.ir,:; Committee attempt. 
to obt.:.in :1. clarification of the petit ioner~' :1.rnbiguous ans,rers b_\· 
n~king speci.fic:t ll_\' whether the group "·:is willing to :1bide b_\· tlw 
Student Bill of Rights gm·erning a.II campus org,1nizations. 
:\Ioreon:r, this question was not among t.hol'e referred h_\· thr, 
District Court to the admini~tratiYe hearing. and it m1s tlwre ad-
dressed onl_,. taug;entiall:1·. The group mrmber~ who had m:.denf) 
st:.tements before the Student Affair~ Commit,tee did not, testif~· '4 
:.ml their posihon wns not clnrified. Their counsel, "·hose tac-tics 
were characterized as "clisruptiye" by the Court of Appe:ils, elected 
to nmke argumcntat.i\·e st:1.t.ements rather th:rn elicit rcle,·ant 1r~t i-
mon>·· Id., at 1126. Indeed. the District Court's failure to identif~-
t.he que.;:t ion of willingness to a.bide b.\- tJ,e College'~ rul es and regula-
1ions :1s a, signifirnnt subject of inquiry, coupled ,Yit.h the eqnirnra-
t,ion on the part of the group's represent.at iYes, lend support to our 
Yiew that a rem:1nd is nece.,:sa r_\·. 
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and action , which is not. Petitioners may, if they so 
choose, preach the propriety of amending or even doing 
away ,Yith any or all campus regulations. They may 
not, however, undertake to flout these rules. MR. Jus-
TICE BLACKMUN, at the time he was a circuit judge on 
the Eighth Circuit, stated: 
"We . . . hold that a college has the inherent power 
to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has 
the inherent po,rnr properly to discipline; that it 
has power appropriately to protect itself and its 
property; that it ma.y expect that its students ad-
here to generally accepted standards of conduct." 
Esteban Y. Central Mi.ssouri State College, 415 F. 
2d 1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 
965 (1970). 
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regula-
tions ,Yith respect to the time, the place. and the manner 
in which student groups conduct their speech-related 
activities must be respected. 2 'i A college administra-
tion may impose a requirement, such as tfis QJJe Pppa.e:., ?7>"-'f 
~ imposed in this case, that a group seeking official 
recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere 
to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does 
not impose an impermissible condition on the students' 
associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to 
assemble, or to petition for changes in school rules is 
in no sense infringed . It merely constitutes an agree-
ment to conform with reasonable standards, respecting 
conduct. This is a minimal requirement in the interest ~ · 
of the entire academic community, of lity group seek- } 
ing the privilege of official recognition. J , 
M;. e1-y.,,, a.d. v. C. il·y a -5, !f',er~ /.r;._ ) 
"" Srr, e.g., OiY!f"~! Oliieago •. tl.,!;ose,,-g- U. S. -, - (1972): 
Adderley Y. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
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Petitioners have not challenged in this litigation the 
procedural or substantive aspects of the College's require-
ments governing applications for official recognition. 
Although the record is unclear on this point, CCSC may 
have, among its requirements, for recognition, a rule 
that prospective groups affirm that they intend to com-
ply with rea~onable campus regulations. Upon remand 
it should first be determined whether the College recog-
nition procedures contemplate any such requirement. 
If so, it should then be ascertained whether petitioners 
intend to comply. Since we do not have the terms of 
a specific prior affirmation rule before us, we are not 
called on to decide whether any particular formulation 
would or would not prove constitutionally acceptable. 
Assuming the existence of a valid rule, however, we do 
conclude that the benefits of participation in the internal , A 
life of the college community may be denied to any · <Jt. l;c:t, 
group that reserves the right to violate any Acampus " 
rules with which they disagree. 24 , , 
IV 
We think the above discussion establishes the appro-
priate framework for consideration of petitioners' re-
quest for campus recognition. Because respondents 
failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment 
principles, the judgment below approving respondents' 
denial of recognition must be reversed. Since we can-
"
4 In addition to the College administration's broad rulcmaking 
power to assure that the traditional academic atmo~phrre is s:tfe-
guarded, it may also impose sanct,ions on those \\·ho ,-iolat.c tJ1c 
rules. We find, for instance, tl1a.t. the St.udent Affairs Committee's 
admonition to pet.itioners in this case suggests one permis~iblc prac-
tice--recognit.ion, once accorded, may be withdra\\"11 or rnspended 
if pet,itioners fail to respect campus lmL See, e. g., Mississippi Civil 
Liberties Union v. University of Southern Mississippi, Ko. 71-1801 
(CA5 1971); American Civil Liberties Unio11 v. Radford College, 
315 F. Supp. 893 (\VD Va. 1970). 
.,> 
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not conclude from this record that petitioners were will-
ing to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulations, 
we order the case remanded for reconsideration. We note, 
in so holding, that the wide latitude accorded by the Con-
stitution to the freedoms of expression and association is 
not without its costs in terms of the risk to the mainte-
nance of civility and an ordered society. Indeed, this 
latitude often has resulted, on the campus and elsewhere, 
in the infringement of the rights of others. Though we-
deplore the tendency of some to abuse the very constitu-
tional privilges they invoke, and although the infringe-
ment of rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, 
we reaffirm this, Court's dedication to the principles of the 
Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society 
is founded. 
Reversed and remanded_ 
¥· 
~, ff i, 1",, ") 1 ~ /1; 1;; "2 '2-1 '2- 1, 7- r 
~~Aki~---~: T~e ~h;:f ~t,stJ ~~ ,-y-- --- Mr. ul~w . c ~ ~u~~-as 
F\L"E CQ PY Mr . J-..:c v~. SG :2 1•1:;,,'nan Mr . 
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F. Don James et al. Circuit. 
[June - , 1972] 
MR. J usTICE POWELL delivered the opm10n of the 
Court. 
This case, arising out of a denial by a state college 
of official recognition to a group of students who desired 
to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS) , presents this Court with questions re-
quiring the application of ,Yell-established First Amend-
ment principles. While the factual background of this 
particular case raises these constitutional issues in a 
manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only 
infrequently presented to lower fed eral courts, our de-
cision today is governed by existing precedent. 
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the 
academic community, we approach our task with special 
caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, fac-
ulty members, and administrators in an environment free 
from disruptive interference with the educational process. 
We also are mindful of the equally significant interest 
in the widest latitude for free expression and debate 
consonant with the maintenance of order. Where these 
interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made 
binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
strikes the required balance. 
2 
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I 
We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 1969-
1970. A climate of unrest prevailed on many college 
campuses in this country. There had been widespread 
civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by 
the seizure of buildings. vandalism, and arson. Some 
colleges had been shut down altogether, while at others 
files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chap-
ters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic 
force during this period.1 Although the causes of cam-
pus disruption were many and complex, one of the prime 
consequences of such activities was the denial by the 
few of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights 
to the majority of students. Indeed, many of the most 
cherished characteristics long associated with institutions 
of higher learning appeared to be endangered. For-
tunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere 
and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet, 
it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case 
arose. 
Petitioners are students attending Central Connec-
ticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution 
of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook 
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chap-
ter" of Students for a Democratic Society ( SDS ) . Pur-
suant to procedures established by the College, peti-
tioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus 
organization ,vith the Student Affairs Committee, a com-
mittee composed of four students, three faculty members 
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request speci-
fied three purposes for the proposed organization 's exist-
ence. It would provide "a forum of discussion and 
' SPc R eport of the Prr~idellt'~ Conun 'n on C:.i rnpH, Unrest (1970) : 
R eport of the ABA Comm·n on C::unpu~ Go \·'t nnd Student Di~~rnt 
(1970) . 
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self-education for students developing an analysis of 
American society"; it would serve as an "agency for 
integrating thought ,vith action so as to bring about 
constructive changes"; and it would endeavor to pro-
vide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of 
leftist students" with other interested groups on cam-
pus and in the community.2 The Committee, while 
satisfied that the statement of purposes ,va.s clear and 
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the 
relationship between the proposed local group and the 
National SDS organization. In response to inquiries, 
representatives of the proposed organization stated that 
they would not affiliate with any national orga.niza-
tion and that their group would remain "completely 
independent." 
In response to other questions asked by Committee 
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus dis-
ruption, the applicants made the following statements, 
which proved significant during the later stages of these 
proceedi11g~: 
"Q. How would you respond to issues of violence 
as other SDS chapters have? 
"A. Our action would have to be dependent upon 
each issue. 
"Q. Would you use any means possible? 
"A. No I can't say that; would not know untiJ 
we know what the issues are. 
"Q. Could you env1s10n the S. D. S. interrupt--
ing a class? 
"A. Impossible for me to say." 
With this information before it, the Committee re-
2 The statement of purposes is set out in full in the dissenting-
opinion from the deci~ion of the Second Circuit. Healy v. James, 445 
F. 2d 1112, 1136-1137 (1971). 
4 
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quested an additiona.l filing by the applicants, includ-
ing a formal statement regarding affiliations. The 
amended application filed in response stated flatly that 
"CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under 
the dictates of any National organization." 3 At a sec-
ond hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the· 
question of relationship with the National organization 
was raised again. One of the organizers explained that 
the National SDS was divided into several "factional 
groups," that the national-local relationship was a loose 
one, and that the local organization accepted only "cer-
tain ideas" but not all of the National organization's 
aims and philosophies. 
By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately 
approved the application and recommended to the Pres-
ident of the College, Dr. James, that, the organization 
be accorded official recognition. In approving the ap-
plication, the majority indicated that its decision was 
premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should 
be represented on campus and that since the Young 
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the 
Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed 
recognized status, a group should be available with which 
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also• 
noted and relied on the organization's claim of inde-
pendence. Finally, it admonished the organization that 
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's 
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies 
against interference with the privacy of other students 
3 445 F. 2d, at 1137. During the Committee's consideration of 
1ictitioners' appli cation , one of the group's representRtivc" \\'a,i asked 
why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a 
nationally known name. The witness' response was that "the name 
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across, 
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested 
in such to express themselves." 
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or destruction of property. The two dissenting mem-
bers based their reservation primarily on the lack of 
clarity regarding the organization's independence. 
Several days later, the President rejected the Com-
mittee's n:commendation, and issued a statement indi-
cating that petitioners' organization v.-as not to be ac-
corded the benefits of official campus recognition. His 
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the 
margin,4 indicate several reasons for his action. He 
4 The President stated: 
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Af-
fairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the· 
majority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students 
for a Democratic Society, it is my judgment that the statement of 
purpose to form n ]o('al chapter of Students for a Democrntic Societ~· 
carries full and unmistakable adherence to at least ~orne of the 
major tenets of the national organization. loose and dividPd though 
that org:rnization ma~- be. The published aims and philosoph~- of 
the Students for a Democra.tic Society, which include disruption 
and violence, are contrary to the approved policy (by faculty, 
students, and administration) of Central Connecticut State Collegt 
which states : 
"'Students do not have the right to invade the privac~- of others, 
to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and es-
sential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of 
others.' 
"The further statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSG 
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any 
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends to, 
follow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a 
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a 
policy. 
"Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the campus, the freedom 
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms 
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities 
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have 
the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to 
express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by 
orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and pro-
test gatherings and utilize the right of petition'-these are all precious 
6 
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found that the organization's philosophy was antithetical 
to the school's policies,5 and that the group's independ-
ence was doubtful. He concluded that approval should 
freedoms that we cherish and are freedoms on which we stand. To 
approve any organization or individual who joins with an organiza-
tion which openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those 
freedoms and to the apprO\·ed 'Statement on the Rights, Freedom~, 
and Rr;;ponsibilities of Students' at Cen1 ral.'" 
5 In 1969, CCSC adopted, as have many other colleges and uni-
versities, a Sta.tcment of Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of 
Rtudents . This statement , commonly referred to ::is the "Student 
Bill of Rights," is printed as an Appendix to the Rcconcl Circuit's 
majority opinion in this case, Healy v. James, 445 F. 2d, at 1132-1136 
( 1971). Part Y of that statement e~tablishcs t he stancb,rds fo r ap-
proval of campus organizations and imposes several basic limitations 
on their campus activities: 
"A, Care shall be taken in the establishment and organization 
of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsi-
bilities of students will be preserved. 
"B. Student organizations shall submit a clc:ir statement of pur-
pose, criteri :1. for membrrship, rules of proredurrs ::ind a fo t of 
offirers as a condition of institutional recognition. They shall not be 
required to submit a membership list as a condition of inst itutional 
recognition. 
"C. Membership in campus organizations shall be limited to 
mat riculated students (day or evening) at the college. Membership-
shall not be restrict ed by race, religion or nationalit~-- The members 
shall have sole power to determine organization policy consistent with 
the regulations of the college, 
"D, Each organization is free to choose its own adviser. Advisers 
to organizations shall advise but not control the organizations and 
their policies, 
"E. College students and student organizations shall have the right 
to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to express 
opinion public]~· and private!~·, and to support causes b~· orderly 
means, The~· may organizr public demonstrations and protest 
gatherings and utilize the right of pet ition. Students do not have-
the right to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard, 
to invade the prime~• of others, to damage the property of others,. 
10 disrupt the regular and essential operation of the eollcgr , or to 
intrrfere with the rights of others." 
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))Ot be granted to any group that "openly repudiates" 
the College's dedication to academic freedom. 
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems 
for the organization's existence and growth. Its mem-
bers \Vere deprived of the opportunity to place announce-
ments regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in 
the student newspaper; they were precluded from using 
various campus bulletin boards; and-most impor-
tantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus 
facilities for holding meetings. This latter disability 
was brought home to petitioners shortly after the Pres-
ident's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice 
calling a meeting to discuss ,vhat further action should 
be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The 
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center 
("Devil's Den") but were disbanded on the President's 
order since nonrecognized groups were not entitled to 
use such facilities.~ 
Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ulti-
mately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the 
burden of nonrecognition, petitioners resorted to the 
courts. They filed a suit in the Federal District Court 
in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief against the President of the College, other admin-
istrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners' 
6 During the meeting petitioners were approached by two of the 
Coltrgc'.- dc:m, 1\·ho f'CJTed pctitio rH'r,- wirh a mcmor:,ndum from 
the President stating: 
"Notice has been receiYed by this office of a meeting of the 
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrda.y-November 6 at 7 :00 p. m. at 
the Devils' Den.' 
"Such meeting may not take place in the Devils Den of the Stu-
dent Center nor in or on any other property of the college since the 
C. C. S. C.-S .. D. S. if' not a chrl~· recognized rollcgc organization. 
"You are hereb)· notified by this action to cease and desist from 
meeting on the college property." 
8 
71-452-0PINION 
HEALY v. JAMES 
primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amend-
ment rights of expression and association arising from 
denial of campus recognition. The cause was submitted 
initially on stipulated facts and, after a short hearing, 
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied pro-
cedural due process because the President had based 
his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant's 
affiliation which were outside the record before him. 
The court concluded that if the President ,vi.shed to act 
on the basis of material outside the application he must 
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity J 
to introduce evidence as to their affiliations. 311 F. 
Supp., at 1276, 1281. While retaining jurisdiction over 
the case, the District Court ordered respondents to hold 
a hearing in order to clarify the several ambiguities sur-
rounding the President's decision. One of the matters to 
be explored was whether the local organization , true to its 
repeated affirmations, was in fact independent of the Na-
tional SDS. Id., at 1282. And if the hearing demon-
strated that the two were not separable, the respondents 
were instructed that they might then review the "aims 
and philosophy" of the National organization. Ibid. 
Pursuant to the court's order, the President desig-
nated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve 
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The 
hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approxi-
mately two hours, added little in terms of objective 
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Peti-
tioners introduced a statement offering to change the 
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS" 
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Con-
necticut State College." They further reaffirmed that 
they would "have no connection whatsoever to the 
structure of an existing national organization." 7 Peti-
7 319 F. Supp., at 114. The hearing officer, o,-er petitioners' ob-
jection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the· 
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original appli-
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tioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty 
adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations 
elsewhere were unaffiliated with any national organiza-
tion. The hearing officer, in addition to introducing 
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Com-
mittee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions 
of a transcript of hearings before the United States 
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee 
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts ,vere of-
fered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities 
had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demon-
strate that there existed a national organization that 
recognized and cooperated with regional and local college-
campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the as-
serted existence of a National SDS, nor did they ques--
tion that it did have a system of affiliations of some-
sort. Their contention was simply that their organiza-
tion would not associate with that network. Through-
out the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes. 
What seemed relevant to one appeared completely im-
material to the other. This failure of the hearing to 
advance the litigation was, at bottom, the consequence· 
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considera-
tions that should control the President's ultimate deci-
sion, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing· 
section . 
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits, 
the President reaffirmed his prior decision to deny peti-
tioners recognition as a campus organization. The· 
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were 
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at 
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the 
orderly process of change" on the campus. 
cation and would be beyond the permissible scope of the hearing. 
Whatever the merits of this ruling, it was still in the record re--
Yiewcr! by the President and ,ms relied on in the subsequent District 
Court opinion without reference to its prior exclusion. Ibid. 
10 
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After the President's second statement issued, the case 
then returned to the District Court where it was ordered 
dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal 
requisites of procedural due process had been complied 
with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their 
burden of showing that they could function free from 
the Kational organization, and, third, that the College's 
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an organiza-
tion whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts 
of disruption" did not violate petitioners' associa.tional 
rights. 319 F. Supp. 113. 
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals where, by a two-to-one vote, the District Court's 
judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not 
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the 
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves 
of the due process accorded them and had failed to meet 
their burden of complying with the prevailing stand-
ards for recognition. 445 F. 2d, at 1131-1132. Judge 
Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal 
to address the merits and finding that petitioners had 
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id., 
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the 
reasons that follow, ,ye conclude that the judgment 
of the courts below must be reversed and the case re-
nrn.nded for reconsideration. 
II 
At the outset we note that state colleges and universi-f 
ties are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First 
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse ga.te." Tinker 
Y. Des J.11 oines Independent Community School D1·s-
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Jus-
tice Fort.as made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rjghts 
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must always be applied "in light of the special charac-
teristics of the . .. environment" in the particular case. 
Ibid. And, "·here state-operated educational institu-
tions are involved, this Court has long recognized "the 
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools." Id., at 507. Yet, the precedents of 
this Court leave no room for the vie"· that, because of 
the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment pro-
tections should apply ,vith less force on college cam-
puses than in the community at large. Quite to the 
contrary, " [ t] he vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is no,Yhere more vital than in the community 
of American schools." Shelton v. 'Pucker, 314 U. S. 
479, 487 (1960) . The college classroom with its sur-
rounding environs is peculiarly the "market place of 
ideas" and n·e break no ncn· constitutional ground in 
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding aca-
demic freedom . K ey-ishian Y. Board of Regents, 385 
U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 
U. S. 234, 249-250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Warren) , 262 (1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion) . 
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is 
the right of individuals to associate to further their per-
sonal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not ex-
plicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held 
to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and 
petition. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
430 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
36G U. S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan 
for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that 
denial without justification of official recognition to col-
12 
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lege organizations burdens or abridges that associa-
tional right. The primary impediment to free associa-
tion flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of 
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate 
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition v.:as 
demonstrated in this case when, several days after the 
President's decision was announced, petitioners were not 
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop 
because they were not an approved group. 
Petitioners' associational interests also were circum-
scribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards 
and the school newspaper. If an organization is to re-
main a viable entity in a campus community in which 
new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess 
the means of communicating with these students. More-
over, the organization's ability to participate in the in-
tellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue 
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the 
customary media for communicating with the admin-
istration, faculty members, and other students.8 Such 
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial. 
Respondents and the courts below appear to have 
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this 
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District 
Court concluded that, 
"President James' discretionary action in deny-
-~~~ 
' It is uncle:ir on this record whether recognition also carries with 
it a right to seek funds from the school budget . Petitioners' counsel 
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group 
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg., 
at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that 
"[r]ecognition does not thereby entitle an organization to college 
financial support." 311 F. Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that, 
at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds, 
and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating 
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational 
aspect of nonrecognition in this case. 
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ing this application cannot be legitimately magni-
fied and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable 
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of 
any segment of the college students; neither does 
his action deter in any material way the individual 
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action 
be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or 
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 319' 
F. Supp., at 116. 
In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was 
the "administrative seal of official college respectabil-
ity." 9 Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals, 
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "col-
lege's stamp of approval." 445 F . 2d, at 1131. Re-
spondents take that same position here, arguing that 
petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that 
they still may distribute written material off campus,. 
and that they still may meet together informally on 
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS. 
We do not agree with the characterization by the 
courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. We 
may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous 
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 (1958), that the admin-
istration "has taken no direct action . . . to restrict the 
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But 
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct 
interference with fundamental rights. The requirement 
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership 
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect, 
infringement of the members' associational rights. Like-
wise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist 
outside the campus community does not ameliorate sig-
u These sta tements are in contrast to the fir~t opinion by t he 
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitu-
tional significance of petitioners' claim. 311 F. Supp ., at 1280-1282._ 
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nificantly the disabilities imposed by the President's 
action. We are not free to disregard the practical reali-
ties. MR. JusTICE STEWART has made the salient point: 
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against 
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled 
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates Y. 
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 ( 1960). See 
also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,263 (1957) 
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); ·watkins v. 
United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 ( 1957) . 
The opinions below also as.5umed that petitioners had 
the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the 
college.10 While petitioners have not cha.llenged the) 
procedural requirement that they file an application 
in conformity "·ith rules of the College,1 1 they do 
question the view of the courts below that final rejec-
tion could rest on their failure to convince the admin-
istration that their organization was unaffiliated with 
the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in 
this opinion, we do not consider the issue of affiliation 
to be a controlling one. But a.part from any particu-
lar issue, once petitioners had filed an application in 
conformity ,,·ith college requirements, the burden was 
upon the College administration t-o justify its decision 
'" 445 F. 2d. nt 11:n : 319 F . Supp. , [ It 116. 
11 The ~t:rnrlnnb fo r officinl rcrogn ition rerp1 irc nppli r·:rnt~ to 
provide a dear st:itement of purposes, cri teria for membership , rules 
of procedure, and a list of officers. Applicants must limit member-
ship to "matriculated students" and ma~, not discriminate on t he 
basis of race, religion or nat ionality. The standa rds further state 
that groups may "examine and discuss all questions of interest," 
they may conduct demonst rations and utilize their right of petition, 
but they are prohibited from interfering with the rights of other 
students. See n. 5, supra. Petitioners haYe not challenged these 
~ta11dard.3 and their ntlidity is not, hPre in qucstio11. I 
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of rejection. See, e. g., Law Students Civil Rights Re-
search Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 162-163 
(1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 
(1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It 
is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial 
of recognition ,ms a form of prior restraint, denying to 
petitioners' organization the range of associational activ-
ities described above. While a college has a legitimate 
interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which 
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that 
interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden" 
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness 
of that action. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 
713-716 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v. 
Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freednian v. J.vlary-
land, 380 U. S. 51, 57 (1965). 
III 
These fundamental errors-discounting the existence 
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplac-
ing the burden of proof-require that the judgments 
below be reversed. But we are unable to conclude that 
no basis exists upon which nonrecognition might be ap-
propriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of 
the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be 
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial 
of recognition . Because of this ambiguous state of the 
record we conclude that the case should be remanded, 
and. in an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts 
upon reconsideration, it is a.ppropriate to discuss the 
several bases of President James' decision. Four pos-
sible justifications for nonrecognition, all closely related, 
might be derived from the record and his statements. 
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate 
his decision: a fourth, however, has merit. 
16 
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A 
From the outset the controversy in this case has cen-
tered in large measure around the relationship, if any, 
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The 
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its 
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue; 
the court-ordered hearing also was directed primarily 
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners 
and their counsel that the local group was in fact inde-
pendent of the Kational organization, it is evident that 
President James was significantly influenced by his ap-
prehension that there was a connection. A ware of the 
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with 
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently 
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient justifica-
tion for denying recognition.1 2 
Although this precise issue has not come before the 
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved 
government-al action imposing criminal sanctions or de-
nying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's 
association ·with an unpopular organization. See, e. g., 
United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian 
v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605- 610 (1967); 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v. 
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961) . In these cases 
it has been established that "guilt by association alone, 
without [ establishing] that an individual's association 
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an im-
permissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment 
rights. United St.ates v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The 
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing 
affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims 
1
" Seen. 4, supra, for the complete text of the Prc~idcnt'R st/\tement .. 
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and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal , • 
aims.1 3 -~
Students for a Democratic Society, as conceded by the 
College and the lower courts, is loosely organized, having 
various factions and promoting a number of diverse social 
and political views, only some of which call for unlawful 
action.14 Not only did, petitioners procla.im their com-
plete independence from tllis organization,15 but they also 
indicated that they shared only some of the beliefs its 
leaders have expressed.16 On this record it is clear that 
the relationship was not an adequate ground for the 
denial of recognition. 
B 
Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with, 
or at least retained an affinity for, National SDS, Presi-
dent James attributed what he believed to be the philos-
ophy of that organization to the local group. He 
1
" In :cddition to the cases cited in the text above,. see also Law 
Students Civil R ights R esearch Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 
164-166 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23, 28 (1971); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Noto v. Unit ed States, 
367 U. S. 290, 299-300 (1961). 
14 See FBI, Appropriation 59-60 (1972), in which the fo rmer Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J . Edgar Hoover, states 
that while violent factions have spun off from SDS, its present 
leadership is "critical of bombing and violence." 
1 5 Petitioners a.%erted their independence both orally and in a 
written submission before the Student Affairs Committee. They re-
stated their nonaffi liation in a formal statement filed prior to the 
court-ordered hearing. The only indication to the contrary is their 
unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether. But see 
n. 3, supra. 
J G Representatives of the group stated during the Student Affair~ 
Committee meetings that they did not identify with all of the Na-
tional's statements, but wished simply to "pick ... certain ideas"· 
from that organization. 
18 
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characterized the petitioning group as adhering to "some 
of the major tenets of the national organization," includ-
ing a philosophy of violence and disruption.17 Under-
standably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an 
article signed by President James in an alumni period-
ical, and made a part of the record below, he announced 
his unwillingness to "sanction an organization that openly 
advocates the destruction of the very ideals and freedoms 
upon which the academic life is founded." He further \ 
emphasized that the petitioners' "philosophies" were J 
"counter to the official policy of the college." 
The mere disagreement of the President "·ith the 
group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recogni-
tion. As repugnant as these views may have been, 
especially to one with President James' responsibility, 
the mere expression of them would not justify the denial 
of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did 
in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus be-
comes immaterial The College, acting here as the in-
strumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or 
association simply because it finds the views expressed 
by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black 
put it most simply and clearly: 
"I do not believe that it can be too often repeated 
that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and 
assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must 
be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later 
they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." Com-
munist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 
367 U. S. 1, 137 (1961). 
C 
As the litigation progressed in the District Court. a 
third rationale for President James' decision-beyond 
17 See n. 4, supra. 
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the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to 
emerge. His second statement, issued after the court-
ordered hearing, indicates that he based rejection on 
a conclusion that this particular group would be a "dis-
ruptive influence at CCSC." This la.nguage was under-
scored in the second District Court opinion. In fact, 
the Court concluded tha.t the President had determined 
that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus activities were 
likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC." 319 
F. Supp., at 116. 
If this reason, directed at the organization's activities 
rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by 
the record, this Court's prior decisions would provide 
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition. 
The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the 
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere 
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite 
or produce such action." Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 
444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiani opinion). See 
also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232 
(1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 289,298 (1961); 
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957). In the 
context of the "special characteristics of the school 
environment." 1 8 the power of the government to pro-
hibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal 
nature. Also prohibitable are actions which "materially 
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school." Tinker v. Des Af oines Independent Commu-
nity School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational 
activities need not be tolerated "·here they infringe rea-
sonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially 
interfere with the opportunity of other students to ob-
tain an education. 
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The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon ,Yhich 
great emphasis was placed by the President, dra,Ys pre-
cisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It 
purports to impose no limitations on the right of col-
lege student organizations "to examine and discuss all 
questions of interest to them." But it also states that 
students have no right ( 1) "to deprive others of the op-
portunity to speak or be heard," (2) "to invade the 
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of 
others," ( 4) "to disrupt the regular and essential opera-
tion of the college," or ( 5) "to interfere with the rights 
of others." rn The lin bet,veen permissible speech and 
impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional require-
ment, and if there were an evidential basis to support 
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat 
of material disruption in violation of that command the 
President's decision should be affirmed.20 
The record, however, offers no substantial basis for 
that conclusion. The only support for the vie"· ex-
pressed by the President, other than the repudiated 
affiliation with National SDS, is to be found in the 
rn See n. 5;. supra. 
~
0 It may not be sufficient merely t,o show the. exis1cnce of a legiti-
mate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to 
regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights-as 
nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate that the action 
faken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and 
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than essential to the furtheran ce of that interest. 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U . S. 367,377 (1968). See also NAACP· 
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Cornrn'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama 
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record, absent a 
showing of any likelihood of disruption or unwillingness to recog11izc 
reasonable rules go\·erning campus conduct, it is not necessary for 
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related 
and narrow response. 
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ambivalent responses offered by the group's representa-
tives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during 
which they stated that they did not know whether they 
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same man-
ner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses. 
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could 
never "envision ... interrupting a class." Whatever 
force these statements might be thought to have is 
largely dissipated by the following exchange between 
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs 
during the court-ordered hearing: 
"Counsel: I just read the document that you're 
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee 
meeting] and I can't see that there's anything in 
it that intimates that these students contemplate 
any illegal or disruptive practice. 
"Dean: No. There's no question raised to that. 
counsel." 
Dean Judd's remark reaffirms, in accord with the full 
record, that there was no substantial evidence that 
these particular individuals acting together would con-
stitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar 
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted 
little more than the sort of "undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance [ which] is not enough to• 
overcome t.he right of freedom of expression." Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S., at 508. 
D 
These same references in the record to the group's 
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues 
of violence" and whether it could ever "envision . . . 
interrupting a class," suggest a fourth possible reason why 
recognition might have been denied to these petitioners. 
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petitioners ' unwillingness to be bound by reasonable 
school rules governing conduct. The College's State-
ment of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Stu-
dents, contains, as we have seen, an explicit statement 
with res,pect to campus disruption. The regulation, 
carefully differentiating between advocacy and action , is 
a reasonable one and petitioners have not questioned 
it directly. 2 1 Yet their statements raise considerable 
question whether they intend to abide by the prohibi-
tions contained therein. 22 
As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the crit-
ica.l line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn 
bet,rnen advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, 
~, See n. 5. supra . 
22 The Court of ApJ)c:i!s found that p C't it,ionn~ "fo iled candidly 
to respond to inquire~ whether the)· ,rnuld resort to ,·iolence and 
disruption on the CCSC campus, in cluding interrupt.ion of clas~e'3." 
4+5 F . 2d, n.t 1131. While iwtit ioners' stat,cmen ts nta)· be rc': td as 
intimating a rejection of rea,-onable regulat ions in advance, t here is. 
in fa ct substantial ambiguity on t,his point. The que~t ion~ 11,ked 
b)' members of the Student Affairs Committee do not nppea r to have 
been propounded wit.h a.n)' clea r distinction in mind between t hat 
whirh the pet-itioner~ migh t adrncat e aml t he rondnrt in " ·hieh 
lh>·e might engage. Kor did t he St,udent Affo.irs Committee attemp t 
to obt.ain a. clarifica tion of the petitioners' ambiguous ans,H•rs b)· 
a,king specifica ll y whether the group " ·as w.illing to abide by tlw 
Student Bill of Rights go,·erning all campus orga niza6ons. 
:\Ioreon !S, t his question was not among t.J10se referred by the 
Diot rict Com t to t he admini~trative hea ri ng . and it m1s there ad-
drc.,scd onl y tangenti::tll)·. The grou p member:; who had m:1 dc 
statements before the Student Affairs Committee did not, t estify 
and their posibon was not cla.rified. Their counsel, whose taet irs 
were characterized as "disrupt.iye" b_,· the Court of Appea l,: , elec ted 
to ma.ke argumentat,i,·e sta.t.cmcnts rather t ha.n elicit. rclc,·a nt t e,:t.i-
mon)·. Id ., at 1126. Indeed. the District Court's fa ilme to ident ify 
t he que.st ion of willingnc.~s to abide b>' the College'~ rul es and regula-
t ion:, as a significant subject of inquir>·, coupled wit,h t he equiYora -
t, ion on the pa rt of the group's represent:,ti,·es , !cud support to our 
Yic,1· tkit a remand is necessa ry. 
__) 
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and action , which is not. Petitioners may, if they so 
choose, preach the propriety of amending or even doing 
away with any or all campus regulations. They may 
not. however, undertake to flout these rules. MR. Jus-
TICE BLACKMUN, at the time he ,rns a circuit judge on 
the Eighth Circuit, stated: 
"We . .. hold that a college has the inherent po,rnr 
to promulgate rules and regula.tions; that it has 
the inherent power properly to discipline; that it 
has power appropriately to protect itself and its 
property; that it ma.y expect that its students ad-
here to generally accepted standards of conduct." 
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F_ 
2d 1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S_ 
965 (1970). 
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regula-
tions with respect to the time, the place. a,nd the manner 
in which student groups conduct their speech-related 
activities must be respected.~" A college administra.-
tion may impose a requirement, such as the one appar-
ently imposed in this case, that a group seeking official 
recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere 
to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does 
not impose an impermissible condition on the students' 
associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to 
assemble, or to petition for changes in school rules is 
in no sense infringed. It merely constitutes an agree-
ment to conform with reasonable standards, respecting 
conduct. This is a minimal requirement in the interest 
of the entire academic community, of any group seek-
ing the privilege of official recognition. 
"" Sec, e. g., City of Chicago Y. Mosley, - U. S. - , - (1972) ; 
Adderley Y. Florido, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (19GG) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 53G, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
;355 U. S. 293,397 (1961). 
24 
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Petitioners have not challenged in this litigation the 
procedural or substantive aspects of the College's require-
ments governing applications for official recognition. 
Although the record is unclear on this point, CCSC may 
have, among its requirements for recognition, a rule 
that prospective groups affirm that they intend to com-
ply with reasonable campus regulations. Upon remand 
it should first be determined whether the College recog-
nition procedures contemplate any such requirement. 
If so, it should then be ascertained whether petitioners 
intend to comply. Since we do not haNe the terms of 
a specific prior affirmation rule before us, we are not 
called on to decide whether any particular formulation 
would or would not prove constitutionally acceptable. 
Assuming the existence of a valid rule, however, we do 
conclude that the benefits of participation in the internal 
life of the college community may be denied to any 
group that reserves the right to violate any campus 
rules with which they disagree. 24 
IV 
We think the above discussion establishes the appro-
priate framew·ork for consideration of petitioners' re-
quest for campus recognition . Because respondents 
failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment 
principles, the judgment below approving respondents' 
denial of recognition must be reversed. Since we can-
24 In addition to tJ10 College administration 's broad rulcmnking 
1,ower to assure that t he t raditional academic atmosphere is safe-
guarded, it may also impose sa.nct,ions on those \vho violnte the 
rules. We find, for irntance, that t he Studen t Affa irs Commi ttee's 
admonit ion to petitioners in this case suggests one permissible prac-
tice--recognit,ion, once accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended 
if pet,itioners fail t o respect campus law. See, e. g. , M ississippi Civil 
Libert ies Union v. University of Southern Mississippi, No. 71-1S01 
(CA5 1971) ; American Civil Liberties Uni011 v. Radford College, 
315 F. Supp. 893 CWD Va. 1970) . 
r 
71--452-0PINION 
HEALY v. JAMES 25, 
not conclude from this record that petitioners were will-, 
ing to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulations, 
we order the case remanded for reconsideration. We noter 
in so holding, that the wide latitude accorded by the Con-
stitution to the freedoms of expression and association is 
not without its costs in terms of the risk to the mainte-
nance of civility and an ordered society. Indeed, this 
latitude often has resulted, on the campus and elsewhere, 
in the infringement of the rights of others. Though we 
deplore the tendency of some to abuse the very constitu-
tional privilges they invoke, and although the infringe-
ment of rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, 
we reaffirm this, Court's dedication to the principles of the 
Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society 
is founded. 
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This case, arising out of a denial by a state college 
of official recognition to a group of students who desired 
to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS) , presents this Court with questions re-
quiring the application of well-established First Amend-
ment principles. While the factual background of this 
particular case raises these constitutional issues in a 
manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only 
infrequently presented to lower federal courts, our de-
cision today is governed by existing precedent. 
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the· 
academic community, we approach our task with special 
caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, fac-
ulty members, and administrators in an environment free· 
from disruptive interference with the educatio~process. 
We also are mindful of the equally significant interest 
in the widest latitude for free expression and debate 
consonant with the maintenance of order. Where these 
interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made 
binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
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I 
We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 1969-
1970. A climate of unrest prevailed on many college 
campuses in this country. There had been widespread 
civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by 
the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson. Some 
colleges had been shut down altogether, while a.t others 
files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chap-
ters on some of those campuses had been a ca.talytic 
force during this period.1 Although the causes of cam-
pus disruption ,vere many and complex, one of the prime 
consequences of such activities v,·as the denial by the 
few of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights 
to the majority of students. Indeed, many of the most 
cherished characteristics long associated with institutions 
of higher learning appeared to be endangered. For-
tunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere 
and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet, 
it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case 
arose. 
Petitioners are students attending Central Connec-
ticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution 
of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook 
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chap-
ter" of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Pur-
suant to procedures established by the College, peti-
tioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus 
organization with the Student Affairs Cornmitt,ee, a com-
mittee composed of four students. three faculty members 
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request speci-
fied three purposes for the proposed organization 's exist-
ence. It would provide "a forum of discussion and 
1 See R e1>ort of the Prc:0 id cnt ':0 Comm'n on C:1mp11~ U nrest (1970) ; 
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self-education for students developing an analysis of 
American society"; it \Yould serve as an "agency for 
integrating thought with action so as to bring about 
constructive changes"; and it would endeavor to pro-
vide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of 
leftist students" with other interested groups on cam-
pus and in the community." The Committee, while 
satisfied that the statement of purposes was clear and 
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the 
relationship between the proposed local group and the 
National SDS organization. In response to inquiries, 
represe11tatives of the proposed organization stated that 
they would not affiliate ,Yith any national organiza-
tion and that their group would remain "completely 
independent." 
In response to other questions asked by Committee 
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus dis~ 
ruption , the applicants made the following statements, 
which proved significant during the later stages of these 
proceedings: 
"Q. How \\·ould you respond to issues of violence 
as other SDS chapters ha.ve? 
"A. Our action would have to be dependent upon 
each issue. 
"Q. Would you use any means possible? 
"A. No I can't say that; would not kno\\· until 
,rn know what the issues are. 
"Q. Could you env1s10n the S. D. S. interrupt-
ing a class? 
"A. Impossible for me to say." 
With this information before it, the Committee re-
2 The statement of purposes is set out in full in the dissenting 
opinion from the decision of the Second Circuit. H ealy v. James, 445 
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quested an additional filing by the applicants, includ-
ing a formal statement regarding affiliations. The 
amended application filed in response stated flatly that 
"CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under 
the dictates of any National organization." 3 At a sec-
ond hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the 
question of relationship with the National organization 
was raised again . One of the organizers explained that 
the National SDS was divided into several "factional 
groups," that the national-local relationship was a loose 
one, and that the local organization accepted only "cer-
tain ideas" but not all of the National organization's 
aims and philosophies. 
By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately 
approved the application and recommended to the Pres-
ident of the z,llege, Dr. James, that the organization 
be accorded official recognition. In approving the ap-
plication, the majority indicated that its decision was 
premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should 
be represented on campus and that since the Young 
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the 
Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed 
recognized status, a group should be available with which 
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also 
noted and relied on the organization's claim of inde-
pendence. Finally, it admonished the organization that 
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's 
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies 
against interference with the privacy of other students 
3 445 F. 2d, at 1137. During the Committee's consideration of 
petitione~application, one of the group's representatives was asked 
why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a 
nationally known name. The witness' response was that "the name 
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across, 
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested 
in such to express themselves." 
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or destruction of property. The two dissenting mem-
bers based their reservation primarily on the lack of 
clarity regarding the organization's independence. 
Several days later, the President rejected the Com-
mittee's ncommendation, and issued a statement indi-
cating that petitioners' organization ,rns not to be ac-
corded the benefits of official campus recognition. His 
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the 
margin ,4 indicate several reasons for his action. He 
4 The President stated: 
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Af-
fairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the 
majority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students 
for a Democrat ic Society, it is my judgment that the sta tement of 
purpose to form a local chapter of Student~ for a Democra tic Society 
carries full and unmistakable adherence to at lca~t some of the 
major tenets of the national organization , loose and divided though 
t hat organization may be. The published aims and philosophy of 
the Students for a Democratic Society, which include disruption 
and violence, are contrary to the approved policy (by faculty, 
students, and administ ration) of Central Connect icut Sta te Colleg0 
which states : 
" 'Students do not have the right to invade the privac~· of others, 
to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and es--
sential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of 
others.' 
"The furt her statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSG 
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictat es of any 
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends to, 
follow the established policy of t he college, they wish to become a 
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a 
policy. 
"Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the campus, the freedom 
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms 
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities 
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have 
the righ t to examine and discuss all questions of interest t o them, to 
express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by 
orderly means. They ffi[l y organize public demonst rations 1111d pro-
test gatherings and utilize the right of petit ion'-these are all precious 
G 
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found that the organization's philosophy was antithetical 
to the school's policies ." and that the group's independ-
ence was doubtful. He concluded that approval should 
freedoms that we cherish and arc freedoms on which we stand. To 
approve any organization or individual who joins with an organiza-
tion which openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those 
freedoms and to the apprond 'Stntemcnt on the Rights, Freedoms, 
alld Re~ponsibilities of Student,' at Ceunal.'" 
5 In 1969, CCSC adopted. ns ham mrtn)· other colleges and uni-
versities , a Stntement of Right8, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of 
Students . This sfaternent , commonly referred to as tJ1e '·Srncle11t 
Bill of Rights," i~ printed ns an Appendix to the Second Circuit's 
majority opinion in this cnse, H ealy v. Jam es, 445 F. 2d, at 1132-1136 
(1971). Part Y of that sratement e~t;1bli~he,: the ~1nuclarcb for ap-
proval of cnmpus orgnnizations nncl imposes se,·eral basic limitations 
on their cnmpus activitie~: 
"A. Care shall be taken in the establishment and organizntion 
of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsi-
bilities of students ,viii be presernd. 
"R. Student org:rnizations sha]l submit a clear statement of pur-
pose, criteria. for membership, rulili of procedures and a li~t of 
officers as a condition of institutionnl recognition. They shall not be 
required to submit n membership list ns a condition of institutional 
recognition. 
"C. Membership in campus organizntions shall be limited to 
matriculated students (clay or enning) at the college. Membership 
shall not be rcstrirt ed by race. religion or nationality. The members 
shall have sole power to determine orgnnizntion policy consistent with 
the regulations of the college. 
"D. Ench orgnnization is free to choose its own adviser. Ad,·isers 
to organizations shall arh·i~e but not control the organizntions and 
their policies. 
"E. College students and student organizations shall have the right 
to examine and discuss all que~tions of interest to them. to express 
opinion publicly and prirntely, and to support causes by orderly 
means. They ma)· orgnnize 1mblic dcmonstra tions n nd protest 
gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not have 
the right to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be hea rd, 
to invade the prirncy of others, to damage the property of others, 
to disrupt the regular and es~ential operation of the collrge, or to 
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~~~ not be granted to any group . · "openly repudiates" 
the _,£,Ollege's dedication to academic freedom. 
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems 
for the organization's existence and growth. Its mem-
bers were deprived of the opportunity to place announce-
ments regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in 
the student newspaper; they were precluded from using 
various campus bulletin boards; and-most impor-
tantly-non recognition barred them from using campus 
facilities for holdillg meetings. This latter disability 
was brought home to petitioners shortly after the Pres-
ident's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice 
calling a meeting to discuss what further action should 
be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The 
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center 
("Devil's Den") but "·ere disbanded on the President's 
order since nonrecognized groups were not entitled to 
use such facilities.a 
Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ulti-
mately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the 
burden of nonrecognition. petitioners resorted to the 
courts. They filed a suit in the Federal District Court 
in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief against the President of the .,,gpllege, other admin-
istrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners' 
6 During the meeting petitioners were appronched by two of the 
~1llrge's deans who sen-eel petitioners with n memorandum from 
the Prrsident stntin!).": 
"Kotice ha s been rccci\·ed by this office of a meeting of the 
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrclay-Non•mber 6 at 7:00 p. m. at, 
the Devils' Den.' 
"Such meeting mn~· not take place in the DeYils Den of the Stu-
dent Center nor in or on an~· other propert)' of the college since the 
C. C. S. a.-S. D. S. is not a dul~· recognized college organization. 
"You are hereby notified by this action to cease and desist from 
meeting on the college propert~·-" 
.a, 
. } .r't. ,. \)\ 
}.l)~a> \_ ~Y' 
\~o tY'f. '7:~~~ • s" 
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primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amend-
ment rights of expression and association arising from 
denial of campus recognition. The cause was submitted 
initially on stipulated facts and, after a short hearing, 
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied pro-
cedural due process because the President had based 
his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant's 
affiliation which "·ere outside the record before him. 
The court concluded that if the President wished to act 
on the basis of material outside the application he must 
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity 
~311 F. Supp., at 1276. 1281. While re-
taining jurisdiction over the case. the District Court 
ordered respondents to hold a hearing in order to clarify 
the several ambiguities surrounding the President's de-
c1s10n. One of the matters to be explored was ·whether 
the local organization, true to its repeated affirmations, 
was in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at 
1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two 
were not separable, the respondents were instructed that 
they might then review the "aims and philosophy" of 
the National organization. Ibid. 
Pursuant to the court's order, the President desig-
nated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve 
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The 
hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approxi-
mately two hours, added little in terms of objective 
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Peti-
tioners introduced a statement offering to change the 
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS" 
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Con-
necticut State College." They further reaffirmed that 
they would "have no connection whatsoever to the 
structure of an existing national organization." 7 Peti-
7 319 F. Supp. , a t 114. The hearing offi cer, oYcr rietitioncr~' ob-
jection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the· 
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original appli-
-i; 
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tioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty 
adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations 
else·where were unaffiliated ;.vith any national organiza-
tion . The hearing officer, in addition to introducing· 
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Com-
mittee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions 
of a transcript of hearings before the United States 
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee 
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were of-
fered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities 
had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demon-
strate that there existed a national organization. that 
recognized and cooperated with regional and local college 
campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the as-
serted existence of a National SDS, nor did they ques-
tion that it did have a system of affiliations of some 
sort. Their contention. was simply that their organiza-
tion would not associate with that network. Through-
out the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes. 
What seemed relevant to one appea.red completely im-
material to the other. This failure of the hearing to 
advance the litigation was, at- bottom, the con.sequence 
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considera-
tions that should control the President's ultimate deci-
sion, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing 
section. 
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits, 
the President reaffirmed his prior decision. to deny peti-
tioners't recognition as a campus organization. The 
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were 
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at 
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the· 
orderly process of change" on the campus. 
cation and would be beyond t lie permissible scope of t he hearing .. 
WhateYer the merits of this ruling, it was still in the record re-
Yiewcd by the President and \\·as relied on in the subsequent Dist rict 
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After the President's second statement issued, the case 
then returned to the District Court where it was ordered 
dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal 
requisites of procedural due process had been complied 
with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their 
burden of showing that they could function free from 
the National organization, and, third, that the ~ollege's 
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an of.ganiza-
tion whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts 
of disruption" did not viola.te petitioners' associational 
rights. 319 F. Supp. 113. 
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals where, by a two-to-one vote, the District Court's 
judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not 
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the 
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves 
of the due process accorded them and had failed to meet 
their burden of complying with the prevailing stand-
ards for recognition. 445 F. 2d, at 1131-1132. Judge 
Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal 
to address the merits and finding that pet,itioners had 
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id., 
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the 
reasons ~ follow, we conclude that the judgment 
of the courts belo,v must be reversed and the case re-
manded for reconsidera.tion. 
II J" t o..4C. 
At the outset \Ye note that{colleges and universi ties 
are not enclaves immune from the s,Yeep of the First 
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker 
,·. Des Moines Independent Community School D1·s-
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course. as Mr. Jus-
tice Fort.as made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights 
il-452-0PIKION 
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must always be applied "in light of the special charac-
teristics of the ... environment" in the particular case. 
Ibid. And, " ·here state-operated educational institu-
tions are involved, this Court has long recognized "the 
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials, consistent with fundamental / 
constitutional safeguards. to prescribe and control con- _, Ye,. 1'"") 1 n 6 
duct in the schools." Id., at 507. ~ precedents of 
this Court leave no room for the view that, because of 
the ackno,Yledged need for order, First Amendment pro-
tections should apply with less force on college cam-
puses than in the community at large. Quite to the 
contrary, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community 
of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 314 U. S. 
479, 487 ( 1960) . The college classroom ,Yith its sur-
rnunding environs is peculiarly the "market place of 
ideas" and ,rn break no new constitutional ground in 
reaffirming this Xation 's dedication to safeguarding aca-
demic freedom. K eyishian v. Board of R egents, 385 
U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 
U. S. 234, 249-250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Jus-
tice \Varren ) . 262 ( 1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion ). 
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is 
the right of individuals to associate to further their per-
sonal beliefs. "\Vhile the freedom of association is not ex-
plicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held 
to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and 
petition. See, e. g., Bafrd v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
430 ( 1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
366 U. S. 293. 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
PaUerson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan 
for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that 
denial ,Yithout justification of official recognition to col-
71-452-0PIKION 
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,_,e organizations burdens or abridges that associa-
--1 tional right~ The primary impediment to free associa-
tion flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of 
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate 
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was 
demonstrated in this case when, several days after the 
President's decision was announced, petitioners were not 
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop 
because they were not an approved group. 
'11 
Petitioners' associational interests also were circum-
scribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards 
and the school newspaper. If an organization is to re-
main a viable entity in a. campus community in which 
new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess 
the means of communicating with these students. More-
over, the organization 's ability to participate in the in-
tellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue 
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the 
customary media for communicating with the admin-
istration, faculty members, and other students. 9 Such 
impediments cannot be vie\Yed as insubstantial. 
11 It i~ unclear on this record whet.her recognition :-d.,o ca rries wi1h 
it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners' counsel 
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group 
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg., 
~.tz- -t;;J_ , •.. ,. /4,'r, 
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Respondents and the courts below appear to have 
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this 
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District 
Court concluded that, 
"President James' discretionary action in deny-
ing this application cannot be legitimately magni-
fied and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable-
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of 
any segment of the college students; neither does 
his action deter in any material way the individual 
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action 
be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or 
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 319 
F. Supp., at 116. 
In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was 
the "administrative seal of official college respectabil-
ity." rn Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals 
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "col-
lege's stamp of approval." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. Re--
spondents take that same position here, arguing that 
petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that 
they still may distribute written material off campus, 
and that they still may meet together informally on 
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS. 
We do not agree with the characterization by the-
courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. ViT e 
at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, stat es flatly that 
"[r] ecognition does not thereby entitle an organization to college 
financial support ." 311 F. Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that, 
at the least, recognit ion only entitles a group to apply for funds, 
and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating 
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational 
aspect of nonrecognition in this case. 
rn These statements are in contrast to t11e first opinion by the 
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the consti tu-
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may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous 
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 ( 1958), that the admin-
istration "has taken no direct a.ction ... to restrict the 
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But 
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct 
interference \Yith fundamental rights. The requirement 
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership 
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect, 
infringement of the members' associational rights. Like-
wise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist 
outside the campus cornrnunity does not ameliorate sig-
nificantly the disabilities imposed by the President's 
action. We are not free to disregard the practical reali-
ties. MR. JuSTICE STEWART has made the salient point: 
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against 
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled 
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v. 
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960) . See 
also Sweezy v. New Harnpshire, 354 U.S. 234. 263 (1957) 
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); Watkins v. 
United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 (1957). 
The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had 
the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the -----:-- 11 
_£..ollege.n While petitioners have <1-0+ challe111 e:dl Nie. 
we1e t'l'Opelly l€Qlfl.PO!!l tlil....fmg an application in J I 
formity \Yith the fQOis91108r rules of the 3.ollegc."' p 1-0CC (Ira., 1-e3v1re -
-::::::. 7nG7J I- rha..f- rhe1 "4-l-5 F. 2d, at 1131: 319 F. Supp. , at llG. f "I 
12 The 3tandards for official rerogllition require applirant8 to I I G 
pro\·ide a clear st:itement of purposes, criteria fo r membership, rules'-----.:-------
of procedure, and a li~t of officers. Applicants must limit member-
ship to "matriculated students" and ma>· not discriminate on the 
basis of race, religion or nationalit_v. The standards further state 
that groups may "examine and discuss all questions of interest," 
they may conduct demonst rations and utilize their right of petition, 
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~u<iU~l~ the view of the courts below that final rejec-
tion could rest on their failure to convince the admin-
istration that their organization was unaffiliated with 
the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in 
this opinion, we do not consider the issue of affiliation 
to be a controlling one. But apart from any particu-
lar issue, once petitioners had filed an application in 
conformity " ·ith college requirements, the burden was 
upon the Q9llege administration to justify its decision 
of rejectio11. See, e. g., Law Studen~SCivil Rights Re-
search Council Y. H' admo11d, 401 U. S. 154. 162--163 
( 1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376- 377 
(1968); Speiser Y. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It 
is to be remembered that the effect of the j;.ollege's denial 
of recognition vvas a form of prior restraint, denying to 
petitioners' organization the range of associational activ-
ities described above. While a college has a legitimate 
interest in preventing disruption on the campus. which 
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that 
interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden" 
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness 
of that action. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 
713-716 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v. 
K eefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U. S. 51, 57 (1965). 
III 
These fundamental errors-discounting the existence 
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplac-
ing the burden of proof-require that the judgments 
below be reversed. But ,rn are unable to conclude that 
no basis exists upon which nonrecognition might be ap-
propriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of 
students. See n. 5, supra. Petitioners haYc not challenged these 
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the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be 
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial 
of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the 
record we conclude that the case should be remanded, 
and~ in an effort to provide guidance to the lo,rnr courts 
upo'.'n reconsideration,/.\ it is appropriate to discuss the 
several bases of Pre~ident James' decision. Four pos-
sible justifications for nonrecognition , all closely related, 
might be derived from the record and his statements. 
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate 
his decision: a fourth, however, has merit. 
A 
From the outset the controversy in this case has cen-
tered in large measure around the relationship, if any, 
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The 
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its 
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue; 
the court-ordered hearing also was directed primarily 
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners 
and their counsel that the local group was in fact inde-
pendent of the National organization, it is evident that 
President James was significantly influenced by his ap-
prehension that there ,:vas a connection. Aware of the 
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with 
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently 
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient just-ifica-
tion for denying recognition. 1 3 
Although this precise issue has not come before the 
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved 
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or de-
nying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's 
association with an unpopular organization . See, e. g., 
United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); K eyishian 
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v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-610 (1967); 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v. 
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961). In these cases 
it has been established that "guilt by association alone, 
without [establishing] that an individual's associat.ion 
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an im-
permissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment 
rights. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The 
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing 
affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims 
and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal 
SDS, as conceded by th~ College and the lower courts, 
is loosely organized, having various factions and pro-
moting a number of diverse social and political views, 
only some of which call for unlawful action.15 Not only 
did petitioners proclaim their complete independence 
from this organization ,rn but they also indicated that 
they shared only some of the beliefs its leaders have 
14 Tn addibon to the cases cit ed in the text above, see also Law 
.Students Civil Rights R esearch Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 
164-166 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23 , 28 (1971); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U . S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United States, 
367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961). 
15 Sec FBI , Appropriation 59-60 (1972) , in which the former Di-
roctor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, states 
that while violent factions haYe spun off from SDS, its present 
leadership is "critical of bombing and ,·iolence." 
1<; P etitioners asserted their independence both ornll~· nnd in a 
written submission before the Student Affairs Committee. They re-
stated their nonaffiliation in a formal statement filed prior to the 
court-ordered hearing. The only indication to the contrary is their 
unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether. But see 








18 HEALY v. JA:\1ES 
expressed." On this record it is clear that the rela-
tionship was not an adequate ground for the denial 
of recognition. 
B 
Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with, 
or at least retained an affinity for , X ational SDS, Presi-
dent James attributed what he believed to be the philos-
ophy of that organizatiou to the local group. He 
characterized the petitioning group as adhering to "some 
of the major tenets of the national organization," iuclud-
ing a philosophy of violence and disruption_, s Under-
standably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an 
article signed by President James in an alumni period-
ical, and made a part of the record below, he announced 
his unwillingness to "sanction an organization that openly ~ 
advocates the destruction of the very ideals ~1d freedoms,,,../ U::J/ 
upon ,,-hich the academic life is founded. " 
The mere disagreement of the President with the 
group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recogni-
tion. As repugnant as these views may ha,·e been , 
especially to one with President James' responsibility, 
the mere expression of them would not justify the denial 
of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did 
in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus be-
comes immaterial. The ~ollege, acting here as the in-
strumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or 
association simply because it finds the views expressed 
by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black 
put it most simply and clearly: 
"I do not believe that it can be too of ten repeated 
that the freedoms of speech. press. petition and 
"H eprr.-rn t:1tin'~ of tbr group ~t:1trcl dmi11iJ; tbr Studrnt Affairs 
Committee meetings that they did not iclentif~- with all of the Ka-
tiona l's statements . but wished simply to "pick ... certain ideas" 
from that organization. 
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assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must 
be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later 
they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." Com-
munist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 
367 U. S. 1, 137 (1061). 
C 
As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a 
third rationale for President James' decision-beyond 
the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to 
emerge. His second statement, issued after the court-
ordered a•;;h·~iui'ltrati1:,C hearing, indicates that he based 
rejection on a conclusion that this particular group would 
be a "disruptive influence at CCSC." This language 
was underscored in the second District Court opinion. 
In fact, the Court concluded that the President had 
determined that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus a.ctiv-
ities were likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC." 
319 F. Supp., at 116. 
If this reason , directed at the organization's activities 
rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by 
the record, this Court's prior decisions would provide 
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition. 
The critical line heretofore dra.wn for determining the 
permissibility of regulation is the line bet"·een mere 
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent la\\·less action and ... likely to incite 
or produce such action." Bra.ndenberg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 
444. 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam, opinion). See 
also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232 
(1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 289,298 (1961); 
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 ( 1957). In the 
context of the "special characteristics of the school 
environment," 19 the power of the government to pro-
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hibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal 
nature. Also prohibitable are actions which "materially 
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school." Tinker v. Des ivloines Independent Commu-
nity School D~trict, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational 
activities need not be tolerated ,vhere they infringe rea-
sonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially 
interfere with the opportunity of other students to ob-
tain an education. 
The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which 
great emphasis 'rrns placed by the President, dra,Ys pre-
cisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It 
purports to impose no limitations on the right of col-
lege student organizations "to examine and discuss all 
questions of interest to them." But it also states that 
students have no right (1) "to deprive others of the op-
portunity to speak or be heard," (2) "to invade the 
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of 
others," ( 4) "to disrupt the regular and essential opera-
tion of the college," or (5) "to interfere with the rights 
of others." 20 The line between permissible speech and 
impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional require-
ment, and if there were an evidential basis to support 
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat 
of material disruption in violation of that command the 
President's decision should be affirmed.21 
00 Seen. 5; supra . 
21 It may not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a legiti-
mate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to 
regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights-as 
nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate that the action 
taken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and 
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest. 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968). See also NAACP 
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Floiida 
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The record, however, offers no substantial basis for 
that conclusion. The only support for the view ex-
pressed by the President other than the repudiated 
affiliation with ~ is to be found in the 
ambivalent responses offered by the group's representa-
tives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during 
which they stated that they did not know whether they 
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same man-
ner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses. 
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could 
never "envision ... interrupting a class." Whatever 
force these statements might be thought to have is 
largely dissipated by the following exchange between 
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs 
during the court-ordered hearing: 
"Counsel: I just read the document that you're 
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee 
meeting] a.nd I can't see that there's anything in 
it that intimates that these students contemplate 
any illegal or disruptive practice. 
"Dean: No. There's no question raised to that, 
counsel." 
Dean Judd's remark reaffirms, in accord with the full 
record, that there was no substantial evidence that 
these particular individuals acting together would con-
stitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar 
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted 
little more than the sort of "undifferentiated fear ~ ~ 
apprehension of disturbance [ which] is not enough to 
overcome the right of freedom of expression." Tinker 
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record , absent a 
showing of any likelihood of disruption or unwillingness to recognize 
reasonable rules goyerning campus conduct, it is not necessary for 
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related 
and narrow response. 
22 
71-452-0PINION 
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Y. D es Moines Independent Community School D£s-
trict, 393 U. S., at 508. 
D - -
These same references in the record to the group's 
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues 
of violence" and whether it could ever "envision . . . 
interrupting a class," suggest a fourth possible reason 
why recognition might have been denied to these peti-
tioners. These remarks might well have been read as 
announcing petitioners' unwillingness to be bound by 
reasonable school rules governing conduct.2 " The col-
lege's Statement of Rights. Freedoms and Responsibili-
ties of Students, contains, as we have seen, an explicit 
statement with respect to campus disruption. The reg-
ulation , carefully differentiating between advocacy and 
action, is a reasonable one and petitioners have not 
questioned it directly.~ 3 Yet their statements raise con-
siderable question whether they intend to abide by the 
prohibitions contained therein.~4 
"" The Court -of Appml~ re:1d thr rrrord :1~ shmrinp: that peti-
tioners "failed c:1ndidl~- to rr~pond to inquiries whether they would 
resort to Yiolence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including 
interruption of classes." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. While petitioner's 
statements may be read :1s intimating a rejection of reasonable col-
lege regulations in adrnnre . there is substanti:11 ambiguity on this 
point. Petitioners appea r to ronrede the appropriateness of those-
standards and the Student Affairs Committee never asked specifically 
whether they were willing to abide b_\· these rules. Moreoyer, the 
issue was not among those referred by the District Court to the 
administrafo·e hearing and neither party pursued this problem at 
t hat time. Indeed, the failure of the District Court to identify this 
as a significant subject of inquiry Jen~ support for the view that 
remand is necessnry. 
"'1 Sre n . 5. supra. 
"' :Kor did tho admini~t r.1tin• lw;1ring clarify this (]ne~lion. It " ·ns 
then addressed only tangcnt inlly; the petitioners who had given the-





HEALY v. JAMES 23 
As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the 
critical line for First Amendment purposes must be 
drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full pro-
tection, and action, which is not. Petitioners may, if 
they so choose, preach the propriety of amending or 
even doing away with any or all campus regulations. 
They may not, however, undertake to flaunt these rules. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, at the time he ,ms a circuit 
judge on the Eighth Circuit, stated: 
"We ... hold that a college has the inherent power 
to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has 
the inherent power properly to discipline; that it 
has power appropriately to protect itself and its 
property; that it may expect that its students adhere 
to generally accepted standards of conduct." Es-
teban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d 
1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965 
(1970). 
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regula-
tions with respect to the time, the place, and the manner 
in which student groups conduct their speech-related 
activities must be respected.~5 A college administration 
may impose a requirement, such as the one apparently 
imposed in this case, that a group seeking official recog-
nition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to rea-
sonable campus law. Such a requirement does not 
impose an impermissible condition on the students' as-
sociational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to as-
to clarify their position; and their counsel, whose tactics were char-
acterized as "disruptive" by the Court of Appeals, elected to make 
argumentative statements rather than elicit relevant testimony. 445 
F. 2d, at 1126. 
~" See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Mosley, - U.S.-, - (19,2); 
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U. S. 536, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
366 U.S. 293,397 (1961). 
=/ 
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semble, or to petition for changes in school rules is in 
no sense infringed. It merely constitutes an agreement 
to conform with reasonable standards respecting con-
duct. This is a minimal requirement, in the interest 
of the entire academic community, of any group seek-
ing the privilege of official recognition . 
'f5":"m ·rn-e-ques.tion-.,~1etlrer-these --pe titimrn 
p;;~ 
(i) ent thr-eat to campus order, we conclude be denied the benefit-IS of partici-pat"l." in the internal 
life of the colle~~'f-0rl .i:~ and it becomes 
clear that~uoners reserve the right to viol 
:!( i 
IV 
We think the above discussion establishes the appro-
priate framework for consideration of petitioners' re-
quest for campus recognition. Because respondents 
failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment 
principles, the judgment below approving respondents' 
denial of recognition must be reversed. Since we can-
not conclude from this record that petitioners J:l,i@t thlfc. w ~ i- c 
threshgld r'ilquir01H:ent dZf willing~to abide by reason-
able campus rules and regulation5i-eMOO~ 
df!mt :Qi.U ef ~ ,i,~loi,t~' ,ye order the case remanded for 
reconsideration. We note. in so holding. that the wide 
latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms 
"" In addition to the £._ollcge admini.,trntion's broad rnlcmaking 
power to assure thnt thif traditional ar::idemic ntmospherc is safe-
guarded, it may nlso im ose sanctions on those "·ho Yiolate the rules. ; ha.. t-
We find, for instance, the Student airs ommittee's admonition to 
petitioners in this cnse to SJJ!!f!...__One permissible pra.cticc-recognk:_ ~ (J"/ 3 es+ $ 
tion, once accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners 
fail to respect campus law. Sec, e. g., Mississippi Civil Liberties 
Union Y. University of Southern iliississipJJi, No. 71-1801 (CA5 
1971) ; American Civil Liberties Union Y. Radford College, 315 F. 
Supp. 893 (WD Va . 1970). 
- ·• 
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of expression and association is not without its costs 
in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and 
an ordered society. Indeed, this latitude often has re-
sulted, on the campus and elsewhere, in the infringe-
ment of the rights of others. Though we deplore the 
tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional priv-
ileges they invoke, and although the infringement of 
rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, we 
reaffirm this Court's dedication to the principles of the 
Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society 
is founded. 
Reversed and remanded. 
